fbpx

In re Knight

In re: JAMES EDWARDS KNIGHT, Debtor.

CASE NO. 91-30264-BKC-RAM CHAPTER 7

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

164 B.R. 3721994 Bankr. LEXIS 192Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P75,78930 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 16187 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 381

 February 22, 1994, Decided

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: A creditor filed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption with respect to his interests in trusts created by his parents. The court considered the issue to be whether the trust interests were property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.S. § 541.

OVERVIEW: The debtor’s mother’s trust named him and his sister as beneficiaries after his mother’s life estate. His father’s trust had been divided into two parts at the father’s death. His mother held absolute discretion over the funds in Part A. The provisions in Part B were the same as in the mother’s trust. There were no spendthrift provisions in the trusts. The parties stipulated that the father’s Part A trust was not property of the bankruptcy estate. The court held that the fact that the debtor’s interests in the Part B trust and his mother’s trust were contingent upon his surviving her did not prevent them from being included in the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(a)(1) evidenced a congressional intent to include all legally recognizable interests, including contingent interests. The contingent nature of the debtor’s interests went to a determination of the value to be includible in the estate. The trusts could be modified only with the consent of the debtor, and the court assumed for purposes of valuation that he would not elect to terminate his own interest.

OUTCOME: The court held that the debtor’s interests in his mother’s trust and in the Part B trust created by his father were property of the bankruptcy estate.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

 

Bankruptcy Law > Estate Property > Content

[HN1] Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a)(1), defines property of the estate broadly to include all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Code has eliminated a requirement that the debtor be able to transfer the interest or that his creditors by some means must be able to reach it. By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time.

Bankruptcy Law > Case Administration > Examiners, Officers & Trustees > Postpetition Transactions

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Estates Created by Trusts & Wills > Future Interests > General Overview

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview

[HN2] For purposes of valuing a beneficiary’s future interest in the corpus of a trust, a court assumes that a beneficiary would not elect to terminate his or her own interest.

 

Bankruptcy Law > Estate Property > Content

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Estates Created by Trusts & Wills > Future Interests > General Overview

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > General Overview

[HN3] The discretionary right to invade principal affects the value of a debtor’s interests as beneficiary of trusts but it does not render them worthless. Similarly, the fact that the debtor must outlive the life beneficiary in order to obtain his share of the trust principal also does not immunize the interest from becoming property of the estate.

 

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Estates Created by Trusts & Wills > General Overview

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Spendthrift Trusts > Exclusion From Bankruptcy Estate

Real Property Law > Estates > Present Estates > Life Estates

[HN4] A contingent remainder is an interest that is alienable and subject to seizure under applicable New York law. Absent any spendthrift provisions which would exclude the interest under 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(c)(2), the debtor’s interests, a 50 percent remainder interest in a trust subject to a life tenancy, are alienable interests that pass to the bankruptcy trustee upon the filing of a bankruptcy case.

 

Bankruptcy Law > Estate Property > Content

[HN5] There is a material difference between an interest which may be unilaterally extinguished by a grantor and an interest which may be defeated by some condition subsequent. In the former case, there is no interest of value which passes to the estate. In the latter, the value is affected by the possibility of future events which may reduce or eliminate the interest, but the interest has value as of the petition date which can and does pass to the Trustee.

COUNSEL:  [**1]  For GIAC Leasing: Robert L. Young, Esq., CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL, SMITH & CUTLER, P.A., Orlando, Florida.

For Debtor: Leslie G. Cloyd, Esq., ACKERMAN, BAKST, CLOYD & SCHERER, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida.

JUDGES: MARK

OPINION BY: ROBERT A. MARK

OPINION

[*373] SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION DETERMINING ESTATE’S INTEREST IN TRUSTS

The Debtor in this Chapter 7 case scheduled certain property described as contingent unvested interests in various trusts. These trust interests were scheduled as exempt. GIAC Leasing Corporation (“Creditor”) filed an objection to the claim of exemption. Although framed as an objection to exemptions because of the form in which the Debtor listed these interests, the issue is whether the trust interests are property of the estate.

After consideration of the arguments presented in written memoranda and in oral argument and after review of the trust documents, the Court scheduled a hearing on October 20, 1993, to announce its ruling. This Supplemental Memorandum Opinion incorporates and supersedes the findings and conclusions stated on the record on that day.

The Court concludes that the Debtor’s interests in the Dorothy E. Knight Trust and Part B of the Charles E. Knight Trust are [**2]  property of the estate; the Debtor’s interest in Part A of the Charles E. Knight Trust is not estate. property.

 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Debtor, James Edwards Knight, is the son of Charles E. Knight and Dorothy E. Knight. The interests at issue are the Debtor’s interest in the Dorothy E. Knight Trust (the “Dorothy Trust”) established on October 1, 1937 and the Debtor’s interest in the Charles E. Knight Trust (the “Charles Trust”) established on January 2, 1946. Upon the death of Charles, the Charles Trust was divided into Part A and Part B as described below.

The Dorothy Trust

The Dorothy Trust terminates upon the death of Dorothy who was 90 years old as of the petition date. At her death, under Section 4 of the trust, the principal will be distributed equally to the Debtor and his sister, if they are alive. If the Debtor predeceases his mother, his share will be distributed to his children.

Since 1965, the Debtor’s sister and Dorothy have served as co-trustees of the trust. Prior to the filing of his Chapter 7 case, the Debtor had been receiving some income distributions from this trust pursuant to Section 3, which provides that income “may be paid from time to time in equal [**3]  or unequal proportions” to Dorothy, the Debtor or his sister.

[*374]  Two other provisions of the trust are relevant to the Court’s analysis. First, the trust may be amended only by the consent of all three trustees. Second, Section 12 of the trust grants the trustees the right to invade principal during Dorothy’s lifetime “in the discretion of the trustees.” According to a supplemental letter submitted by Debtor’s counsel on May 19, 1992, the Dorothy Trust has a value of approximately $ 885,000.00.

The Charles Trust

The Charles Trust, created in 1946 and amended in 1965, was divided, by its terms, into two parts when Charles died. The Debtor, his sister and Dorothy are also co-trustees of this trust.

Dorothy is entitled to receive all of the income from the Part A Trust during her life. At her death, the principal of the Part A Trust will be distributed pursuant to a power of appointment exercisable by Dorothy in her will. The Creditor concedes that the Debtor has no present or future interest in Part A of the Charles Trust, since Dorothy has absolute discretion as to naming him as a beneficiary.

Part B of the Charles Trust is at issue. The Charles Part B Trust provides for Dorothy to [**4]  receive income during her lifetime with the principal to be distributed equally to the Debtor and his sister if they are alive, just like the principal of the Dorothy Trust. Also like the Dorothy Trust, Section 12 of the Charles Part B Trust provides for invasion of the principal during Dorothy’s lifetime. Unlike the invasion of principal provision in the Dorothy Trust, the provisions in the Charles Part B Trust are both more specific and mandatory as follows:

Section 12. Payments By the Trustees.

During the lifetime of CHARLES E. KNIGHT the Trustees shall pay and distribute any portion of this Trust as CHARLES E. KNIGHT may direct by notice in writing to the Trustees. Further, the Trustees shall pay and distribute unto CHARLES E. KNIGHT and/or DOROTHY E. KNIGHT at any time during the duration of this Trust so much of the principal thereof as shall be necessary to keep and maintain CHARLES E. KNIGHT and/or DOROTHY E. KNIGHT in the standard of living to which he and/or she may be accustomed, and/or to provide for his and/or her medical care.

 

The Charles Part B Trust had a value of $ 1,545,000 as of May 19, 1992.

DISCUSSION

[HN1] Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines [**5]  property of the estate broadly to include “all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Code has eliminated a requirement that the debtor be able to transfer the interest or that his creditors by some means must be able to reach it.  In re Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time.  Id. at 1425citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175-76 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6136.

The Debtor argues that he has no vested right to any portion of the principal of the Dorothy Trust unless three contingencies occur: (1) The Debtor survives Dorothy; (2) Dorothy does not amend the trust interest so as to exclude the Debtor as a beneficiary; and (3) the trustees do not consume the entire principal by paying it to Dorothy or other beneficiaries as they may in their discretion do under Section 12 of the  [**6]  trust instrument. The Debtor similarly argues that he has no right to the principal of the Charles Part B Trust unless he survives his mother and the corpus is not consumed by distributions to Dorothy during her lifetime.

The Debtor is wrong as to Dorothy’s unilateral ability to amend the Dorothy Trust to eliminate his interest. Dorothy certainly has absolute discretion as to the Charles Part A Trust, but she may not amend the Dorothy Trust to exclude the Debtor without the consent of the other trustees. The Debtor’s consent to his exclusion post-petition would constitute an unlawful post-petition transfer of property of the estate under § 549 of the  [*375]  Code. Moreover, [HN2] for purposes of valuing a beneficiary’s future interest in the corpus of a trust, the Court assumes that a beneficiary would not elect to terminate his or her own interest.

The trustees in their discretion could distribute principal and consume some or all of the trust principal in both the Dorothy Trust and the Charles Part B Trust prior to Dorothy’s death. [HN3] This discretionary right to invade principal affects the value of the interests but it does not render them worthless. Similarly, the fact that the Debtor must  [**7]  outlive Dorothy in order to obtain his share of the trust principal also does not immunize the interest from becoming property of the estate. See In re Kreiss, 72 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (debtor’s contingent remainder interest in trust was property of the estate). In short, the Debtor’s interests in the Dorothy Trust and the Charles Part B Trust had value as of the petition date and are therefore property of the estate.

Three well reasoned bankruptcy cases support the Court’s conclusion.  In re Newman, 88 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. C.D.Ill. 1987)In re Kreiss, 72 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)In re Dias, 37 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D.Idaho 1984).

In Kreiss, the debtor held a 50% remainder interest in a trust subject to a life tenancy. The court held that this equitable interest, [HN4] a contingent remainder, is an interest that is alienable and subject to seizure under applicable New York law. The same reasoning would apply to both trust interests in this case. Absent any spendthrift provisions which would exclude the interests under § 541(c)(2), the Debtor’s interests [**8]  in both the Dorothy Trust and Charles Part B Trust are alienable interests that passed to the bankruptcy trustee upon the filing of this bankruptcy case.

In Newman, the Debtor trust beneficiary was entitled to distribution of the trust principal at the age of 50. The court observed that the broad definition of property of the estate in § 541 includes interests that are strictly contingent. 88 Bankr. at 192citing In re Brown, 734 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1984). The court held that the debtor’s interest in the trust was property of the estate. As in this case, the contingency merely affects the value of the property interest; it does not prevent the property from becoming property of the estate.  Newman, 88 Bankr. at 192.

In Dias, the court had to determine whether the debtor’s one-third equitable interest in the corpus of a trust was property of the estate. The debtor, who was 23 when the petition was filed, was entitled to her share when she reached age 25. The court noted that the debtor’s interest, though contingent or subject to divestment, was alienable by her on the petition date. The  [**9]  court found that the contingency reduced the value of the interest but that “the interest was not so remote or speculative as to have no value,” 37 Bankr. at 587, and was thus property of the estate.

The cases and arguments relied upon by the Debtor either interpret the more restrictive definition of property under the Bankruptcy Act or are old state court decisions finding certain property interests to be beyond the reach of creditors under state law. See e.g., In re Martin, 47 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1931)Howbert v. Cauthorn, 100 Va. 649, 42 S.E. 683 (1902)Kenwood Trust & Savings Bank v. Palmer, 285 Ill. 552, 121 N.E. 186 (1918)1

 

1    Under the broad definition of property of the estate in § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, it no longer is necessary for an interest to be transferable or leviable to become property of the estate. Nevertheless, under Florida law, even uncertain future interests in land or other property may be alienated and may be subject to execution. See Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1948)Croom v. Ocala Plumbing and Electric Company, 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (Fla. 1911).

[**10]  The Debtor’s reliance on In re Hicks, 22 Bankr. 243 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1982) is also misplaced. In that case, the trust instrument gave the debtor’s mother a power of appointment giving her absolute discretion in determining whether the debtor would receive any portion of the trust corpus. As of the bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s mother had not exercised the power of appointment. The court found that it could not compel the exercise of a discretionary power of appointment  [*376]  and held that the debtor had no interest that passed to the bankruptcy trustee.

The facts and holding in Hicks are consistent with the facts and holding here as to the Charles Part A Trust. As in Hicks, Mrs. Knight has the power of appointment as to the corpus of the Part A Trust. As such, the Debtor’s interest in the Part A Trust is too remote to have value and does not constitute property of the estate. 2

 

2    The Hicks decision also supports this Court’s holding that the potential income distributions from the Dorothy Trust are not property of the estate since the Debtor has no ability to compel payment of these discretionary distributions. See also, In re Dias, 37 Bankr. at 586, in which the court held that discretionary support distributions were not property of the estate.

[**11]  The facts in Hicks are readily distinguishable from the facts presented in the Dorothy Trust and Charles Part B Trust. [HN5] There is a material difference between an interest which may be unilaterally extinguished by a grantor and an interest which may be defeated by some condition subsequent. In the former case, there is no interest of value which passes to the estate. In the latter, the value is affected by the possibility of future events which may reduce or eliminate the interest, but the interest has value as of the petition date which can and does pass to the Trustee.

There is language in Hicks suggesting that a contingent remainder is not property of the estate.  22 Bankr. at 245. While Hicks is correct on its facts because the interest there was subject to a discretionary power of appointment just like the interest in the Charles Part A Trust here, this court does not accept Hicks as authority that all contingent interests are excluded from the estate. Such an overly broad proposition would be inconsistent with § 541 of the Code and contrary to the holdings in Newman, Kreiss and Diascited favorably by the Court.

Other cases cited [**12]  by the Debtor dealing with contingent trust interests have ruled against the trustee on § 541(c)(2) grounds, finding that the interest was subject to enforceable spendthrift provisions.See, e.g., In re Davis, 110 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1989)Horsley v. Maher, 89 Bankr. 51 (D.S.D 1988). There are no spendthrift provisions in the Knight Trusts that would trigger application of the § 541(c)(2) exception.

 

VALUE OF ESTATE’S INTEREST

The possibility of divestment does not render the trust interests without value as of the filing date. The possibility of divestment by virtue of the Debtor predeceasing Dorothy and the possibility of reduction in the trust corpora, by virtue of distributions prior to her death, do affect the value of the interests. Thus, the estate is not entitled to simply receive one half of the principal of each trust as of the filing date. Instead, the value which passes to the estate is the hypothetical value of the trust interests if they had been seized by creditors or sold by the Debtor as of the date of his Chapter 7 petition. See In re Dias, supra, 37 Bankr. at 587.  [**13]  If the parties are unable to agree on the value of the trust interests, the Court will conduct a further evidentiary hearing.

 

CONCLUSION

The Court has analyzed the trust interests in this case in view of the broad scope of § 541 and the absence of any spendthrift restrictions which would protect the interests from passing to the trustee upon the filing of the bankruptcy case. The Court has also distinguished between interests that are so remote as to be without value because, for example, they depend upon the exercise of a power of appointment, and interests such as the ones here, in which the Debtor is a named beneficiary whose rights may be affected by the occurrence of some future conditions.

The trust interests here are of sufficient certainty to render the interests property of the estate. Thus, the Debtor’s interests in the Dorothy Trust and the Charles Part B Trust are deemed to be property of the estate subject to liquidation by the Trustee. The Debtor’s interest in the income from the Dorothy Trust and his potential interest in the Charles Part A Trust are too remote to have value and are thus not property interests which the Trustee may administer.

A separate order will [**14]  be issued in accordance [*377]  with this Opinion. 3

 

3    Pursuant to findings and conclusions announced on the record on October 20, 1993, the Court entered its Order Determining Certain Trust Interests to be Property of the Estate on November 10, 1993. The Debtor’s Motion for Rehearing of that Order is denied in a separate Order entered in conjunction with this Supplemental Opinion.

DATED, this 22nd day of February, 1994.

ROBERT A. MARK, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Cooley v. Cooley

Mary Paula Cooley v. Timothy Cooley

No. 10445

Appellate Court of Connecticut

32 Conn. App. 152; 628 A.2d 608; 1993 Conn. App. LEXIS 338

March 22, 1993, Argued

July 20, 1993, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford and tried to the court, Goldstein, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross appealed to this court.

DISPOSITION: Reversed in part; further proceedings.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In an action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford (Connecticut) and tried to the court, judgment was granted dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief. Plaintiff wife appealed and defendant husband cross-appealed.

OVERVIEW: The wife appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) excluded her from a share in a trust, (2) ordered nonmodifiable, time limited periodic alimony, and (3) ordered financial awards. The husband cross appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) assigned the principal of a trust and (2) apportioned personal property. On appeal, the court held that because the husband, having only a limited power of appointment, had no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the appointive assets of one trust, no portion of those assets could be included in the marital estate. The trial court properly refused to order the husband to exercise his limited power of appointment and properly concluded that the wife was not entitled a share of the one trust. The court found that the financial awards were within the parameters of the trial court’s broad discretion and made in accordance with the law and the evidence. Lastly, for nearly the same reasons that the court concluded that the wife was not entitled to a share in the one trust, it concluded that she as not entitled to a share in a second trust.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment as to the financial orders and remanded the case for further proceedings.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Interpretation

[HN1] The issue of intent as it relates to the interpretation of a trust instrument is to be determined by examination of the language of the trust instrument itself and not by extrinsic evidence of actual intent. The construction of a trust instrument presents a question of law to be determined in the light of facts that are found by the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable. Where the issue presented concerns the court’s legal conclusion regarding intent of the settlor as expressed solely in the language of the trust created, a reviewing court must decide that issue by determining de novo whether that language supports the court’s conclusion.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Interpretation

[HN2] A reviewing court cannot rewrite a trust instrument. The expressed intent must control, although this is to be determined from reading the instrument as a whole in the light of the circumstances surrounding the settlor when the instrument was executed, including the condition of the estate, the relations to family and beneficiaries, and their situation and condition. The construing court will put itself as far as possible in the position of the settlor, in the effort to construe any uncertain language used by the settlor in such a way as shall, conformably to the language, give force and effect to the settlor’s intention. But the quest is to determine the meaning of what the settlor said and not to speculate upon what he/she meant to say.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview

[HN3] A power of appointment is a power of disposition given to a person over property not his own by some one who directs the mode in which that power shall be exercised by a particular instrument. The donor does not vest in the donee of the power title to the property, but simply vests in the donee power to appoint the one to take the title. The appointee under the power takes title from the donor, and not from the donee of the power. The ultimate beneficiary really takes from the person who created the power, the donee of the power acting as a mere conduit of the former’s bounty.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > Beneficiaries > General Overview

Governments > Fiduciary Responsibilities

[HN4] A power of appointment is general if it is exercisable in favor of any one or more of the following: the donee of the power, the donee’s creditors, the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee’s estate. Any other power of appointment is a nongeneral one. As a matter of both common law doctrine and the practicalities of the situation, the donee of a nongeneral power is not the owner of the appointive assets. The donee is in a fiduciary position with reference to the power and cannot derive personal benefit from its exercise. The donee’s creditors have no more claim to the appointive assets than to property which the donee holds in trust. It is immaterial whether or not the donee exercises the power. The situation differs where the donee possesses a general power of appointment. Where a general power has been created, the donee is substantially in the position of an owner.

Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Obligations > Periodic Support

[HN5] One purpose of limiting the duration of an alimony award is to provide an incentive for the spouse receiving support to use diligence in procuring training or skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency. If the time period for the periodic alimony is logically inconsistent with the facts found or the evidence, it cannot stand. The trial court must consider all of its financial orders as a cohesive unit. The trial court need not make a detailed finding justifying its award of time limited alimony, but the record must indicate the basis for that award, and there must be sufficient evidence supporting the award for the particular duration established.

Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Obligations > Rehabilitative Support

[HN6] The court has great discretion in domestic relations cases, and a reviewing court will give great weight to the financial awards because of the trial court’s opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. Although time limited alimony awards are essentially rehabilitative in purpose, there may be other valid reasons for awarding such alimony. The particular length of time needed for alimony can sometimes be established by predicting when future earnings, based on earning capacity as known at the time of the dissolution, will be sufficient for self-sufficiency.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion

Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > General Overview

[HN7] A reviewing court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in making financial awards.

COUNSEL: Joel M. Ellis, with whom was Catherine P. Klingerman, for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

Robert B. Hempstead, for the appellee-appellant (defendant).

JUDGES: Daly, Foti and Landau, Js. The other judges concur.

OPINION BY: FOTI

OPINION

[*153] [**610] This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a dissolution of marriage action. The plaintiff withdrew her complaint after the defendant filed a cross complaint. She now appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) excluded her from a share in a trust, (2) ordered nonmodifiable, time limited periodic alimony, and (3) ordered financial awards. The defendant has cross appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly (1) assigned the principal of a trust and (2) apportioned personal property. We reverse the trial court’s [***2] judgment in part.

The parties were married on September 13, 1972, in Hartford. At the time of the dissolution, they had one minor child, a daughter born March 19, 1975. The prior marriage of each party ended in divorce. The defendant has three adult sons from his first marriage, which ended in 1972; he pays $ 7800 annually in alimony to his former spouse. Beginning in 1974, the defendant’s three sons changed their residence from that of their mother to that of the parties for respective periods of three, five and two years. The plaintiff took an active role in raising the defendant’s sons.

The defendant graduated from Yale, and from Wharton School of Finance with a masters degree in business administration. The parties met when they were both employed at the same stock brokerage firm and eventually developed a relationship that led to marriage. [*154] The defendant later worked for another stock brokerage firm, until he became a bank trust officer and vice president for investments. In August 1982, with the plaintiff’s support, the defendant began working as a chartered financial analyst. When he left the bank he earned about $ 39,000; during the next few years his [***3] salary was about $ 20,000 to $ 25,000. He has had significant trust income to cushion the income loss. Since 1986, the defendant has been employed as an independent contractor-salesperson for an investment advisory firm. He is paid on a commission basis, but has had expectations of an equity position with this firm.

The plaintiff stopped working in 1974 when she became pregnant. She organized a local chapter of The Samaritans, Inc., in 1985. In 1988, she received a masters degree in pastoral ministry from St. Joseph College and began work as a part-time assistant photographer, earning $ 100 a week. She has been employed as a personal financial planner since August, 1989, and is now an independent contractor-salesperson, earning commissions for financial planning and selling various financial products. She expects her income to reach $ 20,000 in a few years when she has built a client base, and thereafter to reach between $ 30,000 and $ 40,000.

During his first marriage, the defendant had a drinking problem. His alcoholism also surfaced in this marriage about 1975 and became a significant factor that eventually doomed the relationship. Although he was a functioning alcoholic [***4] who maintained employment, the defendant’s illness transformed him into a distant family figure. After a confrontation with his children and the plaintiff in December, 1981, the defendant stopped drinking and joined Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) in June, 1982. He believes that during his alcoholic period the plaintiff assumed a dominant role in the marital [*155] and parental relationship and was unable to accept him as an equal partner when he became a recovered alcoholic in 1982.

The parties could not agree on therapists, or Al-Anon, or about the defendant’s alcoholism. The defendant initially went to AA five nights a week. He later reduced the number of sessions, but could spend up to four nights a week at AA, which meant he was out of the house for up to fifty-eight hours a week. The loss of family time became a problem for the parties. By 1985, the marriage was in difficulty; divorce proceedings were initiated in 1988. In November, 1990, the trial court rendered a judgment dissolving the marriage and entered financial orders.

[**611] I

The Appeal

A

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly excluded her from sharing in a trust. The defendant’s [***5] deceased mother set up two trusts in August, 1975, referred to as the “Timothy Trust” and the “Paula Trust.” The trustee of each is an independent bank and both are spendthrift trusts. See General Statutes § 52-321. 1 The plaintiff’s claim relates to the Paula Trust. (Paula is the plaintiff.)

1 General Statutes § 52-321 provides: “Except as provided in sections 52-321a and 52-352b:

“(a) If property has been given to trustees to pay over the income to any person, without provision for accumulation or express authorization to the trustees to withhold the income, and the income has not been expressly given for the support of the beneficiary or his family, the income shall be liable in equity to the claims of all creditors of the beneficiary.

“(b) Any creditor of the beneficiary who has secured a judgment against the beneficiary may bring an action against him and serve the trustees with garnishee process, and the court to which the action is returnable may direct the trustees to pay over the net income derived from the trust estate to the judgment creditor, as the income may accrue, until the creditor’s debt is satisfied.

“(c) The court having jurisdiction over the fund may make such an order for payment pursuant to subsection (b) when the beneficiary is a nonresident of this state, as well as when the beneficiary is a resident, but in the case of a nonresident beneficiary notice shall be given to the nonresident of the action against him as provided in section 52-87. The nonresidence of the beneficiary shall not deprive the court of authority to make such an order.

“(d) If any such trust has been expressly provided to be for the support of the beneficiary or his family, a court of equity having jurisdiction may make such order regarding the surplus, if any, not required for the support of the beneficiary or his family, as justice and equity may require.

“(e) The defendant trustee in any such action shall be entitled to charge in the administration account of the trust such expenses and disbursements as the court to which the action is brought determines to be reasonable and proper.”

[***6] [*156] The Paula Trust was funded in 1975. At that time, the defendant’s mother gifted equal amounts to her four sons. The defendant’s allocation was placed in the Paula Trust. Between the time that the trust was funded and April, 1990, its appreciation was $ 667,848.

During the “initial period” of the Paula Trust, the trust provides that the trustee in its discretion can pay out the annual net income and principal for the care, maintenance and support of the plaintiff as long as she remains married to the defendant. Subject to the plaintiff’s needs, the trustee in its discretion can pay out any remaining income and principal for the maintenance, support and education of the defendant’s children (his three sons and the parties’ daughter). 2 In the [*157] event the marriage terminates, the trustee in its discretion can pay out the annual income and principal solely for the defendant’s children, though not necessarily equally.

2 We note with concern that the trial court did not appoint counsel for the parties’ daughter, who did not reach majority until March 19, 1993; General Statutes § 46b-54 (b); the interests of the minor child and those of the defendant’s three sons were unrepresented throughout this action even though, as secondary beneficiaries under both the Paula Trust and the Timothy Trust, their interests may have been adverse to those of the parties.

We also find troubling the absence of the trustee, Connecticut National Bank, which owes a fiduciary duty to all of the persons whose interests may be affected by the financial orders in this dissolution action. We recognize, however, that because of our disposition of this appeal the trustee may no longer be a necessary party.

[***7] During the initial period, the trust instrument confers on the defendant a limited power to appoint, during his lifetime or by his will, all or any part of the trust principal for the benefit of the plaintiff or his three brothers or any of them.

The trust instrument expressly provides that no interest in the trust, while in the possession of the trustee, shall be subject to the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements or torts of any beneficiary. The Paula Trust is still in its initial period.

The trial court refused to order that the plaintiff share in the appreciation of the Paula Trust. The court found that, under [**612] article eleventh of the trust instrument, 3 she ceased to be a beneficiary upon the filing of this dissolution action, and, therefore, the defendant’s limited power to appoint to her had ceased.

3 Article eleventh provides in pertinent part: “DEFINITION OF TERMS . . . For purposes of this Indenture, the initiation of any legal proceeding by either said Timothy Cooley or said Paula D. Cooley for either a divorce or a legal separation shall constitute the termination of their marriage and the status of said Paula D. Cooley as a beneficiary hereunder shall terminate upon the filing of such papers.”

[***8] The plaintiff disagrees. She recognizes that, pursuant to article first, § (a), during the initial period the trustee may pay her income and principal only “so long as she shall be married to said Timothy Cooley.” She contends, however, that because the initial period of the trust has not terminated, the defendant still has a limited power to appoint to her. She points out that under article second of the Paula Trust, the “initial period” terminates [*158] only upon one of five occurrences, none of which, undisputedly, has happened. 4 She also points out that article first, § (b), provides that “[a]nything herein to the contrary notwithstanding” the defendant may appoint, during his lifetime or by will, all or any part of the trust principal to her or his brothers, or any of them, but not to himself. The plaintiff argues that by this language, the defendant may exercise his power to appoint to her at any time during his life or by his will, even after the marriage terminates, as long as the “initial period” of the trust has not ceased. She claims that the trial court improperly concluded that, pursuant to article eleventh, she ceased to be both an income beneficiary [***9] and a beneficiary of the defendant’s power of appointment upon her filing of a dissolution action.

4 Article second provides:

“TERMINATION OF INITIAL PERIOD OF TRUST

“The initial period of the trust hereby created shall terminate upon the happening of whichever of the following events shall first occur:

“(a) The remarriage of Susan Cooley, the former wife of said Timothy Cooley.

“(b) The death of said Susan Cooley.

“(c) The death of said Timothy Cooley.

“(d) The termination of the marriage of said Paula D. Cooley to said Timothy Cooley if no issue of said Timothy Cooley shall then be living.

“(e) The death of the last survivor of the issue of said Timothy Cooley living at the time of execution of this Indenture if his marriage to said Paula D. Cooley shall previously have terminated.

“Upon such termination of the initial period of the trust, the Trustee shall set out any balance of the Trust Estate not appointed by an effective exercise of the power of appointment contained in Paragraph FIRST (b) hereof, as it is then constituted, under Paragraph THIRD hereof if said Timothy Cooley shall then be living, or if he is not then living, the Trustee shall set out the same under Paragraph FOURTH hereof if said Paula D. Cooley shall then be living and unremarried, and shall have been married to him at the time of his death. If said Paula D. Cooley is not then living and unremarried, or if she was not married to said Timothy Cooley at the time of his death, the Trustee shall set out the Trust Estate under Paragraph FIFTH hereof.”

[***10] We agree with the plaintiff that, under the terms of the trust, termination of the parties’ marriage appears [*159] not to have affected her position as a possible appointee. We disagree, however, with her contention that the court improperly excluded her from a share in the trust corpus.

[HN1] “The issue of intent as it relates to the interpretation of a trust instrument . . . is to be determined by examination of the language of the trust instrument itself and not by extrinsic evidence of actual intent.” Heffernan v. Freedman, 177 Conn. 476, 481, 418 A.2d 895 (1979). The construction of a trust instrument presents a question of law to be determined in the light of facts that are found by the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable. See Connecticut National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chadwick, 217 Conn. 260, 266, 385 A.2d 1189 (1991). Since the issue presented concerns the court’s legal conclusion regarding intent of the settlor as expressed solely in the language of the trust she created, we must decide that issue by determining de novo whether that language supports the court’s conclusion. See Canaan National Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn. 330, 335, 586 [***11] A.2d 562 (1991).

[**613] [HN2] “[W]e cannot rewrite . . . a trust instrument. The expressed intent must control, although this is to be determined from reading the instrument as a whole in the light of the circumstances surrounding the . . . settlor when the instrument was executed, including the condition of [her] estate, [her] relations to [her] family and beneficiaries, and their situation and condition. ‘The construing court will put itself as far as possible in the position of the . . . [settlor], in the effort to construe . . . [any] uncertain language used by [her] in such a way as shall, conformably to the language, give force and effect to [her] intention.’ . . . But ‘[t]he quest is to determine the meaning of what the . . . [settlor] said and not to speculate upon what [she] meant to say.'” (Citations omitted.) Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyman, 148 Conn. 273, 278-79, 170 A.2d 130 (1961).

[*160] In its articulation, the trial court properly concluded that article eleventh terminates the plaintiff’s status as an income beneficiary of the trust upon the filing of divorce papers. The court determined that an inconsistent result would [***12] be possible if it found that even after a divorce the plaintiff remained an appointee under the defendant’s limited power of appointment, with access to the trust corpus. The trial court found this interpretation would be contrary to a harmonious reading of all sections of the trust. The court discerned that the settlor was concerned with the impact of divorce on her proposed gift to her son, and that she desired to protect and preserve the trust from financial claims arising from a dissolution. These intentions are strongly evidenced by the great lengths to which the settlor went to protect the trust assets from claims by the defendant’s first wife, Susan Cooley. The trust instrument also evinces an intent by the settlor to limit the distribution of the trust principal to a very narrow group of persons. Under article sixth, § (c), for instance, in the event that any legal action to enforce a claim against the defendant by his first wife results in a determination that any part of the trust estate may be taken to satisfy such claim, the trustee is directed to terminate the trust as to that part and pay the portion to the defendant’s brothers, the settlor’s other sons; the plaintiff [***13] was not to be a recipient under this provision. Also significant is that the trust’s initial period does not end upon the termination of the parties’ marriage “with issue living.” Under that circumstance, the defendant himself still has no access to trust assets for his own benefit, again evincing the settlor’s intent to shield the assets from the effects of a dissolution judgment. The trust instrument, read as a whole, strongly suggests an intent on the part of the settlor that the plaintiff’s status as a recipient under the trust would change upon termination of the marriage.

[*161] Nevertheless, the phrase “anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding” contained in article first, § (b), appears to preserve the defendant’s power to appoint to the plaintiff even after her filing of divorce papers. While this phrase injects uncertainty into the trust instrument, we need not resolve that uncertainty. We conclude that, even if the language of the trust were crystal clear as to the settlor’s intent that the plaintiff maintain her status as an appointee even after termination of the marriage, the trial court’s decision not to award her a portion of the Paula Trust was proper.

[***14] General Statutes § 46b-81 gives the trial court the power in a dissolution action to “assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.” A limited power of appointment is not a part of the marital estate that can be awarded in a dissolution action, however.

[HN3] “A power of appointment is a power of disposition given to a person over property not his own by some one who directs the mode in which that power shall be exercised by a particular instrument. . . . The donor does not vest in the donee of the power title to the property, but simply vests in the donee power to appoint the one to take the title. The appointee under the power takes title from the donor, and not from the donee of the power. . . . The ultimate beneficiary really takes from the person who created the power, the donee of [**614] the power acting as a mere conduit of the former’s bounty.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Linahan v. Linahan, 131 Conn. 307, 324, 39 A.2d 895 (1944).

Under the terms of the Paula Trust, the defendant was the donee of only a limited or nongeneral power of appointment. [HN4] “(1) A power of appointment is general if it is exercisable [***15] in favor of any one or more of the following: the donee of the power, the donee’s creditors, [*162] the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee’s estate. (2) Any other power of appointment is a nongeneral one.” 2 Restatement (Second), Property § 11.4 “Donative Transfers” (1986). “As a matter of both common law doctrine and the practicalities of the situation, the donee of a nongeneral power is not the owner of the appointive assets. The donee is in a fiduciary position with reference to the power and cannot derive personal benefit from its exercise. The donee’s creditors have no more claim to the appointive assets than to property which the donee holds in trust. It is immaterial whether or not the donee exercises the power.” Id., § 13.1, comment (a). The situation differs where the donee possesses a general power of appointment. “Where . . . a general power has been created, the donee is substantially in the position of an owner.” Id. Because the defendant, having only a limited power of appointment, has no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the appointive assets of the Paula Trust, no portion of those assets may be included in the marital estate.

Nor can the [***16] appointive assets be included in the marital estate by virtue of the plaintiff’s status as the object of the power of appointment given to the defendant. “An object of a power of appointment has an interest analogous to a contingent future interest in the property subject to the power . . . .” Id., § 11.2, comment (d). As one of the possible objects of the defendant’s power, the plaintiff possesses no more than a mere expectancy; her receipt of principal from the trust is wholly contingent upon the defendant’s exercising his discretion to appoint to her. Even if the marriage had continued, the plaintiff’s expectancy might never have been realized if, for example, the defendant had elected to appoint the entire corpus of the Paula Trust to one of his brothers. The plaintiff had no vested right at any [*163] time to the trust corpus that would permit its inclusion in the marital estate. See Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 231, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987) (future property that is a “mere expectancy” is not subject to division in a divorce action).

Finally, because a limited power of appointment such as the defendant’s is not, itself, an asset of the donee; Supreme Colony [***17] v. Towne, 87 Conn. 644, 648, 89 A. 264 (1914); it may be neither assigned nor delegated. The trial court properly refused to order the defendant to exercise his limited power of appointment and properly concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled a share of the Paula Trust.

B

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court’s award of nonmodifiable, time limited periodic alimony was clearly erroneous. 5

5 As part of the court’s award, the plaintiff received a lump sum payment of over $ 100,000 as well as the marital residence valued at $ 225,000 subject to a mortgage of approximately $ 30,000. She was awarded alimony of $ 45,000 payable over four years, ending December 7, 1994, plus two additional years at $ 1 per year.

“The issue of time limited alimony has been considered by this court in a number of cases. See Watson v. Watson, 20 Conn. App. 551, 568 A.2d 1044 (1990); Sunbury v. Sunbury, [13 Conn. App. 651, 538 A.2d 1082 (1988)]; O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. [***18] 300, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988); Louney v. Louney, 13 Conn. App. 270, 535 A.2d 1318 (1988); Markarian v. Markarian, 2 Conn. App. 14, 475 A.2d 337 (1984). In each of these cases, we stated that [HN5] one purpose of limiting the duration of an alimony award [**615] is to provide an incentive for the spouse receiving support to use diligence in procuring training or skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency. See Markarian v. Markarian, supra, 16.

[*164] “In these cases, we reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the spouse should receive time limited alimony for the particular duration established. If the time period for the periodic alimony is logically inconsistent with the facts found or the evidence, it cannot stand. O’Neill v. O’Neill, supra.” Henin v. Henin, 26 Conn. App. 386, 391-92, 601 A.2d 555 (1992).

The trial court must consider all of its financial orders as a cohesive unit. Brash v. Brash, 20 Conn. App. 609, 614, 509 A.2d 44 (1990). The trial court need not make a detailed finding justifying its award of time limited alimony, [***19] but the record must indicate the basis for that award, and there must be sufficient evidence supporting the award for the particular duration established. Mathis v. Mathis, 30 Conn. App. 292, 293, 620 A.2d 174 (1993); Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn. App. 745, 751-52, 612 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992).

Our review of the record in this case indicates that the trial court considered a number of the criteria set out in General Statutes § 46b-82 in exercising its discretion to award time limited alimony, including the length of the marriage, the causes of the dissolution, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, along with the vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the parties. We recognize that the trial court did not explicitly address each criteria. [HN6] The court has great discretion in domestic relations cases; Savage v. Savage, 25 Conn. App. 693, 695, 596 A.2d 23 (1991); and a reviewing court will give great weight to the financial awards because of the trial court’s opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. Holley v. Holley, 194 Conn. 25, 29, 478 A.2d 1000 (1984). [***20] While the trial court did not specifically address rehabilitative alimony, the record supports the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff is not in need of [*165] training or further education in order to obtain the skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency. See Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, 27 Conn. App. 396, 400, 606 A.2d 48 (1992). “Although time limited alimony awards are essentially rehabilitative in purpose, there may be other valid reasons for awarding such alimony.” Roach v. Roach, 20 Conn. App. 500, 506, 568 A.2d 1037 (1990). “The particular length of time needed for alimony can sometimes be established by predicting when future earnings, based on earning capacity as known at the time of the dissolution, will be sufficient for self-sufficency.” Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, supra.

The evidence in the record as to the plaintiff’s education, ability and vocational skills, and the absence of any evidence of physical or mental restrictions, reasonably lead to a conclusion that she will resume a successful business career in a relatively short period of time. We conclude that neither placing a time limit on the alimony nor ordering that its duration be nonmodifiable [***21] was logically inconsistent with these factors.

C

The plaintiff’s final claim is that the trial court improperly awarded the lump sum and periodic alimony and the division of property.

[HN7] As a reviewing court, we are limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in making financial awards. Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 494-95, 460 A.2d 1302 (1983). To conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must first find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably have concluded as it did. Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, supra, 398. Here, the court made clear that it intended to set a greater share of the marital estate to the plaintiff than to the defendant and that one of the difficulties in this matter was to produce an equitable dissolution judgment in a deteriorating financial market. [*166] We have reviewed the record and the evidence in this [**616] case and conclude that the financial awards are within the parameters of the trial court’s broad discretion and made in accordance with the law and the evidence.

II

The Defendant’s Cross Appeal

A

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly [***22] ordered him to exercise his limited power of appointment to appoint to the plaintiff one half of the appreciation of the Timothy Trust. We agree with the defendant.

At the time the defendant’s mother set up the Paula Trust in 1975, she also set up another trust. That trust was funded in 1985 after the defendant’s mother died. The trust property was divided into four equal portions for the defendant and his three brothers; the defendant’s portion is referred to as the Timothy Trust.

Article third, § (a), of the Timothy Trust provides that the trustee, in its discretion, can pay out so much of the annual net income and principal as the trustee deems advisable for the defendant’s care, maintenance and support. Thereafter, the trustee can distribute to the defendant’s four children, not necessarily equally, so much of the balance of the income and principal as the trustee deems advisable for their maintenance, support and education. Article third, § (b), provides that the defendant in his sole discretion may appoint all or any part of the principal of the Timothy Trust, “in trust or otherwise, to or for the benefit of any person, persons or charitable organizations, or any of [***23] them, except himself, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate.” If, at death, the defendant has not exercised [*167] this limited power as to all of the principal of the trust, the balance will be divided equally among his four children.

The trial court determined that because the Timothy Trust did not exclude the plaintiff as a possible beneficiary of the power of appointment and the plaintiff is not a creditor, she should share in the appreciation of the trust principal. As ordered, this would give the plaintiff 50 percent of the difference between the trust’s funding value of $ 237,826 and its market value at the close of business on December 1, 1990, the accounting date nearest to the date of judgment. For nearly the same reasons that we concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to a share in the Paula Trust, we conclude that she is not entitled to a share in the Timothy Trust.

As we noted earlier in this opinion, a limited power of appointment such as the defendant’s is not an asset of the defendant that can be assigned or transferred. Supreme Colony v. Towne, supra, 648-49. The power does not confer on the defendant any title to or interest [***24] in the appointive property. Bankers Trust Co. v. Variell, 143 Conn. 524, 528, 123 A.2d 874 (1956). Unlike a general power, which in some contexts is deemed to be the equivalent of ownership over the appointive assets, a limited power confers on the donee none of the beneficial enjoyment of the property. Nor does the plaintiff have more than a mere expectancy in the trust property. Rubin v. Rubin, supra.

The plaintiff recommends that we cast aside the common law principle that appointive property is not an asset of the donee and that we recognize an equitable power in the trial court to reach the appointive assets and include them in the marital estate. She urges us to employ “a common sense notion that such powers over wealth should be deemed the equivalent of property subject to a court’s control in a dissolution proceeding.” [*168] The plaintiff relies on a doctrine applicable to general powers, “that property of a third person, not owned by a [donee] but over which he had and has exercised a general power of appointment, is deemed in equity to be charged with the payment of the debts of the donee to the extent that his own estate is insufficient to [***25] satisfy them . . . . and while doubts have often been expressed as to the soundness of the reasons underlying [this doctrine] and the logical difficulties involved have been noted, it has been generally adopted [**617] and applied in appropriate cases. . . . The doctrine is purely one of equity. ‘On no theory of hard fact is the property appointed the property of the donee of the power. But very early equity grafted onto these bald facts a principle of fair dealing. That principle was founded on the idea that a man ought to pay his debts if he could. Equity assumed as a matter of good conscience and sound morals that a man in debt could not honestly have meant to give property to his friends or relatives to the exclusion of his creditors, when he could give it to anybody he chose. . . . This is another of numerous illustrations of the application by courts of “fundamental ethical rules of right and wrong” to the complicated affairs of mankind.'” State ex rel. Beardsley v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 124 Conn. 416, 427-28, 200 A. 567 (1938). In keeping with this principle, the plaintiff also urges us to treat the assets subject to the defendant’s limited [***26] power of appointment as they might be treated under the transfer and succession tax laws if they were subject to a general power of appointment in the defendant. By this analysis, she contends, the appointive assets would be includable in the marital estate and would be subject to distribution by the trial court.

The plaintiff’s position has an obvious flaw: While this equitable principle may apply to general powers of appointment, the power possessed by the defendant [*169] under the Timothy Trust was only a limited power. Although the plaintiff acknowledges this important distinction, she urges us to ignore it. We decline to do so.

We earlier underscored the important difference between a general and a limited or nongeneral power of appointment. Again we point out that the nature of this power is such that the defendant, himself, can derive no personal benefit from its exercise. While it is certainly possible, as the plaintiff proposes, that the defendant can indirectly benefit from the power by appointing to persons — his brothers, for instance — who might turn the money back over to the him, we cannot and will not base our decision on such speculation. The trust [***27] instrument specifically provides that the power may not be exercised for the benefit of the defendant himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. Financial awards made in a dissolution proceeding are, by their very nature, a benefit to one party and an obligation to another.

Moreover, while the class of appointees under the Timothy Trust is broader than that under the Paula Trust, the trust instrument expressly excludes creditors from the class of appointees. Contrary to the trial court’s statement that the plaintiff is not a creditor, the judgment in this dissolution action established the plaintiff’s status as that of a judgment creditor. See Urrata v. Izzillo, 1 Conn. App. 17, 18, 467 A.2d 943 (1983) (former spouse is a judgment creditor pursuant to a judgment for alimony and child support); see also McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. 277, 287, 334 A.2d 437 (1973); 2 Restatement (Second), Property § 13.7 “Donative Transfers,” (1986) Reporter’s note 4 (as a result of divorce, spousal claims established in divorce proceedings entitle spouse to same rights against appointive assets as would be available to a creditor). The plaintiff is [***28] thus no longer a permissible appointee.

[*170] We therefore conclude that the trial court improperly ordered the defendant to exercise his limited power of appointment under the Timothy Trust in favor of the plaintiff. 6

6 The defendant also, as part of this claim on his cross appeal, alleges that the trial court incorrectly calculated the amount of the lump sum payment awarded to the plaintiff. Because of our disposition of the first issue on his cross complaint we find it unnecessary to address this.

B

The defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning personal property between the parties. Specifically, he claims that the court failed to consider written proposals submitted by the parties and incorrectly applied the criteria ordinarily relevant to apportionment.

[**618] Because our resolution of the defendant’s first claim requires that we remand the case to the trial court for a reconsideration of all the financial orders; Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 [***29] Conn. 170, 175, 553 A.2d 612 (1989); we need not address this issue.

The judgment is reversed as to the financial orders and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Dean v. United States – Irrevocable Trust Protects Against Federal Tax Lien

987 F.Supp. 1160

Joanne R. DEAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

No. 96-0652-CV-W-5.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.

December 4, 1997.

Page 1161

Edward J. Essay, Colorado Springs, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Anita L. Mortimer, U.S. Atty’s Office, Kansas City, MO, Carol E. Schultz, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Civil Trial Section, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER

LAUGHREY, District Judge.

This case was tried to the Court on November 4 and 5, 1997. Plaintiffs, as the Trustees of the George and Catherine Irrevocable Trust, assert that a wrongful levy was made on trust assets by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The government claims that the levy was proper because George and Catherine Mossie are delinquent taxpayers and the George and Catherine Irrevocable Trust is merely the alter ego of these delinquent taxpayers. The trustees claim that the trust is not the alter ego of George and Catherine Mossie, therefore, the seizure of trust property by the IRS was wrongful and the property should be returned to the trust.

The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

  1. In 1950, George W. Mossie married Catherine P. Mossie.
  2. In 1967, George W. Mossie and Catherine P. Mossie separated and lived apart from one another and continue to do so. During this separation, the Mossies continued to perform their respective functions in the various family businesses and were amicable in their relationship with each other.
  3. Prior to their separation, the Mossies had four children, Tom Mossie, Joanne R.

Page 1162

Mossie (Dean), Janet A. Mossie and Linda L. Mossie.

  1. In 1987, the Mossies decided to equally divide part of the real property owned in their individual names. The division was done because of their long-term separation and upon the advice of their estate planning counsel. On February 23, 1987, deeds were prepared and the property was conveyed into their respective 1987 revocable trusts.
  2. In September of 1987, George W. Mossie was severely injured in an automobile accident and thereafter underwent multiple surgeries which rendered him disabled. In 1988, Catherine P. Mossie suffered a life-threatening illness from which she was not expected to recover. She also had surgery in 1989. Because of these illnesses, George and Catherine Mossie decided to transfer their assets into an irrevocable trust for the sole benefit of their children. This was done on advice of their estate planning counsel.
  3. In November of 1989, the Mossies executed the George and Catherine Irrevocable Trust (hereinafter 1990 Irrevocable Trust) naming Joanne Mossie Dean and Janet A. Mossie as the trustees. The following assets were to be transferred into the irrevocable trust.
  4. 20,000 shares of Summit Structural Steel.
  5. Fifteen duplex units, which had been acquired in 1975 in the name of George and Tom Mossie.
  6. Lake investment property which was used for family vacations.
  7. The foregoing assets were not transferred into the trust until December 4, 1990. The delay was caused by the ill health of George and Catherine Mossie.
  8. When the Mossies transferred their assets into the trust on December 4, 1990, they did not know that their 1988 tax return was being audited by the IRS. At that time, they did not know that they would be assessed back taxes by the IRS. Eventually, the IRS audited the Mossies’ 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 jointly-filed tax returns and did assess back taxes against them.
  9. At the time the assets were transferred into the 1990 Irrevocable Trust, the Mossies had a net worth sufficient to cover their current liabilities and the tax liability that was eventually assessed against them by the IRS.
  10. After a proceeding in the United States Tax Court to determine the tax deficiency owed by the Mossies for their jointly-filed returns for tax years 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990, the IRS assessed back taxes and penalties against the Mossies in the amount of $281,093.95.
  11. On February 8, 1993, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a trust fund recovery penalty in the amount of $109,125.71 against George W. Mossie, Tom Mossie and Summit Structural Steel, relating to the unpaid employment taxes withheld from the wages of the employees of Summit Structural Steel pursuant to I.R.C. § 6672. This assessment was made against George W. and Tom Mossie because they were persons required to collect and truthfully account for and pay over to the United States the federal social security and income taxes withheld from the wages of the employees of Summit Structural Steel, Inc., for the taxable quarter ending June 30, 1992.
  12. On May 4, 1994, two additional real estate holdings were transferred into the 1990 Irrevocable Trust.
  13. The west 70 feet of Lot 2, Highway Lane Addition, a subdivision in Lee’s Summit, Missouri.
  14. Lot 85, Braeside Addition, a subdivision in Lee’s Summit, Jackson County, Missouri, also known as 311 Lincolnwood.
  15. Log 4, Ziegler Addition, a subdivision in Lee’s Summit, Jackson County, Missouri.

These properties were titled in the name of Alamo Real Estate Company, a company owned by George and Catherine Mossie, which was dissolved in 1994 because of financial difficulty.

  1. In 1995, notices of a federal tax lien were filed with the Recorder of Deeds for Jackson County, Missouri, and Morgan County, Missouri, against property held in the names of Joanne R. Dean and Janet A. Mossie, as co-trustees of the 1990 Irrevocable Trust. These liens were levied against

Page 1163

the trustees as the nominees or alter egos of George W. Mossie and Catherine P. Mossie.

  1. The 1990 Irrevocable Trust is not the nominee or alter ego of delinquent taxpayers George W. Mossie and Catherine P. Mossie.
  2. The assets of the 1990 Irrevocable Trust are controlled by the Plaintiff trustees and not George W. Mossie and Catherine P. Mossie.
  3. Except for a brief period at the beginning of the trust when Catherine Mossie used old checks to pay for rental property expenses, all trust checks are signed by the trustees. Catherine Mossie used the old checks because she did not want to waste them.
  4. All deeds and other transfer documents are signed by the trustees.
  5. All tax returns are executed by the trustees.
  6. All promissory notes are executed by the trustees.
  7. All management decisions concerning the trust and its property are made by the trustees, not Catherine or George Mossie.
  8. George and Catherine Mossie do receive some benefits from the trust.
  9. The trustees permit Catherine Mossie to live at 311 Lincolnwood Drive, which has been the family home for the last 33 years. Catherine Mossie does not pay rent to live at 311 Lincolnwood Drive. Catherine Mossie does pay the utilities at 311 Lincolnwood Drive.
  10. The trust also provides a car to Catherine Mossie and George Mossie which is available for their personal use.
  11. The trustees would permit George and Catherine Mossie to stay at the family vacation home, but only Catherine has gone there since 1990 and only once or twice.
  12. George Mossie did not significantly benefit when the trust loaned $275,000 to Summit Structural Steel to pay employment taxes and penalties for the period ending June 30, 1992. At the time of the loan, the majority shareholder of Summit Structural Steel was the 1990 Irrevocable Trust, and the minority shareholder was Tom Mossie. When the employment taxes of Summit Structural Steel were paid off, the trust and Tom Mossie, as owners of the corporation, were the primary beneficiaries. It would be illusory to say that the loan was, therefore, for the benefit of George Mossie merely because he was also liable as an officer of the corporation.
  13. George and Catherine Mossie receive no money from the trust except reimbursement for minimal expenses incurred on behalf of the trust and for gasoline and auto maintenance.
  14. George and Catherine Mossie have provided benefits to the trust.
  15. Catherine Mossie presently manages fifteen duplex rental units which are owned by the trust. She also managed the units when they were owned by her husband and her son. She receives no compensation from the trust for her management of the rental units. She received no compensation for managing the rental property when it was owned by her husband and son.
  16. Catherine Mossie is the bookkeeper for the trust and is not paid for this service.
  17. George Mossie infrequently helps with the rental units by picking up parts needed for repairs.
  18. After the transfer of the rental units to the trust, Catherine Mossie’s responsibilities were decreased and were assumed by the trustees. Tom Mossie and the trustees now are actively involved in the maintenance, cleaning and repair of the rental units. The trustees make the ultimate management decisions concerning the rental property.
  19. Other than to recommend the bank and to introduce the trustees to the bank officers, neither George nor Catherine Mossie helped the trustees to get a loan from the LaMonte Bank to pay employment taxes owed by Summit Structural Steel.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Pursuant to § 6321 and 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C., “the Code”) a tax lien in favor of the United States attaches to all properties and rights to property of a delinquent tax payer from the date the tax liability is assessed. Glass City Bank of Jeanette, Pa. v. United States, 326

Page 1164

U.S. 265, 267-68, 66 S.Ct. 108, 110-11, 90 L.Ed. 56 (1945). The federal tax lien continues until the tax liability is fully satisfied or becomes unenforceable due to lapse of time. 26 U.S.C. § 6322; Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir.1992).

The United States may also file tax liens against property held by a third party, (i.e., person other than the taxpayer) where the third party is the nominee or alter ego of the taxpayer. When such a lien has been filed, the United States may levy upon the property. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51, 97 S.Ct. 619, 627-28, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977); F.P.P. Enters. v. United States, 830 F.2d 114, 117-18 (8th Cir.1987); Loving Saviour Church v. United States, 728 F.2d 1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 1984).

A third party who claims an interest in the property seized by the government may challenge the seizure in a wrongful levy action in the United States District Court pursuant to Code § 7426. In such an action, the initial burden is on the Plaintiff to prove (1) an interest in the property and (2) the tax assessment is for taxes owed by another taxpayer. The burden then shifts to the government to produce substantial evidence showing a nexus between the property and the taxpayer. The Plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the levy was wrongful and should be overruled. Xemas, Inc. v. United States, 689 F.Supp. 917, 922 (D.Minn. 1988), aff’d, 889 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027, 110 S.Ct. 1472, 108 L.Ed.2d 610 (1990).

It appears that state law controls the question of whether a third party is the alter ego of the taxpayer. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 1280, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960); Morgan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 82, 60 S.Ct. 424, 426, 84 L.Ed. 585 (1940). “[I]n the application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property … sought to be reached by statutes.” Id. at 82, 60 S.Ct. at 426. While Aquilino and Morgan seem to clearly indicate that state law controls in a wrongful levy case such as this, there has been confusion over the issue. It appears that some federal courts have considered more than state law to determine whether a third-party is the alter ego of the taxpayer, e.g., James E. Edwards Family Trust by Edwards v. United States, 572 F.Supp. 22, 24-25 (D.N.M. 1983); Loving Saviour Church, 728 F.2d at 1086; Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162 (1980) (“Given the diversity of corporate structures and the range of factual settings in which unjust and inequitable results are alleged, it is not surprising that no uniform standard exists for determining whether a corporation is simply the alter ego of its owner.” Id. at 172.) One court has held, however, that the question of whether state or federal law controls is of little importance because the standards are so similar. “The issue under either state or federal law depends upon who has ‘active’ or ‘substantial control.’” Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.1989). While the Court believes that Aquilino and Morgan require application of state law in this case, the Court’s conclusion would be the same even if the additional factors suggested by the government and considered in other federal cases were also taken into account.

While the Missouri courts have never considered the alter ego doctrine in the context of a trust, the doctrine has been applied in the corporate context where an effort is being made to pierce the corporate veil. Collet v. American Nat’l Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273, 283 (Mo.App.1986). In such cases, the Missouri courts use a three-part test. An individual will be deemed to be the alter ego of a corporation when:

1) The individual completely dominates and controls the finances, policy and business practice of the other corporation.

2) Such control was for an improper purpose such as “fraud or wrong, or … unjust act in contravention of [a third parties’] legal rights.”

3) The alter ego’s control of the corporation caused injury to the third party. National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F.Supp. 248, 256 (W.D.Mo. 1964), aff’d, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir.1965); K.C. Roofing Center v. On Top Roofing, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.App.1991). The alter

Page 1165

ego doctrine, however, will only apply where a corporation has “no separate mind, will or existence of its own.” Thomas Berkeley Consulting Eng’r, Inc. v. Zerman, 911 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo.App.1995).

Because there is no Missouri law applying the alter ego doctrine to trusts, the court assumes that the same standard applied in the corporate context would be applied to trusts. At a minimum, Missouri law would require a showing that the alter ego of the trust so dominated it that the trust had “no separate mind, will or existence of its own.” Thomas Berkeley, 911 S.W.2d at 695. Applying this standard to the 1990 Irrevocable Trust, it is clear that the trust is not the alter ego of George and Catherine Mossie.

Like thousands of aging adults, George and Catherine Mossie created a trust for the benefit of their children, making it irrevocable as their health deteriorated. They did not rely on a mail order product peddled by tax protesters. They set up their trust with an estate planner from a sophisticated law firm. They executed the documents necessary to transfer the legal title of their assets to the trust, and, other than a brief period when Catherine Mossie wrote checks for the rental property using old personal checks rather than trust checks, the trustees executed all documents requiring signatures by the owner of the trust property. Tax returns were executed by the trustee. Checks were signed by the trustees. The trustees decided how to spend trust assets, when to make repairs on the rental property, and the rent to be paid by tenants. The trustees borrowed and repaid money in the name of the trust. In other words, the legal control of the trust assets has consistently been exercised by the trustee, not the taxpayer. These trusts were not a sham and did “coincide with economic reality.” F.P.P. Enters., 830 F.2d at 117. Also see James Edwards Family Trust, 572 F.Supp. at 24. While it is true that there is a family relationship between the trustees and the taxpayers, the taxpayers had forever given up the right to control the disposition of the trust property and whatever advice the taxpayer gives to the trustee can be ignored. The government minimizes the importance of legal title and legal control, but the ancient law of trust is grounded in just such distinctions.

The government is correct that practical control is an important consideration, but the Court finds that the balance weighs in favor of the taxpayer on this question as well. After the trusts were created, the behavior of the trustees and settlors changed. The trustees made the decisions about the assets and also became more actively involved in the cleaning, maintenance and rental of the duplexes. While Catherine Mossie continues to be involved in the maintenance of the rental property, it is clear that she does not control the decision-making. George Mossie is no more involved in the rental property than any parent who occasionally helps their children with business advice or runs an errand for them to pick up supplies. It is not unusual for parents to continue to help their children, even after the parents’ assets are placed in trust. Indeed, even where a parent’s assets are transferred in fee simple presently to the children, most parents continue to help. Indeed, even if parents have never transferred any property to their children, parents help children with their property. That is how families do function and should function. It would substantially undermine trust law if such behavior was sufficient to characterize the settlor as the alter ego of the trust and negate the validity of the trust.

The trust does not support George and Catherine Mossie. They receive no money from the trust except reimbursement for minimal expenses incurred on behalf of the trust. It is true that they both drive cars owned by the trust for their personal use and Catherine Mossie lives in the family home. But these facts alone are insufficient to characterize the trust as the alter ego of the taxpayers. A beneficiary of the trust could sue the trustees for failing to comply with a term of the trust, but small deviations from the trust are not enough to invalidate the whole trust.

The government attempted to show that the $275,000 loan made to Summit Structural Steel, Inc. was for the benefit of George Mossie because he was chairman of the board and, in that capacity, was liable for the

Page 1166

past-due employment taxes of the corporation. Tom Mossie, however, owned 49 per cent of the stock of Summit Structural Steel and, as president of the corporation and a stockholder, was also liable for the employment taxes. More importantly, the trust owned 51 per cent of the stock and would be directly liable if the taxes were not paid. Any benefit to George Mossie under these circumstances is illusory and is certainly not enough evidence that the trust had “no separate mind, will, or existence of its own.” Thomas Berkeley, 911 S.W.2d at 695.

The fact that the trustee’s parents were permitted to use the family vacation property is de minimis given that they had little or no contact with the vacation property, did not use it even when it was in their own name and such sharing would be expected. It is also significant that at the time the property was placed in trust, the taxpayers had sufficient assets to meet their tax liability and to provide for their own personal expenses. There is no evidence that the trust was created for an improper purpose.

The cases cited by the government in support of their argument that the alter ego doctrine is applicable to this case are not persuasive because they are factually distinguishable. The government’s authority falls into two categories. The first group of cases involve trusts established by or with the assistance of tax protestors. The so-called “family” trusts give the settlor complete access to the trust property so that the settlor can use it for self-support. This is because the trustee is completely controlled by the settlor. Loving Saviour Church, 728 F.2d at 1086. (The taxpayer transferred all assets to a trust and the trust transferred the assets to a church which was established and controlled by the taxpayer. The taxpayer/settlor received all his support from the church which received all the income from the taxpayer’s chiropractic practice); F.P.P. Enters. 830 F.2d at 117 (The trust lacked the essential elements of a trust. The trust failed to identify beneficiaries and the taxpayer, not the trustee, exercised control over the trust property. The taxes on the trust property and the expenses paid to maintain the trust property were deducted from the personal income tax of the taxpayer.)

In the second group of cases cited by the government, corporations have been found to be the alter ego of the taxpayer because the taxpayer controls the corporate entity. Wilcox v. United States, 983 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir.1992) (Table); 1992 WL 393581 (unpublished per curium opinion) (The corporation and trust were the alter ego of taxpayer/anesthesiologist because the taxpayer commingled corporate, individual and pension property and as the only shareholder and officer of the corporation and as the only trustee of the pension had complete control over the disposition of corporate and pension property. Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927, 107 S.Ct. 3210, 96 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (Wolfe was deemed to be the alter ego of corporation/taxpayer because Wolfe was the sole shareholder of the corporation and, as the director and president of the corporation, made all corporate decisions without consulting with the other directors. Corporate expenses, including personnel costs, were paid from a sole proprietorship operated by Wolfe and all income of the corporation was put into the sole proprietorship’s bank account); Ames Investment, Inc. v. United States, 819 F.Supp. 666 (E.D.Mich.1993), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1097, 1994 WL 529863 (6th Cir.1994) (A corporation was formed to purchase and manage real estate. The first property purchased was a house which was used as the personal residence of the taxpayer who was a shareholder and director of the corporation. This house was the most valuable asset of the corporation. It was never rented or used as an office. There were never any corporate meetings and there was no capitalization of the corporation or any profit from the corporation.)

The common thrust of all these cases is that the alter ego doctrine will apply when the delinquent taxpayer is really in control of the corporation or trust and so dominates it that the corporation or trust form exists, but there is no substance to it. As already discussed, the 1990 Irrevocable Trust is a valid trust instrument, created for a valid purpose, comports with economic reality, and the trustees, in most aspects, have respected the terms of the trust. To permit the alter ego doctrine to apply in such a case would require

Page 1167

an expansion of the alter ego doctrine which the Court is unwilling to do without clearer direction from Congress or the Missouri courts. The Court, therefore, finds that the levies by the IRS against the assets of the George and Catherine Irrevocable Trust of December 4, 1990, was unlawful. The property seized by the IRS pursuant to the levies shall be returned to the trustees and all tax liens related to the unlawful levies shall be released. The Plaintiffs’ request for damages and attorneys’ fees is denied.

One troubling aspect of this case is the fact that the family home was deeded to the trust but Catherine Mossie has continued to control and occupy the home since the formation of the trust. The trustees acknowledged at trial that they and the Mossies have always understood that Catherine Mossie would continue to occupy the house until her death. Catherine Mossie also holds a deed of trust against the house which secures a promissory note in favor of Catherine Mossie. That promissory note is in default and has been since the property was transferred into trust. Catherine Mossie has the beneficial interest in the property during her lifetime and holds the key to the legal title at any time that she chooses to foreclose on the property. While it is true that the trust holds legal title until foreclosure, effectively Catherine Mossie controls the future disposition of the family home. While an argument could be made that the house was never a part of the trust, even though legal title was transferred to it, the government has insisted during this litigation that the house was properly placed in trust and is subject to the trust. The government’s position, therefore, forecloses a finding that the house is subject to the IRS levy because it is the property of the delinquent taxpayer, Catherine Mossie, not the property of the trust. The Court’s decision in this case, however, does not preclude the IRS from levying on property owned by Catherine Mossie, such as the promissory note and deed of trust on the property at 311 Lincolnwood. The only issue before this Court, however, is whether the levy by the IRS against the assets of the trust was wrongful. The Court has rejected the government’s argument that the 1990 Irrevocable Trust is the alter ego of George and Catherine Mossie and, therefore, the IRS levy on the trust property was wrongful and the trust property must be returned to the trust and the liens released from the trust property.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

  1. Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff trustees.
  2. The property of the 1990 Irrevocable Trust which has been seized by the IRS to satisfy the tax liability of George and Catherine Mossie shall be returned to the trustees.
  3. The 1995 tax liens filed with the Recorder of Deeds for Jackson County, Missouri, and Morgan County, Missouri, against property held in the name of Joanne R. Dean and Janet A. Mossie as co-trustees of the 1990 Irrevocable Trust shall be forthwith release.
  4. The Plaintiffs’ request for damages and attorneys’ fees is denied.

Evseroff – alter-ego applied to a trust

U.S. v. Evseroff, No. 00-CV-06029 (E.D.N.Y., April 30, 2012).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
JACOB EVSEROFF, ET AL., Defendants.
No. 00-CV-06029 (KAM).
United States District Court, E.D. New York.
April 30, 2012.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, District Judge.
This case arises out of efforts by the United States (the “government”) to collect taxes owed by Jacob Evseroff (“Evseroff”) by accessing assets currently held by a trust that Evseroff established in 1992 for the benefit of his two sons (the “Trust”). The United States argues that Evseroff’s attempts to transfer various pieces of his own property to the Trust should not frustrate the government’s collection efforts under several legal theories. A bench trial was held before Judge David G. Trager on November 7 and 8, 2005, and a post-trial order was entered on September 27, 2006 that rejected the government’s claims, holding that the Trust property could not be used to satisfy Evseroff’s tax debts (the “Post-Trial Order”).
The government appealed the Post-Trial Order, and on March 21, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. In its remand order, the Second Circuit directed the district court to reconsider its findings regarding whether certain conveyances by Evseroff to the Trust were actually fraudulent and whether the Trust was Evseroff’s alter ego or held property as his nominee. For the reasons discussed below, the government may collect on all property held by the Trust.
BACKGROUND
This case has been discussed in several prior opinions. See United States v. Evseroff, No. 00-CV-6029, 2001 WL 1571881 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2001) (entering judgment on the judgment of the United States Tax Court regarding Evseroff’s tax liability) (“Evseroff I”); United States v. Evseroff, No. 00-CV-6029, 2002 WL 1973196 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002) (allowing Evseroff to designate an expert to testify as to the value of his assets and ordering that interest on Evseroff’s tax debts continue to accrue) (“Evseroff II”); United States v. Evseroff, No. 00-CV-6029, 2003 WL 22872522 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (denying the government’s summary judgment motion on its claim to access the Trust’s assets) (“Evseroff III”); Evseroff v. United States, No. 03-CV-0317, 2004 WL 3127981 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004) (rejecting Evseroff’s claim under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights) (“Evseroff IV”); United States v. Evseroff, No. 00-CV-6029, 2006 WL 2792750 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding, after a bench trial, that the government could not access assets held by the Trust) (“Evseroff V” or the Post-Trial Order). It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with these decisions and, therefore, the relevant facts and procedural history are described only as necessary below.
Evseroff’s tax liability arose primarily from his decision to invest in a series of tax shelters between 1978 and 1982 that generated deductions which were later disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *1.[1] Evseroff was first notified that he had outstanding tax liabilities in December 1990, when he received a letter from the IRS after being audited. This letter indicated that he owed $227,282 in taxes and penalties. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *1. Evseroff received another letter from the IRS in January 1991, and the parties stipulated that, as of December 6, 1990, Evseroff owed $647,549.40 in back taxes and accrued interest. Id. In January of 1992, the IRS sent Evseroff a notice of deficiency indicating that he had accrued more than $700,000 in tax liability. Id. at *2.
Also in January of 1992, Evseroff met with an attorney to set up the Trust. Id. It is unclear whether Evseroff first met with the attorney about the Trust before or after receiving the January 1992 letter from the IRS. Id. In April 1992, Evseroff challenged the IRS’s calculation of his tax liabilities in a petition to the United States Tax Court. Id. In June 1992, the Trust was created, with Evseroff’s sons as the named beneficiaries. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *2. Also in June 1992, Evseroff transferred approximately $220,000 to the Trust (“the $220,000”). Id. In October 1992, Evseroff transferred his primary residence, located at 155 Dover Street in Brooklyn (“the Dover Street Residence”), to the Trust. Id. In November of 1992, the Tax Court entered judgment against Evseroff in the amount of $209,113 in taxes and penalties and $560,000 in interest. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *2.
The particulars of the transfer of the Dover Street Residence are set forth here in detail. Evseroff received no consideration for the deed transferring the Dover Street residence to the Trust. (See Deposition of Jacob Evseroff dated February 7 and 21, 2002 (“J. Evseroff Dep.”), Ex. 12 (the “Transfer Agreement”).)[2] Pursuant to the Transfer Agreement[3], Evseroff was allowed to live in the house and pay the expenses as he had before. (Id.) Evseroff did not pay the Trust any cash rent, but he was responsible for the expenses of the Dover Street Residence, such as the mortgage and taxes on the property. (Id.) Moreover, the Transfer Agreement specified no end date after which Evseroff’s right to live in the Dover Street Residence expired. (Id.) There is no evidence that the Trust assumed Evseroff’s mortgage obligations. The Transfer Agreement did not give Evseroff the power to sell the home, id., and Evseroff never attempted to do so, Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *4. The fair market value of the Dover Street Residence in 1992 was $515,000. (United States (“Gov’t”) Ex. 6 at 5; ECF No. 190, Defendant’s Post-Remand Memorandum of Law (“Evseroff Mem.”) at A-1.) In 1995, the payments on the mortgage were $1,044 per month. (ECF No. 186-3, United States’ Post-Remand Supplemental Memorandum (“Gov’t Mem.”) at 3; Evseroff Mem. at A-3.) In 1992, the mortgage was scheduled to be paid off in approximately five years. (Tr. at 91-93; Evseroff Mem. at A-3.)
With respect to the management of the Trust, a series of Evseroff family friends and business associates served as trustees. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *9. There is little evidence that they were actively involved in managing the Trust or its assets. Indeed, one trustee appears to have believed that he had no responsibilities until Evseroff’s death. (Transcript of Deposition of Barry Schneider dated January 3, 2002 (“Schneider Dep. Tr.”) at 20.) The accounting work for the Trust was performed by Frederick Blumer, an accountant who also performed accounting work for Evseroff and Evseroff’s law firm. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *3. The accountant was not paid for his work on behalf of the Trust, which he did as a professional courtesy to Evseroff. Id. The Trust’s tax returns took Blumer between one-half hour and an hour to prepare. (Transcript of Deposition of Frederick Blumer dated February 21, 2002 (“02/21/02 Blumer Dep. Tr.”) at 39.) The Trust’s tax statements were apparently never even sent to the trustees, and instead were sent directly to Evseroff. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *3, *11.
Between 1992 and 1998, the Trust did not record Evseroff’s payment of expenses for the Dover Street Residence as income.[4] (02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Exs. 1-7.) The Trust also did not claim the mortgage interest deduction for the Dover Street Residence between those years, though it did claim the deduction for real estate taxes between 1994 and 1998. (Id.) Indeed, the Trust never assumed the mortgage for the Dover Street Residence. (Gov’t Mem. at 3; Evseroff Mem. at A-2, A-3.) Evseroff also remained the named beneficiary of the flood and fire insurance policies on the Dover Street Residence. (J. Evseroff Dep., Exs. 32-33; Evseroff Mem. at A-7.)
Several other facts bear generally on Evseroff’s financial affairs. For one, Evseroff had a wife from whom he had been separated for eleven years at the time he created the Trust. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *2 n.3. Evseroff would later state that one of his reasons for setting up the Trust was to ensure that his two sons, rather than his estranged wife, received the benefit of his estate. Id. at *2. Additionally, he purchased a home in Florida in September of 1991. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *2-3. He apparently believed that the Florida home could not be seized by the IRS. Id. at *2.
Starting in 1997, Evseroff moved his funds around from place to place and, at one time, had his sons hold money for him rather than establishing a bank account. Id. at *3; Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *5-6. Further, Evseroff admitted that he kept personal funds in his law firm checking account and wrote checks on the account to pay for some personal expenses because he was concerned that the IRS would seize funds from his personal checking account. (Tr. at 72-73, 82-85; see also J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 28.)
Evseroff’s financial situation at the time of his transfer of the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust is difficult to discern with precision. Two points, however, are clear: (1) Evseroff was technically solvent after these transfers despite his tax debts, and (2) Evseroff’s readily accessible assets[5] were insufficient to satisfy his tax debt.
First, with regard to Evseroff’s solvency, the court found in its Post-Trial Order that on October 18th, 1992 — just ten days after Evseroff transferred the Dover Street Residence to the Trust — Evseroff’s tax liabilities totaled $770,530.64. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *2-3. Evseroff’s total assets, after and excluding the two transfers involving the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000, could be reasonably estimated at anywhere between $847,342[6] to $1,422,646.[7] See id. at *3-5. Thus, as of October 18, 1992, he had assets valued somewhere between $76,811 and $652,115 over and above his tax liabilities. See id. Regardless of where within that range the value of Evseroff’s assets actually fell, the results of the fraudulent transfer, nominee, and alter ego analyses would be the same.
Second, with regard to Evseroff’s readily accessible assets, those assets were insufficient to satisfy Evseroff’s tax liabilities. In the Post-Trial Order, the court identified two readily accessible assets in Evseroff’s possession: his $230,000 Florida residence and his $75,575 law practice. See id. at *3-4. The court did not find Evseroff’s retirement accounts to be readily accessible because the government could be delayed in its efforts to collect future distributions from the $355,304 in Evseroff’s retirement accounts.[8] Id. at *5 n.7. In addition, the court heard evidence that Evseroff moved his cash assets from one account to another and hid them in his law practice checking account, with his sons, and in his sons’ businesses in an effort to prevent the United States from collecting his cash assets. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3; (see Tr. at 72-73, 82-85; J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 28; 02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Ex. 19). Thus, considering only Evseroff’s readily accessible assets, the law practice and the Florida residence, those assets would be worth considerably less than Evseroff’s tax debt. The value of Evseroff’s law practice and Florida Residence totaled a mere $305,575, which was almost $465,000 less than his tax debt. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3.
At the bench trial held before The Honorable David G. Trager on November 7 and 8, 2005, the government pressed three theories for recovering assets from the Trust: (1) that Evseroff transferred assets to the Trust through constructively fraudulent conveyances; (2) that Evseroff transferred assets to the Trust through actually fraudulent conveyances; and (3) that the Trust was Evseroff’s alter ego/nominee. Id. at *4-7.
Evseroff claimed that his motivation in setting up the Trust was estate planning. Id. at *2. At the time that Evseroff started the process of setting up the Trust, he was 68 years old and had a wife from whom he had been separated. Id. at *2-3. He testified that he set up the Trust so that (1) his sons would get the benefit of his estate, (2) his estranged wife would not receive a portion of his assets, and (3) he could avoid the estate tax. Id. at *2. The government, by contrast, argued that his motive in setting up the Trust was to avoid his outstanding tax debts.
In the Post-Trial Order, Judge Trager noted that Evseroff’s motives were mixed, specifically that:
At trial, it became apparent that Evseroff had mixed motives in establishing the Trust: he was concerned about his separated wife taking a share of his estate, he wished to provide for his two unmarried sons who were living with him and he was concerned about the government’s potential collection efforts. All of these motives were present. If the issue were decided today, based on all that happened in the interim, it is clear that his tax problems would be the predominate concern. However, when these events occurred, the separation from his wife and need for estate planning based on this separation was much more at the forefront of his life.
Id. at *3. With respect to the government’s legal arguments, the Post-Trial Order found that the property transfers to the Trust were neither constructively nor actually fraudulent, based primarily on the fact that Evseroff was still solvent, despite his tax debts, after transferring both the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust. Id. at *5-6. The Post-Trial Order also rejected the government’s claim that the Trust was either Evseroff’s alter ego or that it held property as his nominee. Id. at *6-7. With respect to the latter two findings, the Post-Trial Order reasoned that Evseroff’s creation of the Trust was not primarily motivated by his desire to avoid the government’s collection efforts. Id. at *7. The Post-Trial Order also noted that there was no evidence that Evseroff had used or controlled any of the money in the Trust, id., and that he was solvent at the time of the transfers, id. at *6. Finally, the Post-Trial Order discussed the fact that Evseroff provided valuable consideration to the Trust in exchange for the use of the Dover Street Residence in that he paid the mortgage and other expenses related to the property. Id. at *7.
The government appealed and the Second Circuit reversed and remanded by summary order. United States v. Evseroff, 270 F. App’x 75 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order).[9] Regarding the actual fraud finding, the Second Circuit held that a finding that the transfers did not leave Evseroff insolvent did not preclude a finding that the transfers constituted actually fraudulent conveyances. Id. at 77. On remand, the Second Circuit directed the district court to consider both whether Evseroff intended to defraud the government and also whether he intended to hinder or delay its collection efforts. Id.
In analyzing the alter ego and nominee issues, the Second Circuit instructed that “the critical issue in resolving a nominee or alter ego claim is not motive, but control.” Id. The Second Circuit further noted that, if Evseroff controlled the trust, this court should then determine “whether Evseroff used this control to commit fraud or other wrongful conduct, such as whether he ever used the trust for his benefit rather than the benefit of his two sons.” Id. at 78. In order to determine whether Evseroff used control of the Trust to commit wrongful conduct, the Second Circuit suggested that this court consider factors such as (1) how the payments made by Evseroff for the Dover Street Residence’s expenses compared to the value of the house, and (2) how the payments were treated by the relevant entities for accounting and tax purposes. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Fraudulent Conveyance
On remand, the government argues that Evseroff’s transfers of the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust represent fraudulent conveyances under a theory of actual fraud. Under New York law, “[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.” N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law sec. 276. As this section indicates, a conveyance may be fraudulent whether a debtor intends to actually “defraud” a creditor or merely intends to “hinder or delay” their collection efforts.
“The requisite intent required by this section need not be proven by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the allegedly fraudulent transfer.” Steinberg v. Levine, 774 N.Y.S.2d 810, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004) (citation omitted); see also Capital Distributions Servs., Ltd. v. Ducor Exp. Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 195, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Steinberg). Whether a conveyance is fraudulent “is ordinarily a question of fact,” Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Rice, 605 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1993), and a creditor must prove his case by “clear and convincing evidence.” Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 357, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 639 (2d Cir. 1995)).
In determining whether Evseroff had the requisite fraudulent intent, it is necessary to examine a series of factors that are generally referred to as “badges of fraud.” Capital Distributions Servs., 440 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (quoting Steinberg, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 810).
These badges of fraud include lack or inadequacy of consideration, family, friendship, or close associate relationship between transferor and transferee, the debtor’s retention of possession, benefit, or use of the property in question, the existence of a pattern or series of transactions or course of conduct after the incurring of debt, and the transferor’s knowledge of the creditor’s claim and the inability to pay it. . . .
Steinberg, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citations omitted). A court may also consider “the financial condition of the party sought to be charged both before and after the transaction in question . . . . [and the] shifting of assets by the debtor to a corporation wholly controlled by him. . . .” In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1582-83 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
Based on the clear and convincing evidence in the record, factual findings in the Post-Trial Order establish that both conveyances at issue were actually fraudulent. As noted above, the Post-Trial Order found that Evseroff’s motives for creating the Trust were mixed: he was concerned with estate planning and with avoiding collection by the IRS and a claim by his estranged wife. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3. The Post-Trial Order also found that Evseroff did not receive consideration for the transfer of $220,000 of personal funds to the trust. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *2, *5. Nor did he receive consideration for the transfer of the Dover Street Residence other than a rental agreement with the Trust allowing him to reside in the home in exchange for his payment of operating and maintenance expenses in lieu of rent. Id. at *4. Further, the court found that Evseroff was solvent after the transfers. Id. at *6. Nothing has been presented that contradicts these findings.
Nevertheless, neither the fact that Evseroff had mixed motives in establishing the Trust nor the fact that he was solvent after he made the transfers absolves him of liability. The primary issue is his intent — not his actual financial status. See N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law sec. 276; see also Grumman Aerospace Corp., 605 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (finding that a cause of action predicated upon sec. 276 “may lie even where fair consideration was paid and where the debtor remains solvent”). Although there must be some actual financial harm to a creditor to support a fraudulent conveyance finding, a debtor need merely “deplete or otherwise diminish the value of the assets of the debtor’s estate remaining available to creditors” to be liable. Lippe, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (citations omitted).
By making the transfers of the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust, Evseroff unambiguously caused the requisite actual harm to his creditors by reducing the assets he had available to satisfy his tax debt and reducing the value of his readily accessible assets well below the amount of his tax debt. As noted above, at the time of the conveyances, Evseroff’s tax liabilities totaled $770,530.64. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3. As discussed previously, Evseroff’s total assets after and excluding the two transfers could reasonably be estimated at anywhere from $847,342 to $1,422,646 — leaving him somewhere between $76,811 and $652,115 over and above his tax debts if all of his assets are included. As such, the IRS would have had to collect somewhere between half and ninety percent of Evseroff’s total assets in order to satisfy his tax debts. This would be a difficult task — particularly given evidence in the record that Evseroff was not inclined to cooperate with collection efforts.[10] And if one includes only Evseroff’s readily accessible assets, the transfers reduced the value of Evseroff’s remaining assets to $305,575 — well below the amount of his tax liability. At the very least, the transfers made collection efforts much more difficult.
Moreover, Evseroff’s financial picture was even less favorable than the snapshot of the amount he owed the IRS in 1992 would suggest. That federal tax debt was not the only potential demand on his assets. Evseroff was sixty-eight at the time he created the Trust, and, as he testified at trial, he was getting ready to retire. (Tr. at 38-39, 187-88.) Although Evseroff’s assets exceeded his tax liability, his assets were not so substantial as to guarantee that he would not outlive them. Moreover, Evseroff’s IRS debt would continue to accrue interest to the extent that he did not pay it down. Evseroff was also aware that he might need to make payments to his estranged wife should they divorce, and he wished to provide as substantial an inheritance as possible to his two sons. These probable demands on his assets, combined with his tax debt, exceeded the assets he had available after the transfers.
Evseroff was well aware of his financial difficulties, including his tax liabilities, when he transferred the assets to the Trust. In December 1990 — more than a year before he first met with his attorney to set up the Trust — Evseroff received an IRS estimate that he owed $227,282, not including interest. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *1. Just a few weeks later, in January 1991, he received another letter from the IRS reflecting a total liability that he inaccurately estimated at $800,000. Id. In January 1992, he received an IRS letter indicating that he had a liability of more than $700,000. Id. at *2. Although it is not clear whether Evseroff had received the January 1992 letter at the time that he first met with an attorney to establish the Trust, he had received the January 1991 letter. Moreover, Evseroff certainly had received the January 1992 letter at the time that he actually conveyed the $220,000 in cash and the Dover Street Residence to the Trust in June and October of 1992 respectively. The other demands on his assets — such as his family obligations — were also undoubtedly apparent to him at that time. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Evseroff knew that he was jeopardizing his ability to pay his taxes when he conveyed the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust.[11]
In addition to the evidence of Evseroff’s financial situation, evidence of Evseroff’s conduct at the time he made the transfers further supports a finding that he intended to hinder or delay collection of his assets, particularly his tax debt. For one, he engaged in a “pattern or series of transactions or course of conduct after the incurring of debt” that establish his intent to impair, handle, or delay the IRS’s ability to collect his tax debts when he made the relevant conveyances. Steinberg, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 810. Around the time that Evseroff established the Trust in 1992, he purchased a Florida home that he appears to have thought could not be seized by the IRS. Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *2. Five years thereafter, in 1997, Evseroff also moved his funds from place to place and, on one occasion, had his son hold money for him rather than establishing a bank account. Id. at *3; Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *5-6. Although these suspicious movements of funds did not occur until 1997 — about five years after Evseroff transferred the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust — they nonetheless shed light on Evseroff’s general intent in conveying assets to the Trust because they show additional attempts to avoid paying a known tax debt.
These monetary transactions in 1997 are particularly significant because the IRS could only collect his assets to the extent that it could find them. Much of Evseroff’s net worth consisted of cash. If the IRS could only reliably collect on Evseroff’s readily accessible assets, it would only have access to $305,575 — almost $465,000 less than his tax debt in 1992. Thus, Evseroff’s movement of cash assets to avoid collection in combination with his earlier conveyances of the $220,000 and the Dover Street Residence made collection efforts much more difficult.
Finally, Evseroff’s intent to shield his assets from the IRS’s collection is demonstrated by the fact that he retained the benefits of ownership of the Dover Street Residence after he transferred it to the Trust for no consideration. As noted above, Evseroff continued to live in the residence after the transfer. Evseroff argues that he was, in fact, renting the residence from the Trust, as evidenced by the Transfer Agreement that obligated him to pay certain expenses in lieu of rent, (Evseroff Mem. at 4; J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12), and that his ability to live in the house was limited by the fact that the trustees had the power to sell the house at any time, (Evseroff Mem. at A-2). But neither of these arguments is persuasive.
As discussed infra Part II, Evseroff’s post-transfer payment of the mortgage and other expenses related to the property in lieu of rent were the type of payments that an owner of property would make, not those that a renter would make. Additionally, although the trustees nominally had the power to remove Evseroff from the Dover Street Residence, there was no evidence that they would actually utilize that power because, as discussed more fully infra Part III, Evseroff dominated the Trust to such a degree that it was not a bona fide entity, but merely an extension of Evseroff. Among other things, the trustees were his friends and business associates, and at least one trustee was unaware of any duties he had as a trustee. (Schneider Dep. Tr. at 19-20.) Although the Trust could have removed Evseroff from the Dover Street Residence, as a practical matter, Evseroff’s enjoyment of the residence was secure, allowing him to enjoy use and occupancy of the Dover Street Residence as an owner would, given the lack of evidence that either Evseroff or the Trust ever tried to rent or sell the property. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *4.
Evseroff’s de facto ownership of the Dover Street Residence is further demonstrated by the fact that Evseroff received no consideration for transferring the Dover Street Residence to the Trust. (J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12.) The lack of consideration to Evseroff indicates that Evseroff was not relinquishing any rights to the property in exchange for which he would be paid. And because his sons were the beneficiaries of the Trust, the transfer allowed Evseroff to ensure that they would receive the Dover Street Residence upon his passing, as they would have had he remained the owner of the property.[12]
Evseroff responds that his true intention was not to avoid paying his taxes to the United States, but rather to engage in estate planning — primarily by ensuring that his assets passed to his two sons rather than to his estranged wife on his passing. The Post-Trial Order found that Evseroff’s estate planning motive was but one of his motives in addition to protecting the assets from the IRS and his estranged wife at the time that he created the Trust, Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3, and there is no reason to question that finding. Nonetheless, even if Evseroff was motivated to create the Trust, in part, by his desire to provide an inheritance for his sons and shield his assets from his wife, his intent to evade the IRS’s collection effort was substantial and sufficient on its own. Evidence in the record, as discussed above, demonstrates Evseroff’s intent to shield his assets specifically from the government’s collection efforts. Moreover, the IRS was seeking to collect much more than Evseroff’s wife was likely to obtain in a divorce settlement as she did not seek a settlement during the years of their separation. Thus, Evseroff’s intent to evade, hinder, delay, and frustrate the IRS’s collection efforts was sufficient to cause him to transfer the assets to the Trust, regardless of any additional motive that he might have had. Accordingly, Evseroff’s transfer of the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 to the Trust was fraudulent as provided by New York Debtor and Creditor Law sec. 276. See Capital Distributions Servs., 440 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (noting that the remedy for a fraudulent conveyance is that the creditor may collect upon the fraudulently conveyed property).[13]
II. Nominee
The government also argues that it should also be able to collect upon the Dover Street Residence and the $220,000 because Evseroff is the real owner of both. Though both assets are legally held by the Trust, the government argues that the Trust merely holds them as Evseroff’s nominee.[14] “Under the nominee doctrine, an owner of property may be considered a mere `nominee’ and thus may be considered to hold only bare legal title to the property.” United States v. Snyder, 233 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (D. Conn. 2002).
The nominee theory focuses
on the relationship between the taxpayer and the property . . . to discern whether a taxpayer has engaged in a sort of legal fiction, for federal tax purposes, by placing legal title to property in the hands of another while, in actuality, retaining all or some of the benefits of being the true owner.
Richards v. United States (In re Richards), 231 B.R. 571, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1999). As distinct from the government’s claim that Evseroff’s conveyances were actually fraudulent, a nominee finding can be made even where there was no intent to defraud creditors or hinder collection efforts. In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 579-80 (finding that a trust held assets as a taxpayer’s nominee even when the conveyance of the property to the trust was not fraudulent). Rather than intent, the nominee theory focuses on control. Id.
The nominee theory also differs from the alter ego theory in that the nominee theory focuses on the taxpayer’s control over and benefit from the property while the alter ego theory emphasizes the taxpayer’s control over the entity that holds the property.[15] Compare In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 579 (discussing the nominee theory and noting that “the critical consideration is whether the taxpayer exercised active or substantial control over the property”), and United States v. Stonier, No. 88 N 993, 1994 WL 395644, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 1994) (listing five factors for making a nominee determination, three of which relate to the transferor’s control over or benefit from the property), with Babitt v. Vebeliunas (In re Vebeliunas), 332 F.3d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the alter ego theory and noting that an individual must control the corporation for alter ego liability to attach); and Dean v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (collecting cases and stating that “the common thrust . . . is that the alter ego doctrine will apply when the delinquent taxpayer is really in control of the corporation or trust and so dominates it that the corporate or trust form exists, but there is no substance to it”).
Where a nominee relationship is found, the government may access only the property held on the taxpayer’s behalf by the nominee, not all property of the nominee. See In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 580; see also Giardino v. United States, No. 96-CV-6348T, 1997 WL 1038197, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1997) (“[T]he government has the authority to seize or levy on the property of the taxpayer held by the nominee in order to collect the tax liabilities of the taxpayer.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
In determining whether a taxpayer’s property is held by a nominee, courts examine:
(1) whether inadequate or no consideration was paid by the nominee; (2) whether the property was placed in the nominee’s name in anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability while the transferor remains in control of the property; (3) whether there is a close relationship between the nominee and the transferor; (4) whether they failed to record the conveyance; (5) whether the transferor retains possession; and (6) whether the transferor continues to enjoy the benefits of the transferred property.
Giardino, 19libu97 WL 1038197, at *2 (citation omitted); LiButti v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 71, 76 (N.D.N.Y 1997); see also In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 579 (considering these factors as well as whether the transferor spent personal funds maintaining the property). As noted above, “the critical consideration is whether the taxpayer exercised active or substantial control over the property.” In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 579 (citation omitted). The government bears the burden of proving that the taxpayer’s property is held by a nominee.[16]
In the instant case, the Trust held the Dover Street Residence, but not the $220,000, as Evseroff’s nominee. Turning first to the Dover Street Residence, an examination of the factors listed above demonstrates that the Trust was Evseroff’s nominee. Considering the first factor, the Trust paid no consideration to Evseroff for the property. (J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12.) Evidence in the record indicates that the second factor is satisfied in that the Trust was created and the property was transferred in anticipation of Evseroff’s liability to the IRS and possibly his estranged wife, and Evseroff remained in possession and control of the Dover Street Residence. The third factor is also satisfied in that Evseroff had a close relationship with the trustees, having selected close friends and associates to manage the Trust. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *9.
As for the fifth and sixth factors, there is substantial evidence in the record that Evseroff retained and enjoyed possession and control of the Dover Street Residence, even after title was legally transferred to the Trust. Despite the transfer, Evseroff retained possession of the Dover Street Residence and benefitted from it as though he were an owner: he continued to live in the Dover Street Residence without paying rent although he continued to pay the mortgage and other expenses necessary to operate and maintain the property, including taxes, water, sewer charges, utilities, fuel, and insurance (J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12); he remained the named beneficiary of the flood and fire insurance policies (J. Evseroff Dep., Exs. 32-33; Evseroff Mem. at A-7); and there is no evidence that the Trust ever officially assumed the mortgage for the Dover Street Residence nor did the Trust claim the mortgage interest deduction between 1992 and 1998 (see 02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Exs. 1-7; Evseroff Mem. at A-2, A-3). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Trust ever took any action that would have interfered with Evseroff’s enjoyment of the property: his rental agreement had no set end date (J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12) and there is no evidence that the Trust ever contemplated selling or renting the property to anyone other than Evseroff. These facts all indicate that Evseroff retained possession and benefitted from his use and occupancy of the Dover Street Residence much as he had when he held legal title to it. Cf. In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 580.
In response, Evseroff argues that the Trust was not his nominee with regard to the Dover Street Residence because: (1) his status was that of a renter rather than that of an owner, as demonstrated by the fact that he paid the mortgage and upkeep costs on the property in lieu of rent;(2) he only had a license to the property, and therefore could have been evicted at any time; and (3) he did not act like an owner in that he never tried to sell the property. None of these arguments is persuasive.
With regard to Evseroff’s first argument, the mere fact that Evseroff made some payments relating to the property does not rebut the inference that he was the de facto owner of the property. See City View Trust v. Hutton, No. 98-CV-1001-B, 1998 WL 1031525, at *10 (D. Wyo. Nov. 02, 1998). The payments Evseroff made in exchange for his occupancy of the property — taxes, insurance, water and the mortgage — were precisely those that an owner of the property would make. The Trust did not claim Evseroff’s payments between 1992 and 1998 as income, the Trust’s tax returns were prepared by Evseroff’s accountant and sent to Evseroff rather than the Trust, and the Trust did not claim mortgage interest deductions but did claim real estate tax deductions between 1994 and 1998. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *3, *11; (see 02/21/02 Blumer Dep. Tr. at 39, Exs. 1-7). Indeed, payment of upkeep costs for a property has been specifically identified as a factor favoring a nominee finding. In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 579. Thus, the inference that the Trust was merely his nominee is a strong one.
Moreover, the payments that a renter would have made on the Dover Street Residence would have differed greatly from those that Evseroff made. Although Evseroff made mortgage payments for about five years after the inception of the purported lease, after that he was only responsible for the property’s upkeep and expenses. (Tr. at 91-93; J. Evseroff Ex. 12.) Therefore, after the mortgage was paid off, the Trust received no net return on the Dover Street Residence. Were the Trust truly the owner, it would have sought to receive market rental rates, which would likely have exceeded the mere cost of maintaining the property. Furthermore, even for the term where Evseroff was paying for both the mortgage and the upkeep of the property, those combined payments were still low in comparison to the property’s fair market value in 1992 of $515,000.
Evseroff’s argument that he was merely a licensee who could have been evicted from the property at any time fares no better. According to Evseroff, because the agreement allowing him to live in the Dover Street Residence did not contain an end date, it did not constitute a lease under New York law. (Evseroff Mem. at 9.) Instead, Evseroff contends that the agreement was a mere license, revocable at any time. (Id.)
Even assuming that Evseroff is correct regarding the legal status of the agreement, it would provide little support for his argument that he did not exercise active control over the property. Given Evseroff’s control over the Trust, see infra Part III, there was no realistic prospect that his possession and enjoyment of the Dover Street Residence would be challenged. A merely theoretical possibility that the transferor could be evicted does nothing to rebut a nominee finding. See City View Trust, 1998 WL 1031525, at *10.
Finally, Evseroff’s argument that he did not act like an owner in that he never tried to sell the property and never attempted to use it as collateral for a loan is not enough to avoid a nominee finding given the evidence discussed above. See Evseroff, 270 F. App’x at 78 (citing LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1997)). Many property owners neither use their property as collateral (apart from their mortgage) nor attempt to sell their property. Thus, the fact that Evseroff has not attempted to sell the Dover Street Residence and has not pledged it as collateral does little to refute that he was acting as the de facto owner of the property. Accordingly, the Trust plainly holds the Dover Street Residence as Evseroff’s nominee and the United States may therefore recover against the Dover Street Residence under a nominee theory.
The government, however, has not shown that the Trust holds the $220,000 as Evseroff’s nominee. Indeed, only a few thousand dollars have ever been distributed by the Trust, and that money went towards paying taxes owed by the Trust, namely, income taxes on interest earned by the Trust and real estate taxes in specific years for the Dover Street Residence. (See Tr. at 61; J. Evseroff Dep. Tr. at 126-27; 02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Exs. 1-7.) There is no evidence that those funds were distributed at Evseroff’s direction. And even if they were, the distribution benefitted the Trust significantly more than it benefitted Evseroff.[17]
The overall objective of the nominee analysis is to determine whether the debtor retained the practical benefits of ownership while transferring legal title. See In re Richards, 231 B.R. at 578. The most important factors in the nominee analysis center on the transferor retaining possession of the property and deriving benefits from it. See id. at 579. Given that the money held by the Trust has remained substantially unused by Evseroff, he has neither retained possession nor derived benefit from the funds.
The government responds by emphasizing Evseroff’s control over the funds. According to the government, the fact that the Trust’s cash has remained undistributed demonstrates Evseroff’s control of the funds because Evseroff did not want the funds to be distributed. (Gov’t Mem. at 4 (citing Tr. at 61; J. Evseroff Dep. Tr. at 126-27).) The fact that the Trust’s retention of the funds was consistent with Evseroff’s wishes, however, is of minimal evidentiary value without some evidence that Evseroff controlled the funds by actions intended to ensure that the Trust funds would not be distributed. In that regard, there is no evidence that Evseroff intervened to prevent any disbursements that would have been made if the Trust really were the owner of the $220,000. Absent any evidence that Evseroff actively tried to control the Trust funds, the government has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Evseroff was a nominee of the funds.
III. Alter Ego
Finally, the government argues that it should be able to reach the assets held in the Trust because the Trust is Evseroff’s alter ego.
The alter ego doctrine arose from the law of corporations and allows a creditor to disregard the corporate form (also known as “piercing the corporate veil”) either by using an owner’s assets to satisfy a corporation’s debt or by using the corporation’s assets to satisfy the individual’s debt. See State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 1995). The essence of the alter ego theory is that the entity in question really has no separate existence — it is merely a tool of someone or something else. See Bridgestone/Firestone v. Recovery Credit Servs., 98 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1996).[18]
Although the New York Court of Appeals has never held that the alter ego theory may be applied to reach assets held in a trust, In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d at 90-91; Winchester Global Trust Co. v. Donovan, 880 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Table), 2009 WL 294685, at *9-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Feb. 4, 2009) (noting the lack of precedent but finding that veil piercing applies to trusts), there is no policy reason why veil piercing would apply only to corporations but not to trusts. The policy behind corporate veil piercing is to prevent a debtor from using the corporate legal form to unjustly avoid liability. See Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S. Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1991). That policy applies equally to trusts. Cf. Winchester Global Trust, 2009 WL 294685, at *9-10. Moreover, there is some precedent indicating that the alter ego doctrine also applies to trusts. See Evseroff, 270 F. Appx. at 77-78; see also Dean, 987 F. Supp. at 1165; Katz v. Alpert, 919 N.Y.S.2d 148, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011); Winchester Global Trust, 2009 WL 294685, at *9-10. Accordingly, for the reasons below, the alter ego theory will be applied to the Trust.
To pierce the veil in New York, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the owner exercised such control that the corporation has become a mere instrumentality of the owner, who is the real actor; (2) the owner used this control to commit a fraud or `other wrong’; and (3) the fraud or wrong results in an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff.” In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d at 91-92 (citations omitted); see also Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 138 (noting that the alter ego theory and the three factor test discussed above “are indistinguishable . . . and should be treated as interchangeable” (citation omitted)).
With regard to the question of Evseroff’s control over the Trust, the relevant factors can be drawn by analogy from the corporate context. In analyzing the alter ego question as it relates to a corporation, courts consider factors such as “the absence of . . . formalities . . ., the amount of business discretion displayed by the allegedly dominated corporation . . ., whether the related corporations deal with the dominated corporation at arms length .. . [and] whether the corporation in question had property that was used by other of the corporations as if it were its own.” In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d at 91 n.3 (citation omitted). Though these factors require adaptation as applied to a trust, they nonetheless provide some guidance in determining the issue of control. In particular, they indicate that it is necessary to examine whether the Trust’s formalities were observed, whether the Trust exercised its own discretion and made its own decisions as an entity, and whether it dealt with Evseroff at arms length or whether Evseroff effectively controlled the Trust’s property.
These factors all indicate that Evseroff dominated the Trust. Trust formalities were so poorly observed as to give rise to an inference that the Trust was not a bona fide entity. To be sure, a trust instrument was prepared, tax returns were filed on behalf of the Trust, and trustees were appointed. The Trust, however, did not book the payments Evseroff made in lieu of rent as income between 1992 and 1998 on its tax returns. (See 02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Exs. 1-7.) The Trust never officially assumed the mortgage for the Dover Street Residence. (See Gov’t Mem. at 3; Evseroff Mem. at A-2, A-3.) Thus, the Trust did not claim the mortgage interest deduction for the Dover Street Residence between 1992 and 1998 — although it did claim the deduction for real estate taxes between 1994 and 1998. (See 02/21/02 Blumer Dep., Exs. 1-7.) Instead, Evseroff paid the mortgage interest and, for some years, paid real estate taxes and claimed the deductions. (Tr. at 50-51; see Gov’t Mem. at 3, 5.) Evseroff remained the named beneficiary of the flood and fire insurance policies on the Dover Street Residence. (J. Evseroff Dep., Exs. 32-33; Evseroff Mem. at A-7.) Finally, Evseroff’s accountant prepared the Trust’s tax returns as a professional courtesy to Evseroff, spent only half an hour to prepare them, and sent the Trust returns to Evseroff rather than the trustees. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *3, *11; (02/21/02 Blumer Dep. Tr. at 36-39). All of the above evidence demonstrates both that there was little substance to the Trust and that it was merely an extension of Evseroff.
The manner in which the Trust was managed also demonstrates that it was merely an extension of Evseroff. Though trustees were appointed, there is little evidence that they played an active role in making decisions for the Trust. One apparently believed that he had no Trust responsibilities until Evseroff’s death. (Schneider Dep. Tr. at 20.)
Having trustees play an active role in managing the trust is an important factor in deciding whether to respect the form of a trust. See Dean, 987 F. Supp. at 1165. Moreover, active involvement of trustees of the sort that would support the separate existence of a trust looks very different than the minimal involvement present here. See id.[19] Accordingly, the trustees’ lack of substantial control over the Trust is an important point in favor of the government.
Similarly, Evseroff also evinced his domination of the Trust by controlling its property to a high degree. As discussed supra Part II, Evseroff acted as the owner of the Dover Street Residence. He made the same payments that an owner would make and had a similar degree of practical control over and enjoyment of the property as an owner would have. Although Evseroff’s domination of the $220,000 in the Trust appears to have been more limited, see supra Part II, that fact does not undermine the significant countervailing evidence that Evseroff dominated the Trust. In 1992, when Evseroff transferred the assets into the Trust, the Dover Street Residence was worth approximately $515,000, making it by far the Trust’s most valuable asset. Evseroff’s control over the Dover Street Residence establishes a high degree of dominance over Trust property, further evincing his dominance over the Trust. Thus, it is clear that Evseroff had the requisite degree of control over the Trust to support an alter ego finding.
Because Evseroff controlled the Trust, it is necessary to determine whether he used that control to commit a fraud or wrong against the government, and whether that wrong resulted in an unjust loss. In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d at 91-92. On the facts presented here, these elements are plainly satisfied. As noted above, Evseroff essentially used the Trust to shield his assets from attack by those with potential claims upon them, including the government. Moreover, given the potential claims on Evseroff’s assets, and his demonstrated ability to shield his liquid assets from collection through a series of transfers, see Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3, Evseroff’s use of the Trust undoubtedly caused damage to the government by hindering its collection of taxes. Indeed, the government’s continuing difficulties collecting Evseroff’s taxes are evidence of the damage caused.
As a result, the government may collect against all assets held by the Trust. The essence of the alter ego theory is that the existence of the Trust as a separate entity is a fiction — in fact the Trust is Evseroff. See Claudio v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 581, 587-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“`The courts will look beyond the fiction of corporate entity and hold two corporations to constitute a single unit in legal contemplation, where one is so related to, or organized, or controlled by, the other as to be its mere agent, instrumentality, or alter ego.'” (citation omitted)); see also Austin Powder Co. v. McCullough, 628 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995) (noting that where an “alter ego” finding is made “the corporate form may be disregarded to achieve an equitable result”). Based on the court’s determination that the Trust is but an alter ego of Evseroff, its assets should be subject to collection just as if they were held by Evseroff. Moreover, there appears to be no reason why it would be inequitable for the government to collect on all assets held by the Trust on the facts of this case. Accordingly, all of the Trust’s assets are subject to collection.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the government may proceed to collect against all assets held by the Trust established by Evseroff. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to enter judgment in favor of the United States and to close the case.
So ordered.
[1] The IRS also assessed additional liabilities based on Evseroff’s 1991, 1992, and 1996 tax returns. Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *6.
[2] All deposition transcripts and exhibits referenced herein were admitted into the trial record, subject to relevance objections. (See Transcript of Trial held on November 7 and 8, 2005 (“Tr.”) at 86-87.)
[3] The Transfer Agreement also appears to transfer a Florida residence owned by Evseroff to the Trust in October 1992. (See J. Evseroff Dep., Ex. 12.) It appears, however, that title to the Florida residence remained with Evseroff, see Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3, and thus the transfer of the Florida residence to the Trust apparently never took place. In any case, the status of the Florida residence is not material to the outcome here. The government does not claim that such a residence was fraudulently conveyed. Moreover, if the Florida residence had been conveyed to the Trust, it would only further indicate the weakness of Evseroff’s financial condition after the two conveyances at issue here and thereby support the legal conclusions detailed below.
[4] The record does not contain information on this point for years after 1998.
[5] For the reasons described below, Evseroff’s pension fund and tax assets may not be readily accessible to the United States.
[6] This figure includes $230,000 for Evseroff’s Florida residence, $75,575 for his law practice, and $541,767 for a Citibank account, which may be a pension account. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3-4.
[7] This figure includes $230,000 for Evseroff’s Florida residence, $75,575 for his law practice, $308,304 for a Citibank pension account, $47,000 for a Republic Bank Keogh account, an estimated $220,000 in savings accounts or money market accounts, and $541,767 for a different Citibank account, which may have been a pension account. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3-4. This figure does not include the $577,000 cash amount that Evseroff listed in response to the government’s first interrogatories (see Gov’t Ex. 6, at 5), which may be duplicative of the accounts listed above, see Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3, *5.
[8] As of the beginning of 1992, Evseroff’s retirement accounts consisted of a Citibank pension account valued at $308,304 and a Republic Bank Keogh account valued at $47,000. See Evseroff V, 2006 WL 2792750, at *3. Neither party has established whether the Citibank account containing $541,767 was a retirement account or another type of account, and thus whether it was readily accessible. Id. at *6.
[9] The government appealed only the actual fraud and nominee/alter ego findings; it did not appeal the constructive fraud finding. Evseroff, 270 F. App’x at 77.
[10] The government argues that Evseroff’s pension funds should be excluded from the calculation of his assets because they were, at the very least, more difficult to collect. It is true that pension funds receive substantial protection from creditors under state law. Cf. Pauk v. Pauk, 648 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1996); 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions sec. 198 (2009). There is little impediment, however, to the immediate collection of pension funds by the IRS. The IRS has broad powers to access a taxpayer’s assets notwithstanding protections available for pension funds under state law. See 26 U.S.C. sec. 6334(a),(c) (1992) (noting that “[n]otwithstanding any other law of the United States . . . no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a),” which does not exempt retirement accounts like Evseroff’s). Moreover, “[s]tate law define[s] the nature of the taxpayer’s interest in the property, but the state-law consequences of that definition are of no concern to the operation of the federal tax law.” United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 723 (1985) (holding that state laws governing creditors’ rights did not impair the IRS’s levy power); see also Jacobs v. IRS (In re Jacobs), 147 B.R. 106, 108-09 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the IRS could levy on a pension fund protected from creditors under state law). Indeed, the IRS can levy upon and force the immediate liquidation of an IRA where the taxpayer can withdraw his funds. Kane v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., 145 F.3d 1218, 1221-24 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the IRS stands in the shoes of the taxpayer for levy purposes (citations omitted)). As Evseroff apparently had the ability to withdraw and use his pension funds (see Tr. at 96-97), the government likely could have accessed the funds as well. Accordingly, the pension funds should not be categorically excluded from consideration in Evseroff’s asset total. Furthermore, even if the IRS were unable to collect from Evseroff’s pension funds, it would not affect the result reached here.
[11] Evseroff argues in his post-remand submission that he was acting in good faith because he believed that the IRS had accepted his offer to settle his tax liabilities for approximately $110,000 in 1993 (the “initial offer in compromise”). See Evseroff IV, 2004 WL 3127981, at *1; (Evseroff Mem. at 5, 21-22.) The evidence of this purported settlement, however, was not admitted at trial and will not be considered except as discussed here.
Prior to trial, the government indicated that it could prove that this alleged settlement was fraudulent and, indeed, had done so in another action. See Evseroff IV, 2004 WL 3127981, at * 1; see also Evseroff III, 2003 WL 22872522, at *4. The government also represented that it had evidence of a series of other offers in compromise that Evseroff submitted. (See Tr. at 24-26.) The government argued that these other offers were in bad faith and designed to delay collection efforts. (See id.) Evidence of these other offers in compromise would, however, have been extremely time-consuming to present.
In a pre-trial evidentiary ruling, the court held that Evseroff could not introduce evidence of the initial offer in compromise unless the government introduced evidence of the other offers in compromise. (See Tr. at 23-26, 193-94.) As the government never sought to introduce evidence regarding the other offers in compromise, the door was not opened to Evseroff to present evidence regarding the initial offer in compromise.
Evseroff claims that the door was opened to the evidence of the initial offer in compromise because the government relied on evidence regarding Evseroff’s actions after the transfers to the Trust. The evidentiary ruling, however, did not specify that this sort of evidence would open the door to evidence regarding the offer in compromise. Moreover, post-transfer evidence is commonly and properly offered as evidence of intent in fraudulent conveyance cases. Cf. Steinberg, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (noting that a debtor’s retention of control after the legal transfer of the property supports a finding of an actually fraudulent conveyance). Even apart from the evidentiary ruling, the government’s post-transfer evidence would not open the door to the offer in compromise evidence Evseroff wishes to present and it will not be considered. By contrast, the court will consider the government’s evidence of Evseroff’s post-transfer actions to the extent it is relevant to Evseroff’s intent.
[12] Although Evseroff’s transfer of the Dover Street Residence does not bear directly on the $220,000 transfer, the fact that the two transfers were made at around the same time indicates that Evseroff’s intent regarding the $220,000 transfer was the same as that regarding the Dover Street Residence.
[13] If these assets have been damaged or disbursed, a money judgment may also be available. Capital Distributions Servs., 440 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (citations omitted). Additionally, the creditor is generally entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. (citing N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law. sec. 276-a).
[14] The nominee and alter ego issues have generally been discussed together in the prior opinions and filings in this case. As discussed later in this decision, however, there are relevant analytical differences between the two theories.
[15] Although some authority discerns little practical difference between the nominee and alter ego theories, see United States v. Engels, No. C98-2096, 2001 WL 1346652, at *6 (N.D. Iowa. Sept. 24, 2001), for reasons discussed below, the differences between the nominee and alter ego theories are relevant in this case.
[16] The parties dispute whether the government must prove that the Trust is held by Evseroff’s nominee by a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Because I find that the government’s proof satisfies either standard with regard to the Dover Street residence and fails to satisfy either standard with regard to the $220,000, I need not resolve this dispute.
[17] The government argues that the distribution to pay the real estate taxes for the Dover Street Residence benefitted Evseroff because he had a contractual duty to the Trust to pay those taxes. The government, however, ignores the fact that the distribution also benefitted the Trust. The Trust, as owner of the property, had an independent duty to pay taxes on the residence. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law sec. 926(1) (“The owner of real property . . . shall be personally liable for the taxes levied thereon.”); id. sec. 304(2) (Although a renter may have an interest in the real property that makes the renter subject to personal tax liability, “[n]othing in this subdivision shall relieve the owner of real property from the obligation for paying all taxes due on the real property under his ownership or vitiate the sale of said real property for unpaid taxes or special ad valorem levies.”). Therefore, the fact that the Trust distributed Trust funds to pay taxes for the Dover Street Residence does not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the funds were being used to benefit Evseroff, and not the Trust.
[18] As with the nominee issue, the parties dispute whether the government must prove that the Trust was Evseroff’s alter ego by a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Because I find that the government’s proof satisfies either standard, I need not resolve this dispute.
[19] The Dean court respected the legal form of a trust as established by two parents for the benefit of their children against IRS collection efforts when, among other things:
[O]ther than a brief period . . ., the trustees executed all documents requiring signatures by the owner of the trust property. Tax returns were executed by the trustee. Checks were signed by the trustees. The trustees decided how to spend trust assets, when to make repairs on the rental property, and the rent to be paid by tenants. The trustees borrowed and repaid money in the name of the trust. In other words, the legal control of the trust assets has consistently been exercised by the trustee, not the taxpayer.

Law and Precedent Supporting the 541 Trust®

STATEMENT OF THE LAW

Our 541 Trust® is built on two irrefutable legal principles:

1.         With respect to an irrevocable trust, a creditor of the settlor may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor’s benefit (Essentially, if the trust is self-settled, it is vulnerable).  See Uniform Trust Code Section 505; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS Section 156(2) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Section 58(2). This principle has been adopted in hundreds of cases throughout the country and many states have enacted statutes with this identical language. For example, see Alabama Code Section 19-3B-505; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-7705; Cal. Prob. Code § 15304; Ga. Code Ann. § 53-12-28(c); Florida Trust Code Section 736.0505(b); Ind. Code Ann. § 30-4-3-2; Kan. Stat. Ann, §33-101; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§2004(2); Michigan Code Section 7506(c)(2), Mo. Ann. Stat. § 456.080.3(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 72-33-305; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5205(c); Ohio Code Section 5805.06; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, §175.25G; Pennsylvania Code Title 20 §7745; R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-9.1-1; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §112.035(d); Utah Code Section 75-7-505(b); Virginia Code Section 55-545.05 ); W. Va. Code §36-1-18 (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. §701.06(1).

2.         A settlor can retain a special power of appointment without subjecting the trust to the claims of creditors.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS Section 22.1; US Bankruptcy Code Section 541(b)(1), California Probate Code Section 681; Delaware Code Section 3536; Georgia Code Section 23-2-111; New York Code 10-7.1; Also see cases set forth below.

APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE 541 TRUST®

The 541 Trust® is an irrevocable trust that includes the following features:

1.         The settlor is not a beneficiary and no distributions can be made to or for the settlor’s benefit.

2.         The settlor retains a “special power of appointment” which allows the settlor to change the trustees, the beneficiaries, or the terms of the 541 Trust® at any time (except that the assets cannot be distributed to or for the settlor’s benefit). In addition, the settlor can appoint assets to any other person at any time.

Creditors have no claim against the 541 Trust® because no distributions can be made for the settlor’s benefit. The cases and statutes set forth below show that these powers of appointment do not give creditors any claim against the 541 Trust®There are no statutes, cases, secondary sources or commentaries to the contrary.

COURT CASES

In re Jane McLean Brown, D. C. Docket No. 01-14026-CV-DLG (11th Cir. 2002) Defendant funded irrevocable trust and retained an income interest and a special power of appointment over principal. 11th Circuit analyzes creditor’s access to an irrevocable trust. The trust principal was not included in the defendant’s bankruptcy estate. To read the case, follow this link: In re Jane McLean Brown

In Estate of German, 7 Cl. Ct. 641 (1985) (85-1 USTC Par 13,610 (CCH)) – Assets of an irrevocable trust were not subject to the creditors of the settlor despite the fact that the trustees and beneficiaries had power to appoint the assets to the settlor.

Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997) – 5th Circuit Court holds that the portion of the trust that was not self-settled is not included in the bankruptcy estate, and assets subject to a special power of appointment are excluded from the bankruptcy estate. To read this case, click Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank                 

In re Hicks, 22 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D.Ga.1982) – A court cannot compel the exercise of a special power of appointment and the assets of the trust were not included in the bankruptcy estate of a permissible appointee. To read this case, click In-re-Hicks

In re Knight, 164 B.R. 372 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1994) – The interest of a contingent beneficiary was included in the bankruptcy estate, but the interest of a permissible appointee of a power of appointment was too remote to be property and was not included in the bankruptcy estate. To read this case, click In re Knight

In re Colish, 289 B.R. 523 (Bankr.E.D. N.Y. 2002) – The interest of a contingent beneficiary was included in the bankruptcy estate. The court distinguished this from Knight and Hicks where the interest of a permissible appointee under a power of appointment was not included. To read this case, click Colish-v-United-States

Cooley v. Cooley, 628 A.2d 608 (1993) – A special power of appointment is not a part of the marital estate that can be awarded in a divorce action. As one of the possible objects of the defendant’s power, the plaintiff possesses no more than a mere expectancy. To read this case, click Cooley-v-Cooley

 Cote v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., No. 4:03-CV-296-A, 2003 WL 23194260 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2003) – Permissible appointee is not an “interested person” with standing to sue the trust. This is relevant because if the permissible appointee has no standing to sue the trust, neither should a creditor of a permissible appointee.

Avis v. Gold, 178 F.3d 718 (1999) – Permissible appointee had no interest which could be included in the bankruptcy estate, or to which an IRS tax lien could attach, prior to the time the power was exercised in favor of the debtor.

Horsley v. Maher, U.S. Bankruptcy Ct. Case No. 385-00071 (1988) – debtor was a permissible appointee of Trust A and a beneficiary of Trust B. Trust A was not included in the bankruptcy estate because “the debtor holds no interest in Trust A.” The assets of Trust B were included in the bankruptcy estate.

  1. S. v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (1994) – Assets subject to discretionary special power of appointment not subject to tax lien

Spetz v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 737 N.Y.S. 2d 524 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua Co, Jan. 15, 2002) – New York Supreme Court holds that special power of appointment does not cause trust assets to be taken into account for purposes of Medicaid qualification

Verdow v. Sutkowy, 209 F.R.D. 309 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) – Assets subject to special power of appointment not taken into account for purposes of Medicaid qualification

United States v. Baldwin, 391 A.2d 844 (1978) – Assets subject to special power of appointment not subject to tax lien

Estate of Ballard v. Commissioner, 47 BTA 784 (1942), aff’d, 138 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1943) – Assets of trust not included in husband’s estate merely because wife had the power to return the assets to the husband.

Kneeland v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 34 BTA 816 – Board of Tax Appeals (1936) – Assets of trust not included in husband’s estate merely because wife had the power to return the assets to the husband.

Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 US 93 (Supreme Court 1935) – Assets of trust not included in wife’s estate merely because the beneficiaries had the power to terminate the trust and return the assets back to the wife.

Price v. Cherbonnier, 63 Atl 209 (1906) – Creditors of the donee of a special power of appointment cannot reach the assets subject to the power.

Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 194 (1881) – Assets subject to power of appointment not subject to claims of creditors.

Jones v. Clifton, 101 US 225 (1879) – Assets subject to power of appointment not subject to claims of creditors.

Holmes v. Coghill, 33 Eng. Rep 79 (1806) – Assets subject to power of appointment not subject to claims of creditors.

____________________________________________________________________________

For an excellent summary of the law supporting this kind of trust (from an unrelated law firm), see Asset Protection Planning with Trusts – A Practical Overview by Alexander A. Bove, Jr. published in Journal of Practical Estate Planning (CCH Inc., April-May 2002).

Building a Better Asset Protection Trust/ as published in Estate Planning Magazine

Estate Planning Journal (WG&L)
Volume 38, Number 01, January 2011
Use ‘Powers’ to Build a Better Asset Protection Trust, Estate Planning Journal, Jan 2011

 

Use ‘Powers’ to Build a Better Asset Protection Trust

A creatively drafted special power of appointment can be used to increase flexibility, asset protection, and anonymity of a trust.

Author: LEE S. McCULLOUGH, III, ATTORNEY

LEE S. McCULLOUGH, III practices exclusively in the areas of estate planning and asset protection in Provo, Utah. He also teaches estate planning as an adjunct professor at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University

An asset protection trust can provide a person with security and peace of mind by ensuring that some assets are protected against future potential liabilities. State and federal laws support the use of an asset protection trust that is designed and funded in an ethical manner. Fraudulent transfer laws prevent the use of an asset protection trust to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

For the past several decades, most asset protection trusts have been based on the concept of a self-settled trust. 1 Historically, the general rule has been to deny asset protection to a self-settled trust. 2 This began to change when laws were passed in offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cook Islands and the Isle of Man, which protect the assets in a self-settled trust. Beginning with the Alaska Trust Act in 1997, 13 states now offer some degree of asset protection for a self-settled trust:

(1) Alaska.

(2) Colorado.

(3) Delaware.

(4) Hawaii.

(5) Missouri.

(6) Nevada.

(7) New Hampshire.

(8) Oklahoma.

(9) Rhode Island.

(10) Missouri.

(11) Tennessee.

(12) Utah.

(13) Wyoming.

Although this concept has dominated the discussion and the practice of designing asset protection trusts, it is not the only option. The special power of appointment, an old reliable tool, can be implemented to replace and improve on the concept of a self-settled trust.

The special power of appointment is perhaps the most powerful and unappreciated tool in estate planning and asset protection. While most estate planners regularly use special powers of appointments to add flexibility to trust documents, most fail to recognize many of the most powerful uses of this tool. Whether designing a trust solely to protect against potential creditors, or to protect against estate taxes as well, a special power of appointment can be used to build a better asset protection trust.

Powers of appointment are nothing new

The concept of a power of appointment has been a part of the English common law for hundreds of years. This concept is well recognized in all 50 states and in the federal tax laws. 3 Although some minor variations in the law pertaining to powers of appointment have occurred over time, the basic principles, which form the basis of this article, have never varied. These basic principles are summarized below.

Key terminology. Familiarity with the following terms is crucial to an understanding of the strategies discussed below:

A power of appointment is a power that enables the donee of the power, acting in a nonfiduciary capacity, to designate recipients of beneficial ownership interests in the appointive property. 4The “donor” is the person who created the power of appointment.The “donee” is the person on whom the power is conferred (and who may exercise the power).The “permissible appointees” or “objects” are the persons for whom the power may be exercised.An “appointee” is a person to whom an appointment has been made.A “taker in default of appointment” is a person who will receive the property if the power is not exercised. 5

A power of appointment is “general” to the extent that the power is exercisable in favor of the donee, the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee or the donee’s estate, regardless of whether the power is also exercisable in favor of others. 6 A power that is not general is referred to as a “special” or “nongeneral” power of appointment.

Basic rules pertaining to asset protection and estate tax inclusion. Property that is subject to a presently exercisable general power of appointment is generally subject to the creditors of the donee because it is a power that is equivalent to ownership. 7 On the other hand, property subject to a special power of appointment is exempt from claims of the donee’s creditors. 8 The donee of a special power of appointment is not considered to have a property interest in the property subject to the power because it cannot be exercised for the economic benefit of the donee. 9 Because the donee has no property interest, the property subject to the power of appointment is not included among the property of the donee for purposes of judgment collection, bankruptcy, 10 divorce, Medicaid eligibility, estate tax inclusion, 11 or other determinations that involve the property of the donee.

Similarly, a permissible appointee (including the donor) has no property interest in a power of appointment. 12 Any attempt to include the interest of a permissible appointee for purposes of judgment collection, bankrupty, divorce, Medicaid eligibility, estate tax inclusion, or other determinations that involve the property of the donee would be a logical and practical impossibility because most special powers of appointment include everyone in the world as a permissible appointee, except for the donee, the donee’s estate, and the creditors of the donee and the donee’s estate.

Replacing the self-settled asset protection trust

An irrevocable trust with a special power of appointment that includes the donor as a permissible appointee (referred to herein as a “special power of appointment trust”) can be used to replace and improve on the concept of a self-settled asset protection trust. Both the self-settled asset protection trust and the special power of appointment trust can be designed so that gifts to the trust are incomplete for gift tax purposes 13—and thus not subject to gift tax at the time of the initial transfer. Both of these trusts can also be designed as a grantor trust for income tax purposes so that income from the trust is taxed to the settlor. If the tax treatment for these two trusts is the same, and the ability to benefit the settlor is the same, what is the difference between a self-settled asset protection trust and a special power of appointment trust?

The pros and cons of these two alternatives may be summarized as follows:

(1) No case law supports the asset protection provided by a self-settled asset protection trust because the statutes that allow asset protection for a self-settled trust are relatively new and untested. On the other hand, the inability of a creditor of a permissible appointee to reach the assets of a special power of appointment trust is supported by centuries of common law that is consistent throughout all 50 states in addition to federal bankruptcy courts. 14 In addition, the asset protection provided by a special power of appointment trust is supported by the logical and practical impossibility of ascribing trust liability for all permissible appointees when that class includes every person on earth other than the donee, the donee’s estate, and the creditors of the donee and the donee’s estate.

(2) The common law rule, followed by the majority of states, is that the assets of a self-settled trust are available to the claims of the settlor’s creditors. 15 Many commentators believe that a state that does not grant asset protection for self-settled trusts will not uphold the laws of a state that does grant asset protection for self-settled trusts, because doing so would violate the first state’s public policy. 16 The asset protection provided by a special power of appointment trust is not dependent on the state where the parties reside or the state where the matter is adjudicated.

(3) Many commentators question whether a self-settled asset protection trust will hold up in a bankruptcy court. At least two bankruptcy courts have held that the recognition of an offshore self-settled trust would offend federal bankruptcy policies. 17 A person who files bankruptcy is typically required to disclose any trust in which he or she is included as a beneficiary. In addition, the 2005 changes to the Bankruptcy Code have created a new ten-year limitations period for transfers to self-settled trusts that are meant to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. 18 Even if a bankruptcy court is unable to bring the assets of a self-settled trust into the bankruptcy estate, the court could dismiss the debtor’s case and deny the debtor a discharge under the bankruptcy laws. In contrast, the special power of appointment trust should be irrelevant to a bankruptcy proceeding because the settlor has no beneficial interest in the trust.

(4) Many of the state statutes that grant some form of asset protection for a self-settled trust also include exceptions that allow creditors to seize the assets of a self-settled trust for child support, alimony, transfers made within certain time periods, government creditors, bankruptcy, or certain torts. 19 In contrast, no statutory exceptions allow a creditor of a permissible appointee to reach the assets of a special power of appointment trust.

(5) Plaintiff’s attorneys, creditors, and government agencies often ask if a person is a beneficiary of a trust in order to determine whether the trust assets may be attached or taken into account for various purposes. This opens the trust up to inspection and evaluation by an adverse party, and it may affect a person’s eligibility for certain programs or benefits. The special power of appointment trust is immune to this kind of scrutiny because the settlor is not a beneficiary, and most every person in the world is a permissible appointee.

(6) A self-settled trust governed by the laws of an exotic and foreign jurisdiction often carries with it a negative stigma and a perception of wrongdoing. Upon learning that a person is a beneficiary of a self-settled trust in a foreign jurisdiction, judges, juries, and government agencies are likely to view the person as a criminal who is attempting to avoid the law. In contrast, a special power of appointment trust established in a domestic jurisdiction for the benefit of a person’s family has the appearance of an ordinary measure established by a law-abiding citizen for estate planning purposes.

(7) The self-settled asset protection trust requires the appointment of a trustee or co-trustee in one of the jurisdictions where self-settled trusts are allowed (with some jurisdictions requiring the use of a corporate trustee 20); the special power of appointment trust does not require the appointment of a corporate trustee or a trustee that is located in a certain jurisdiction.

(8) One may argue that the self-settled trust is safer than the special power of appointment trust because the trustee has a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries and this ensures that the trustee will not distribute the assets to the wrong people. 21 However, if the trustee has a discretionary power to sprinkle assets among the potential beneficiaries, there is still a chance that the trustee will not distribute the assets according to the wishes of the settlor. The settlor of a special power of appointment trust could use the following measures to ensure that the donee of the power does not exercise it inappropriately:

The settlor could appoint one or more co-donees who are required to act together.The settlor could limit the class of permissible appointees.The settlor could appoint a trust protector with power to approve or veto the exercise of a power of appointment.The settlor could grant a trust protector the power to remove and replace a donee.

To illustrate the differences between a self-settled asset protection trust and a special power of appointment trust, consider the following example:

Scenario 1. Dawn creates a self-settled asset protection trust naming her brother as the trustee. She names herself, her spouse, and her children as the beneficiaries. She gives her brother the power to withhold distributions or to sprinkle distributions among the beneficiaries as he determines in his sole and absolute discretion. Dawn funds her self-settled asset protection trust at a time and in a manner that is not considered a fraudulent transfer.

Scenario 2. Michael creates a special power of appointment trust naming his brother as the trustee. Michael names his spouse and children as the beneficiaries, but he does not include himself as a potential beneficiary. He gives his brother the same power to withhold distributions or to sprinkle distributions among the beneficiaries as he determines in his sole and absolute discretion. Michael also gives his brother a special power of appointment to appoint assets to any person other than himself, his estate, or the creditors of himself or his estate. Michael funds his special power of appointment trust at a time and in a manner that is not considered a fraudulent transfer.

In both scenarios, the brother of the settlor has power to withhold assets or sprinkle assets among the spouse and children of the settlor. In both scenarios, the brother of the settlor can transfer all, part, or none of the assets of the trust to the settlor at any time and for any reason.

Now assume that both Dawn and Michael are sued, and a judgment is entered against them. The creditor’s attorneys will ask both Dawn and Michael if either is the beneficiary of any trust. Michael will correctly answer that he is not a beneficiary of a trust. Even if creditors discover that Michael once created a trust, they will have no claim on the trust because Michael is not included as a beneficiary. Dawn, on the other hand, will have to reply that she is the beneficiary of a self-settled trust, and her creditors will then commence an examination of the trust and an attempt to confiscate its assets.

Improving an intentionally defective grantor trust

An intentionally defective grantor trust is a trust that is excluded from the settlor’s estate for gift and estate tax purposes but whose income is attributed to the settlor for income tax purposes. The name comes from the fact that the settlor intentionally includes a “defect” in the trust document that causes the income to be taxable to the settlor (or “grantor”). The purpose of an intentionally defective grantor trust is to protect assets from estate taxes in addition to protecting assets from the potential future creditors of the settlor. An intentionally defective grantor trust is typically used to own life insurance or other appreciating assets. In order to ensure that the assets of the trust are not included in the settlor’s estate, the settlor is not included as a beneficiary of an intentionally defective grantor trust.

The concept of an intentionally defective grantor trust can be greatly improved if the settlor grants a special power of appointment allowing a donee to appoint assets to any person other than the donee, the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee or the donee’s estate. The grant of a special power of appointment to a non-adverse party is one way to cause an irrevocable trust to be treated as a “grantor trust” for income tax purposes. 22 This power allows the donee potentially to appoint the assets of the trust back to the settlor. The donee should not be a person who is also a beneficiary of the trust, or the exercise of a special power of appointment may result in a taxable gift. 23 The fact that the settlor and the settlor’s spouse are included as permissible appointees is insufficient to cause the trust assets to be included in their taxable estate because most everyone in the world is a permissible appointee. 24

Example. Sarah and John both create an intentionally defective grantor trust, and both transfer significant assets to the trust by gift and by sale in order to remove the assets from their taxable estates. Sarah’s trust also includes a special power of appointment allowing her brother to appoint assets to any person other than himself, his estate, or the creditors of the brother or his estate. If the estate tax is repealed, if Sarah falls on hard times, or if she decides that she does not want her children to receive a large inheritance, Sarah’s brother can simply appoint the assets to her at any time. John’s trust does not include this special power. Thus, he has no way to benefit from the assets in the trust, and the trustee has no power to give them back to him.

This option to return assets to the settlor may be especially useful if Congress eventually increases the estate tax exemptions while maintaining the step-up in basis for property included in a decedent’s taxable estate. The special power of appointment that is included in Sarah’s trust would allow her brother to appoint sufficient assets back to her to take full advantage of the step-up in basis at her death to the extent of her available estate tax exemption.

Conclusion

Although a special power of appointment is an old familiar tool, it may be used in creative ways to add greater flexibility, greater asset protection, and greater anonymity to a trust. In fact, it may accomplish what was otherwise impossible in that it allows a person to make an irrevocable gift without giving up the possibility that the assets that were given might be returned.

1

A “self-settled” trust is one in which the settlor is included as a beneficiary of the trust.
2

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, section 156.
3

See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY sections 318-369 (1940), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSERS sections 11.1-24.4 (1986), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006) section 17.1, and IRC Section 2041.
4

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006) section 17.1.
5

Id. at section 17.2.
6

Id. at section 17.3.
7

Id. at section 17.4.
8

Id. at section 22.1.
9

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS section 56 comment b (2003).
10

See 11 U.S.C. section 541.
11

See Sections 2041 and 2514.
12

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006) Section 17.2. Also see In re Hicks, 22 BR 243 (Bkrptcy. DC Ga., 1982) and In re Knight, 164 BR 372 (Bkrptcy. DC Fla., 1994).
13

A transfer to a trust is “incomplete” for gift tax purposes if the settlor retains a power to veto distributions proposed by the trustee. See Reg. 25.2511-2(c).
14

Supra note 12.
15

Supra note 2.
16

A trust is generally governed by the law of the jurisdiction designated in the trust agreement unless that jurisdiction’s law is contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue. See Uniform Trust Act section 107 and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sections 273 and 280.
17

See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 698, and In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98.
18

11 U.S.C. section 548(e).
19

See Utah Code 25-6-14, Delaware Code Section 3573, Oklahoma Statutes Title 31, section 11.
20

See Utah Code 25-6-14; Oklahoma Statutes Title 31, section 11.
21

By definition, a trustee has a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of a trust, while a donee of a power of appointment acts in a nonfiduciary capacity and has no duty to the beneficiaries or permissible appointees. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006) section 17.1.
22

See Section 674.
23

See Reg. 25.2514-1(b)(2).
24

Section 2042(2) provides that a reversionary interest could cause the trust assets to be included in the settlor’s estate if the value of the reversionary interest immediately before the insured’s death exceeds 5% of the value of the trust. Because the special power of appointment is exercisable in the donee’s absolute discretion, the value of the reversionary interest is less than 5% of the value of the trust. See Reg. 20.2042-1(c)(3). If it can be shown that the settlor and the donee had an express or implied understanding that distributions would be made to the settlor, then the assets of the trust could possibly be included in the settlor’s estate under Section 2036(a)(1).

© 2010 Thomson Reuters/RIA. All rights reserved.

Testimonial

  • “For the best asset protection, I use McCullough.” – Jeff Kearl, Chairman of the Board, Skullcandy
  • “My asset protection strategy has proven itself exceptionally well.” – Matt Heaton, Founder of Bluehost
  • “I trust McCullough with my asset protection planning.” – John Pestana, Founder of Omniture
  • “The strategies introduced by McCullough have held up in IRS audits and bankruptcy and have saved our clients millions.” – Brittany Allred, CPA
  • “When under attack, I slept well knowing that McCullough had done my asset protection work.” – Dave Hunter, Stone 5 Studios

What We Do

  • We will give you a free initial consultation with complete confidentiality
  • We will give you the latest, most innovative and effective strategies
  • We will quote you a comprehensive fixed fee – with no surprises
  • We will provide legal services that are honest, ethical and reliable
  • We will implement your strategy in days, not months
  • We will provide ongoing support for every plan we implement

Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission, No. SC08-1009, FL Sup. Ct. (24 june 2010)

Charging Order Provision does Not Protect Interest in a Single-Member LLC

Supreme Court of Florida

_____________

No. SC08-1009

____________

SHAUN OLMSTEAD, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee.

[June 24, 2010]

CANADY, J.

In this case we consider a question of law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerning the rights of a judgment creditor, the appellee Federal Trade Commission (FTC), regarding the respective ownership interests of appellants Shaun Olmstead and Julie Connell in certain Florida single-member limited liability companies (LLCs). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question: “Whether, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 608.433(4), a court may order a judgment-debtor to surrender all ̳right, title, and interest‘ in the debtor‘s single-member limited liability company to satisfy an outstanding judgment.” Fed. Trade Comm‘n v. Olmstead, 528 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). We have discretionary jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(6), Florida Constitution.

The appellants contend that the certified question should be answered in the negative because the only remedy available against their ownership interests in the single-member LLCs is a charging order, the sole remedy authorized by the statutory provision referred to in the certified question. The FTC argues that the certified question should be answered in the affirmative because the statutory charging order remedy is not the sole remedy available to the judgment creditor of the owner of a single-member limited liability company.

For the reasons we explain, we conclude that the statutory charging order provision does not preclude application of the creditor‘s remedy of execution on an interest in a single-member LLC. In line with our analysis, we rephrase the certified question as follows: “Whether Florida law permits a court to order a judgment debtor to surrender all right, title, and interest in the debtor‘s single- member limited liability company to satisfy an outstanding judgment.” We answer the rephrased question in the affirmative.

I. BACKGROUND

The appellants, through certain corporate entities, “operated an advance-fee credit card scam.” Olmstead, 528 F.3d at 1311-12. In response to this scam, the FTC sued the appellants and the corporate entities for unfair or deceptive trade practices. Assets of these defendants were frozen and placed in receivership. Among the assets placed in receivership were several single-member Florida LLCs in which either appellant Olmstead or appellant Connell was the sole member. Ultimately, the FTC obtained judgment for injunctive relief and for more than $10 million in restitution. To partially satisfy that judgment, the FTC obtained—over the appellants‘ objection—an order compelling appellants to endorse and surrender to the receiver all of their right, title, and interest in their LLCs. This order is the subject of the appeal in the Eleventh Circuit that precipitated the certified question we now consider.

II. ANALYSIS

In our analysis, we first review the general nature of LLCs and of the charging order remedy. We then outline the specific relevant provisions of the Florida Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act), chapter 608, Florida Statutes (2008). Next, we discuss the generally available creditor‘s remedy of levy and execution under sale. Finally, we explain the basis for our conclusion that Florida law permits a court to order a judgment debtor to surrender all right, title, and interest in the debtor‘s single-member LLC to satisfy an outstanding judgment. In brief, this conclusion rests on the uncontested right of the owner of the single- member LLC to transfer the owner‘s full interest in the LLC and the absence of any basis in the LLC Act for abrogating in this context the long-standing creditor‘s remedy of levy and sale under execution.

A. Nature of LLCs and Charging Orders

The LLC is a business entity originally created to provide “tax benefits akin to a partnership and limited liability akin to the corporate form.” Elf Altochem North Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1998). In addition to eligibility for tax treatment like that afforded partnerships, LLCs are characterized by restrictions on the transfer of ownership rights that are related to the restrictions applicable in the partnership context. In particular, the transfer of management rights in an LLC generally is restricted. This particular characteristic of LLCs underlies the establishment of the LLC charging order remedy, a remedy derived from the charging order remedy created for the personal creditors of partners. See City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 752 P.2d 673, 681-683 (Kan. 1988) (discussing history of partnership charging order remedy). The charging order affords a judgment creditor access to a judgment debtor‘s rights to profits and distributions from the business entity in which the debtor has an ownership interest.

B. Statutory Framework for Florida LLCs

The rules governing the formation and operation of Florida LLCs are set forth in Florida‘s LLC Act. In considering the question at issue, we focus on the provisions of the LLC Act that set forth the authorization for single-member LLCs, the characteristics of ownership interests, the limitations on the transfer of ownership interests, and the authorization of a charging order remedy for personal creditors of LLC members.

Section 608.405, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[o]ne or more persons may form a limited liability company.” A person with an ownership interest in an LLC is described as a “member,” which is defined in section 608.402(21) as “any person who has been admitted to a limited liability company as a member in accordance with this chapter and has an economic interest in a limited liability company which may, but need not, be represented by a capital account.” The terms “membership interest,” “member‘s interest,” and “interest” are defined as “a member‘s share of the profits and losses of the limited liability company, the right to receive distributions of the limited liability company‘s assets, voting rights, management rights, or any other rights under this chapter or the articles of organization or operating agreement.” § 608.402(23), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 608.431 provides that “[a]n interest of a member in a limited liability company is personal property.”

Section 608.432 contains provisions governing the “[a]ssignment of member‘s interest.” Under section 608.432(1), “[a] limited liability company interest is assignable in whole or in part except as provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement.” An assignee, however, has “no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs” of the LLC “except as provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement” and upon obtaining “approval of all of the members of the limited liability company other than the member assigning a limited liability company interest” or upon “[c]ompliance with any procedure provided for in the articles of organization or operating agreement.” Id. Accordingly, an assignment of a membership interest will not necessarily transfer the associated right to participate in the LLC‘s management. Such an assignment which does not transfer management rights only “entitles the assignee to share in such profits and losses, to receive such distribution or distributions, and to receive such allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit or similar item to which the assignor was entitled, to the extent assigned.” § 608.432(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008).

Section 608.433—which is headed “Right of assignee to become member”—reiterates that an assignee does not necessarily obtain the status of member. Section 608.433(1) states: “Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, an assignee of a limited liability company interest may become a member only if all members other than the member assigning the interest consent.” Section 608.433(4) sets forth the provision— mentioned in the certified question—which authorizes the charging order remedy for a judgment creditor of a member:

On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the limited liability company membership interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of such interest. This chapter does not deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the member‘s interest.

C. Generally Available Creditor’s Remedy of
Levy and Sale under Execution

Section 56.061, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that various categories of real and personal property, including “stock in corporations,” “shall be subject to levy and sale under execution.” A similar provision giving judgment creditors a remedy against a judgment debtor‘s ownership interest in a corporation has been a part of the law of Florida since 1889. See ch. 3917, Laws of Fla. (1889) (“That shares of stock in any corporation incorporated by the laws of this State shall be subject to levy of attachments and executions, and to sale under executions on judgments or decrees of any court in this State.”). An LLC is a type of corporate entity, and an ownership interest in an LLC is personal property that is reasonably understood to fall within the scope of “corporate stock.” “The general rule is that where one has any ̳interest in property which he may alien or assign, that interest, whether legal or equitable, is liable for the payment of his debts.‘” Bradshaw v. Am. Advent Christian Home & Orphanage, 199 So. 329, 332 (Fla. 1940) (quoting Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 57 So. 243, 245 (Fla. 1911)).

At no point have the appellants contended that section 56.061 does not by its own terms extend to an ownership interest in an LLC or that the order challenged in the Eleventh Circuit did not comport with the requirements of section 56.061. Instead, they rely solely on the contention that the Legislature adopted the charging order remedy as an exclusive remedy, supplanting section 56.061.

D. Creditor’s Remedies Against the Ownership
Interest in a Single-Member LLC

Since the charging order remedy clearly does not authorize the transfer to a judgment creditor of all an LLC member‘s “right, title and interest” in an LLC, while section 56.061 clearly does authorize such a transfer, the answer to the question at issue in this case turns on whether the charging order provision in section 608.433(4) always displaces the remedy available under section 56.061. Specifically, we must decide whether section 608.433(4) establishes the exclusive judgment creditor‘s remedy—and thus displaces section 56.061—with respect to a judgment debtor‘s ownership interest in a single-member LLC.

As a preliminary matter, we recognize the uncontested point that the sole member in a single-member LLC may freely transfer the owner‘s entire interest in the LLC. This is accomplished through a simple assignment of the sole member‘s membership interest to the transferee. Since such an interest is freely and fully alienable by its owner, section 56.061 authorizes a judgment creditor with a judgment for an amount equaling or exceeding the value of the membership interest to levy on that interest and to obtain full title to it, including all the rights of membership—that is, unless the operation of section 56.061 has been limited by section 608.433(4).

Section 608.433 deals with the right of assignees or transferees to become members of an LLC. Section 608.433(1) states the basic rule that absent a contrary provision in the articles or operating agreement, “an assignee of a limited liability company interest may become a member only if all members other than the member assigning the interest consent.” See also § 608.432(1)(a), Fla. Stat (2008). The provision in section 608.433(4) with respect to charging orders must be understood in the context of this basic rule.

The limitation on assignee rights in section 608.433(1) has no application to the transfer of rights in a single-member LLC. In such an entity, the set of “all members other than the member assigning the interest” is empty. Accordingly, an assignee of the membership interest of the sole member in a single-member LLC becomes a member—and takes the full right, title, and interest of the transferor— without the consent of anyone other than the transferor.

Section 608.433(4) recognizes the application of the rule regarding assignee rights stated in section 608.433(1) in the context of creditor rights. It provides a special means—i.e., a charging order—for a creditor to seek satisfaction when a debtor‘s membership interest is not freely transferable but is subject to the right of other LLC members to object to a transferee becoming a member and exercising the management rights attendant to membership status. See § 608.432(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (setting forth general rule that an assignee “shall have no right to participate in the management of the business affairs of [an LLC]”).

Section 608.433(4)‘s provision that a “judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of [an LLC] interest” simply acknowledges that a judgment creditor cannot defeat the rights of nondebtor members of an LLC to withhold consent to the transfer of management rights. The provision does not, however, support an interpretation which gives a judgment creditor of the sole owner of an LLC less extensive rights than the rights that are freely assignable by the judgment debtor. See In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 540 (D. Colo. 2003) (rejecting argument that bankruptcy trustee was only entitled to a charging order with respect to debtor‘s ownership interest in single-member LLC and holding that “[b]ecause there are no other members in the LLC, the entire membership interest passed to the bankruptcy estate”); In re Modanlo, 412 B.R. 715, 727-31 (D. Md. 2006) (following reasoning of Albright).

Our understanding of section 608.433(4) flows from the language of the subsection which limits the rights of a judgment creditor to the rights of an assignee but which does not expressly establish the charging order remedy as an exclusive remedy. The relevant question is not whether the purpose of the charging order provision—i.e., to authorize a special remedy designed to reach no further than the rights of the nondebtor members of the LLC will permit—provides a basis for implying an exception from the operation of that provision for single- member LLCs. Instead, the question is whether it is justified to infer that the LLC charging order mechanism is an exclusive remedy.

On its face, the charging order provision establishes a nonexclusive remedial mechanism. There is no express provision in the statutory text providing that the charging order remedy is the only remedy that can be utilized with respect to a judgment debtor‘s membership interest in an LLC. The operative language of section 608.433(4)—”the court may charge the [LLC] membership interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest”— does not in any way suggest that the charging order is an exclusive remedy.

In this regard, the charging order provision in the LLC Act stands in stark contrast to the charging order provisions in both the Florida Revised Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 620.81001-.9902, Fla. Stat. (2008), and the Florida Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, §§ 620.1101-.2205, Fla. Stat. (2008). Although the core language of the charging order provisions in each of the three statutes is strikingly similar, the absence of an exclusive remedy provision sets the LLC Act apart from the other two statutes. With respect to partnership interests, the charging order remedy is established in section 620.8504, which states that it “provides the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a partner or partner‘s transferee may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor‘s transferable interest in the partnership.” § 620.8504(5), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). With respect to limited partnership interests, the charging order remedy is established in section 620.1703, which states that it “provides the exclusive remedy which a judgment creditor of a partner or transferee may use to satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor‘s interest in the limited partnership or transferable interest.” § 620.1703(3), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).

“[W]here the legislature has inserted a provision in only one of two statutes that deal with closely related subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the failure to include that provision in the other statute was deliberate rather than inadvertent.” 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:2 (7th ed. 2008). “In the past, we have pointed to language in other statutes to show that the legislature ̳knows how to‘ accomplish what it has omitted in the statute [we were interpreting].” Cason v. Fla. Dep‘t of Mgmt. Services, 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006); see also Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P‘ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 185 (Fla. 2007); Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000).

The same reasoning applies here. The Legislature has shown—in both the partnership statute and the limited partnership statute—that it knows how to make clear that a charging order remedy is an exclusive remedy. The existence of the express exclusive-remedy provisions in the partnership and limited partnership statutes therefore decisively undermines the appellants‘ argument that the charging order provision of the LLC Act—which does not contain such an exclusive remedy provision—should be read to displace the remedy available under section 56.061.

The appellants‘ position is further undermined by the general rule that “repeal of a statute by implication is not favored and will be upheld only where irreconcilable conflict between the later statute and earlier statute shows legislative intent to repeal.” Town of Indian River Shores v. Richey, 348 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1977). We also have previously recognized the existence of a specific presumption against the “[s]tatutory abrogation by implication of an existing common law remedy, particularly if the remedy is long established.” Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990). The rationale for that presumption with respect to common law remedies is equally applicable to the “abrogation by implication” of a long-established statutory remedy. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752 (1975) (” ̳[R]epeals by implication are disfavored,‘ and this canon of construction applies with particular force when the asserted repealer would remove a remedy otherwise available.”) (quoting Reg‘l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133 (1974)). Here, there is no showing of an irreconcilable conflict between the charging order remedy and the previously existing judgment creditor‘s remedy and therefore no basis for overcoming the presumption against the implied abrogation of a statutory remedy.

Given the absence of any textual or contextual support for the appellants‘ position, for them to prevail it would be necessary for us to rely on a presumption contrary to the presumption against implied repeal—that is, a presumption that the legislative adoption of one remedy with respect to a particular subject abrogates by implication all existing statutory remedies with respect to the same subject. Our law, however, is antithetical to such a presumption of implied abrogation of remedies. See Richey; Thornber; Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 31 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1947).

In sum, we reject the appellants‘ argument because it is predicated on an unwarranted interpretive inference which transforms a remedy that is nonexclusive on its face into an exclusive remedy. Specifically, we conclude that there is no reasonable basis for inferring that the provision authorizing the use of charging orders under section 608.433(4) establishes the sole remedy for a judgment creditor against a judgment debtor‘s interest in single-member LLC. Contrary to the appellants‘ argument, recognition of the full scope of a judgment creditor‘s rights with respect to a judgment debtor‘s freely alienable membership interest in a single-member LLC does not involve the denial of the plain meaning of the statute. Nothing in the text or context of the LLC Act supports the appellants‘ position.

III. CONCLUSION

Section 608.433(4) does not displace the creditor‘s remedy available under section 56.061 with respect to a debtor‘s ownership interest in a single-member LLC. Answering the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, we hold that a court may order a judgment debtor to surrender all right, title, and interest in the debtor‘s single-member LLC to satisfy an outstanding judgment.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LEWIS, J., dissenting.

I cannot join my colleagues in the judicial rewriting of Florida‘s LLC Act. Make no mistake, the majority today steps across the line of statutory interpretation and reaches far into the realm of rewriting this legislative act. The academic community has clearly recognized that to reach the result of today‘s majority requires a judicial rewriting of this legislative act. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Limited Liability Companies: Tax and Business Law, ¶ 1.04[3][d] (2008) (discussing fact that statutes which do not contemplate issues with judgment creditors of single-member LLCs “invite Albright-style judicial invention”); Carter G. Bishop, Reverse Piercing: A Single Member LLC Paradox, 54 S.D. L. Rev. 199, 202 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 199, 221-25 (2005) (“The situation in Albright theoretically might seem to be better redressed through explicit application of traditional state remedies than by a federal court trying to shoehorn its preferred result into the state LLC statute. The problem . . . is that no state remedy is appropriate because the asset protection was explicitly permitted by the applicable statute. The appropriate solution, therefore, lies in fixing the statute.” (emphasis supplied)); Thomas E. Rutledge & Thomas Earl Geu, The Albright Decision – Why an SMLLC Is Not an Appropriate Asset Protection Vehicle, Bus. Entities, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 16; Jacob Stein, Building Stumbling Blocks: A Practical Take on Charging Orders, Bus. Entities, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 29. (stating that the Albright court “ignored Colorado law with respect to the applicability of a charging order” where the “statute does not exempt single- member LLCs from the charging order limitation”). An adequate remedy is available without the extreme step taken by the majority in rewriting the plain and unambiguous language of a statute. This is extremely important and has far- reaching impact because the principles used to ignore the LLC statutory language under the current factual circumstances apply with equal force to multimember LLC entities and, in essence, today‘s decision crushes a very important element for all LLCs in Florida. If the remedies available under the LLC Act do not apply here because the phrase “exclusive remedy” is not present, the same theories apply to multimember LLCs and render the assets of all LLCs vulnerable.

I would answer the certified question in the negative based on the plain language of the statute and an in pari materia reading of chapter 608 in its entirety. At the outset, the majority signals its departure from the LLC Act as it rephrases the certified question to frame the result. The question certified by the Eleventh Circuit requested this Court to address whether, pursuant to section 608.433(4), a court may order a judgment debtor to surrender all “right, title, and interest” in the debtor‘s single-member limited liability company to satisfy an outstanding judgment. The majority modifies the certified question and fails to directly address the critical issue of whether the charging order provision applies uniformly to all limited liability companies regardless of membership composition. In addition, the majority advances a position with regard to chapter 56 of the Florida Statutes that was neither asserted by the parties nor discussed in the opinion of the federal court.

Despite the majority‘s claim that it is not creating an exception to the charging order provision of the statute for single-member LLCs, its analysis necessarily does so in contravention of the plain statutory language and general principles of Florida law. The LLC Act inherently displaces the availability of the execution provisions in chapter 56 of the Florida Statutes by providing a remedy that is intended to prevent judgment creditors from seizing ownership of the membership interests in an LLC and from liquidating the separate assets of the LLC. In doing so, the LLC Act applies uniformly to single- and multimember limited liability companies, and does not provide either an implicit or express exception that permits the involuntary transfer of all right, title, and interest in a single-member LLC to a judgment creditor. The statute also does not permit a judgment creditor to liquidate the assets of a non-debtor LLC in the manner allowed by the majority today. Therefore, under the current statutory scheme, a judgment creditor seeking satisfaction must follow the statutory remedies specifically afforded under chapter 608, which include but are not limited to a charging order, regardless of the membership composition of the LLC.

Although this plain reading may require additional steps for judgment creditors to satisfy, an LLC is a purely statutory entity that is created, authorized, and operated under the terms required by the Legislature. This Court does not possess the authority to judicially rewrite those operative statutes through a speculative inference not reflected in the legislation. The Legislature has the authority to amend chapter 608 to provide any additional remedies or exceptions for judgment creditors, such as an exception to the application of the charging order provision to single-member LLCs, if that is the desired result. However, by basing its premise on principles of law with regard to voluntary transfers, the majority suggests a result that can only be achieved by rewriting the clear statutory provisions. In effect, the majority accomplishes its result by judicially legislating section 608.433(4) out of Florida law.

For instance, the majority disregards the principle that in general, an LLC exists separate from its owners, who are defined as members under the LLC Act. See §§ 608.402(21) (defining “member”), 608.404, Fla. Stat. (2008) (“[E]ach limited liability company organized and existing under this chapter shall have the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary to carry out its business and affairs . . . .”). In other words, an LLC is a distinct entity that operates independently from its individual members. This characteristic directly distinguishes it from partnerships. Specifically, an LLC is not immediately responsible for the personal liabilities of its members. See Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Coughlin, 830 A.2d 1114 (Conn. 2003). The majority obliterates the clearly defined lines between the LLC as an entity and the owners as members.

Further, when the Legislature amended the LLC requirements for formation to allow single-member LLCs, it did not enact other changes to the provisions in the LLC Act relating to an involuntary assignment or transfer of a membership interest to a judgment creditor of a member or to the remedies afforded to a judgment creditor. Moreover, no other amendments were made to the statute to demonstrate any different application of the provisions of the LLC Act to single- member and multimember LLCs. For example, the LLC Act generally does not refer to the number of members in an LLC within the separate statutory provisions. The Legislature is presumed to have known of the charging order statute and other remedies when it introduced the single-member LLC statute. Accordingly, by choosing not to make any further changes to the statute in response to this addition, the Legislature indicated its intent for the charging order provision and other statutory remedies to apply uniformly to all LLCs. This Court should not disregard the clear and plain language of the statute.

In addition, the majority fails to correctly set forth the status of a member in an LLC and the associated rights and interests that such membership entails. An owner of a Florida LLC is classified as a “member,” which is defined as

any person who has been admitted to a limited liability company as a member in accordance with this chapter and has an economic interest in a limited liability company which may, but need not, be represented by a capital account.

§ 608.402 (21), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“Definitions”) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, to be a member of a Florida LLC it is now necessary to be admitted as such under chapter 608 and to also maintain an economic interest in the LLC. Moreover, a member of an LLC holds and carries a “membership interest” that encompasses both governance and economic rights:

“Membership interest,” “member‘s interest,” or “interest” means a member‘s share of the profits and the losses of the limited liability company, the right to receive distributions of the limited liability company‘s assets, voting rights, management rights, or any other rights under this chapter or the articles of organization or operating agreement.

§ 608.402(23), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis supplied). This provision was adopted during the 1999 amendments, which was after the modification to allow single- member LLCs. See ch. 99-315, § 1, at 4, Laws of Fla. In stripping the statutory protections designed to protect an LLC as an entity distinct from its owners, the majority obliterates the distinction between economic and governance rights by allowing a judgment creditor to seize both from the member and to liquidate the separate assets of the entity.

Consideration of an involuntary lien against a membership interest must address what interests of the member may be involuntarily transferred. Contrary to the view expressed by the majority, a member of an LLC is restricted from freely transferring interests in the entity. For instance, because an LLC is a legal entity that is separate and distinct from its members, the specific LLC property is not transferable by an individual member. In other words, possession of an economic and governance interest does not also create an interest in specific LLC property or the right or ability to transfer that LLC property. See § 608.425, Fla. Stat. (2008) (stating that all property originally contributed to the LLC or subsequently acquired is LLC property); see also Bishop, supra, 54 S.D. L. Rev. at 226 (discussing in context of federal tax liens the fact that “[t]ypically, a member is not a co-owner and has no transferable interest in limited liability company property”) (citing Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 501 (1996), 6A U.L.A. 604 (2003)). The specific property of an LLC is not subject to attachment or execution except on an express claim against the LLC itself. See Bishop & Kleinberger, supra, ¶ 1.04[3][d].

The interpretation of the statute advanced by the majority simply ignores the separation between the particular separate assets of an LLC and a member‘s specific membership interest in the LLC. The ability of a member to voluntarily assign his, her, or its interest does not subject the property of an LLC to execution on the judgment. Under the factual circumstances of the present case, the trial court forced the judgment debtors to involuntarily surrender their membership interests in the LLCs and then authorized a receiver to liquidate the specific LLC assets to satisfy the judgment. In doing so, the trial court ignored the clearly recognized legal separation between the specific assets of an LLC and a member‘s interest in profits or distributions from those assets. See F.T.C. v. Peoples Credit First, LLC, No. 8:03-CV-2353-T-TBM, 2006 WL 1169677, *2 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2006) (ordering the appellants to “endorse and surrender to the Receiver, all of their right, title and interest in their ownership/equity unit certificates” of the LLCs for the receiver to liquidate the assets of these companies). The majority approves of this disregard by improperly applying principles of voluntary transfers to allow creditors of an LLC member to attack and liquidate the separate LLC assets.

Additionally, the transfer of a membership interest is restricted by law and by the internal operating documents of the LLC. Although a member may freely transfer an economic interest, a member may not voluntarily transfer a management interest without the consent of the other LLC members. See § 608.432(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Contrary to the view of the majority, in the context of a single-member LLC, the restraint on transferability expressly provided for in the statute does not disappear. Unless admitted as a member to the LLC, the transferee of the economic interest only receives the LLC‘s financial distributions that the transferring member would have received absent the transfer. See § 608.432(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Bishop & Kleinberger, supra, ¶ 1.01[3][c]. Consequently, a member may cease to be a member upon the assignment of the entire membership interest (i.e., transferring all of the following: (1) share of the profits and losses of the LLC, (2) right to receive distributions of LLC assets; (3) voting rights, (4) management rights, and (5) any other rights). See §§ 08.402(23), 608.432(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). Furthermore, a transferring member no longer qualifies under the statutory definition of “member” upon a transfer of the entire economic interest. See § 608.402(21), Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining “member” as a person who has an economic interest in an LLC). However, unless otherwise provided in the governing documents of the entity (i.e., the articles of incorporation and the operating agreement), the pledge or granting of “a security interest, lien, or other encumbrance in or against, any or all of the membership interest of a member shall not cause the member to cease to be a member or to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member.” § 608.432(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, a judgment or a charging order does not divest the member of a membership interest in the LLC as the member retains governance rights. It only provides the judgment creditor the economic interest until the judgment is satisfied.

Whether the LLC Act allows a judgment creditor of an individual member to obtain this entire membership interest to exert full control over the assets of the LLC is the heart of the underlying dispute. Neither the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act nor the Florida LLC Act contemplates the present situation in providing for single-member LLCs but restricting the transferability of interests. This problematic issue is not one solely limited to our state, though our decision must be based solely on the language and purpose of the Florida LLC Act. Thus, in my view, this Court must apply the plain meaning of the statute unless doing so would render an absurd result. In contrast, the majority simply rewrites the statute by ignoring those inconvenient provisions that preclude its result.

Legislative Intent With Regard to the Rights of a Judgment Creditor of a Member

I understand the policy concerns of the FTC and the majority with the inherent problems in the transferability of both governance and economic interests under the LLC Act because the plain language does not contemplate the impact of a judgment creditor seeking to obtain the entire membership interest of a single- member LLC and to obtain the ability to liquidate the assets of the LLC. The Florida statute simply does not create a different mechanism for obtaining the assets of a single-member LLC as opposed to a multimember LLC and, therefore, there is no room in the statutory language for different rules.

However, I decline to join in rewriting the statute with inferences and implications, which is the approach adopted by the majority. This Court generally avoids “judicial invention,” as accomplished by the majority, when the statute may be construed under the plain language of the relevant legislative act. See Bishop & Kleinberger, supra, ¶ 1.04[3][d]. In construing a statute, we strive to effectuate the Legislature‘s intent by considering first the statute‘s plain language. See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 2008) (citing Borden v. East- European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)). When, as it is here, the statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not “look behind the statute‘s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.” Daniels v. Fla. Dep‘t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). This is especially applicable in the instance of a business entity created solely by state statute.

If the statute had been written as the majority suggests here, I would agree with the result requested by the FTC. However, the underlying conclusion lacks statutory support. By reading only self-selected provisions of the statute to support this result, the majority disregards the remainder of the LLC Act, which destroys the isolated premise that the charging order provision only applies to multimember LLCs and that other statutory restrictions do not exist.

Additionally, exceptions not found within the statute cannot simply be read into the statute, as the majority does by holding that single-member LLCs are an implicit exception to the charging order provision. The remedy provided to the FTC by the federal district court and approved by the majority in this instance— that a judgment creditor of a single-member LLC is entitled to receive a surrender and transfer of the full right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor and to liquidate the LLC assets—is not provided for under the plain language of the LLC Act without judicially writing an exception into the statute.

Judgment Creditor Can Charge the Debtor Member’s Interest in the LLC
With Payment of the Unsatisfied Judgment

As a construct of statutory creation, an LLC is an entity separate and distinct from its members, and thus the liability of the LLC is not directly imputed to its members. In a similar manner, the liability of individual members is not directly imposed separately upon the LLC.

Although a member‘s interest in an LLC is considered to be personal property, see § 608.431, Fla. Stat. (2008), and personal property is generally an asset that may be levied upon by a judgment creditor under Florida law, see § 56.061, Fla. Stat. (2008), there are statutory restrictions in the LLC context. Any rights that a judgment creditor has to the personal property of a judgment debtor are limited to those provided by the applicable creating statute.

The appellants contend that if a judgment creditor may seek satisfaction of a member‘s personal debt from a non-party LLC, the plain language of the LLC Act limits the judgment creditor to a charging order. See § 608.433(4), Fla. Stat. (2008). A charging order is a statutory procedure whereby a creditor of an individual member can satisfy its claim from the member‘s interest in the limited liability company. See Black‘s Law Dictionary 266 (9th ed. 2009) (defining term in the context of partnership law). It is understandable that the FTC challenges the charging order concept being deemed a remedy for a judgment creditor because, from the creditor‘s perspective, a charging order may not be as attractive as just seizing the LLC assets. For example, a creditor may not receive any satisfaction of the judgment if there are no actual distributions from the LLC to the judgment creditor through the debtor-member‘s economic interest. See Elizabeth M. Schurig

& Amy P. Jetel, A Shocking Revelation! Fact or Fiction? A Charging Order is the Exclusive Remedy Against a Partnership Interest, Probate & Property, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 57, 58. The preferred creditor‘s remedy would be a transfer and surrender of the membership interest that is subject to the charging order, which is a more permanent remedy and may increase the creditor‘s chances of having the debt satisfied. See id.

The application of the charging order provision, including its consequences and implications, has been hotly debated in the context of both partnership and LLC law because of the similarities of these entities. The language of the charging order provision in the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976), as amended in 1985, is virtually identical to that used in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, as well as in the Florida LLC Act. See §§ 608.433(4), 620.153, Fla. Stat. (2008). The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2001 significantly changed this provision by explicitly allowing execution upon a judgment debtor‘s partnership interest. See Schurig & Jetel, supra, at 58. However, the Florida Partnership Act provides that a charging order is the exclusive remedy for judgment creditors. See § 620.8504(5), Fla. Stat. (2008) (stating the charging order provision provides the “exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a partner or partner‘s transferee may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor‘s transferable interest in the partnership”). In the context of partnership interests, Florida courts have also determined that a charging order is the exclusive remedy for judgment creditors based on the straightforward language of the statute. See Givens v. Nat‘l Loan Investors L.P., 724 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that charging order is the exclusive remedy for a judgment creditor of a partner); Myrick v. Second Nat‘l Bank of Clearwater, 335 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (substantially similar). The Florida LLC Act has neither adopted an explicit surrender-and-transfer remedy nor does it include a provision explicitly stating that the charging order is the exclusive remedy of the judgment creditor. The plain language of the charging order provision only provides one remedy that a judgment creditor may choose to request from a court and that the court may, in its discretion, choose to impose. See § 608.433(4), Fla. Stat. (2008).

To support its conclusion that charging orders are inapplicable to single- member LLCs, the majority compares the provision in the partnership statute that mandates a charging order as an exclusive remedy to the non-exclusive provision in the LLC Act. The exclusivity of the remedy is irrelevant to this analysis. By relying on an inapplicable statute, the majority ignores the plain language of the LLC Act and the other restrictions of the statute, which universally apply the use of a charging order to judgment creditors of all LLCs, regardless of the composition of the membership. The majority opinion now eliminates the charging order remedy for multimember LLCs under its theory of “nonexclusivity” which is a disaster for those entities.

Plain Meaning of the Statute’s Actual Language

The charging order provision does not act as a reverse-asset shield against the creditors of a member. Instead, the LLC Act implements statutory restrictions on the transfer and assignment of membership interests in an LLC. These restrictions limit the mechanisms available to a judgment creditor of a member of any type of LLC to obtain satisfaction of a judgment against the membership interest. Specifically, section 608.433(4) grants a court of competent jurisdiction the discretion to enter a charging order against a member‘s interest in the LLC in favor of the judgment creditor:

608.433. Right of assignee to become member.—

  1. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, an assignee of a limited liability company interest may become a member only if all members other than the member assigning the interest consent.
  2. An assignee who has become a member has, to the extent assigned, the rights and powers, and is subject to the restrictions and liabilities, of the assigning member under the articles of organization, the operating agreement, and this chapter. An assignee who becomes a member also is liable for the obligations of the assignee‘s assignor to make and return contributions as provided in s. 608.4211 and wrongful distributions as provided in s. 608.428. However, the assignee is not obligated for liabilities which are unknown to the assignee at the time the assignee became a member and which could not be ascertained from the articles of organization or the operating agreement.
  3. If an assignee of a limited liability company interest becomes a member, the assignor is not released from liability to the limited liability company under ss. 608.4211, 608.4228, and 608.426.
  4. On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the limited liability company membership interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of such interest. This chapter does not deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption . . . .

§ 608.433, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis supplied).

The majority asserts that the placement of the charging order provision
within the section titled “Right of assignee to become member” mandates that the provision only applies to circumstances where the interest of the member is subject to the rights of other LLC members. There is absolutely nothing to support the notion that the Legislature‘s placement of the charging order provision as a subsection of section 608.433, instead of as a separately titled section elsewhere in the statute, was intended to unilaterally link its application only to the multimember context. For instance, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, unlike the Florida statute, places the charging order provision as a separately titled section within the article that discusses transferable interests and rights of transferees and creditors. See Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 503 (revised 2006), 6B U.L.A. 498 (2008). Other states have also adopted a statutory scheme that places the charging order remedy within a separate provision specifically dealing with the rights of a judgment creditor. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-171 (2007). Thus, the majority‘s interpretation would again fail by a mere movement of the charging order provision to a separately titled section within the Act.

In contrast to the majority, my review of this provision begins with the actual language of the statute. In construing a statute, it is our purpose to effectuate legislative intent because “legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court‘s statutory construction analysis.” See Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)) (quoting State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002)). A statute‘s plain and ordinary meaning must be given effect unless doing so would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result. See City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1993). Here, the plain language establishes a charging order remedy for a judgment creditor that the court may impose. This section provides the only mechanism in the entire statute specifically allocating a remedy for a judgment creditor to attach the membership interest of a judgment debtor. In the multimember context, the uncontested, general rule is that a charging order is the appropriate remedy, even if the language indicates that such a decision is within the court‘s discretion. See Myrick, 335 So. 2d at 344. As the Second District explained:

Rather, the charging order is the essential first step, and all further proceedings must occur under the supervision of the court, which may take all appropriate actions, including the appointment of a receiver if necessary, to protect the interests of the various parties.

Id. at 345. Without express language to the contrary, the discretionary nature of this remedy applies with equal force to single- and multimember LLCs, which the majority erases from the statute.

Nevertheless, the certified question before us is not the discretionary nature of this remedy but whether a court should even apply the charging order remedy to single-member LLCs. The majority rephrases the question certified to this Court as not considering whether an exception to the charging order provision should be implied for single-member LLCs. In doing so, the majority unjustifiably alters and recasts the question posited by the federal appellate court to fit the majority‘s result. The convoluted alternative presented by the majority is premised on a limited application of a charging order without express language in the statutory scheme to support this assertion.

Here, the plain language crafted by the Legislature does not limit this remedy to the multimember circumstance, as the majority holds. Further, exceptions not made in a statute generally cannot be read into the statute, unless the exception is within the reason of the law. See Cont‘l Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. 1986) (“This Court cannot grant an exception to a statute nor can we construe an unambiguous statute different from its plain meaning.”); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952) (“We apprehend that had the legislature intended to establish other exceptions it would have done so clearly and unequivocally. . . . We cannot write into the law any other exception . . . .”). Thus, without going behind the plain language of the statute, at first blush, the statute applies equally to all LLCs, regardless of membership composition.

The distinction asserted by the FTC is clearly inconsistent with the plain language of section 608.434 with regard to the proper method for a judgment creditor to reach the interest of a member in a LLC in that a complete surrender of the membership interest and the subsequent liquidation of the LLC assets are not contemplated by the LLC Act. The majority‘s interpretation that the charging order remedy only applies to multimember LLCs can only be given effect if the plain language of this provision renders an absurd result, which it does not.

The purpose of creating the charging order provision was never limited to the protection of “innocent” members of an LLC. Moreover, when amending the LLC Act to permit single-member LLCs, the Legislature did not also amend the assignment of interest and charging order provisions to create different procedures for single- and multimember LLCs. The appellants argue that this indicates a manifestation of legislative intent; however, it appears more likely that our Legislature, as with many other states, had not yet contemplated the situation before us. Even so, the appropriate remedy in this circumstance is not for this Court to impose its speculative interpretation, but for the Legislature to amend the statute to reflect its specific intention, if necessary. When interpreting a statute that is unambiguous and clear, this Court defers to the Legislature‘s authority to create a new limitation and right of action. Here, the actual language of the statute does not distinguish between the number of members in an LLC. Thus, the charging order applies with equal force to both single-member and multimember LLCs, and the assignment provision of section 608.433 does not render an absurd result.

The majority purports to base its analysis on the plain language of the statute. However, the FTC and a multitude of legal theorists agree that the plain language of the statute does not support this result. See e.g., Bishop & Kleinberger, supra, ¶ 1.04[3][d]; Bishop, supra, 54 S.D. L. Rev. at 202; Ribstein, supra, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. at 221-25; Rutledge & Geu, supra, Bus. Entities, Sept.- Oct. 2003 at 16; Stein, supra, Bus. Entities, Sept.-Oct. 2006 at 28. All authorities recognize that the sole way to achieve the result desired by the FTC and the majority is to ignore the plain language of the statute. No external support exists for the majority‘s bare assertions.

Rights of an Assignee

The plain language of section 608.433(4) applies the charging provision to the judgment creditor of both a single-member and multimember LLC. The next analytical step is to determine what rights that charging order provision grants the judgment creditor. To the extent that a membership interest is charged with a judgment, the plain text of the statute specifically provides that the judgment creditor only possesses the rights of an assignee of such interest. See § 608.433(4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of such interest.”).

To determine the rights of an assignee of such an interest, we look to section 608.432, which defines these rights. To divine the intent of the Legislature, we construe related statutory provisions together, or in pari materia, to achieve a consistent whole that gives full, harmonious effect to all related statutory provisions. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)). The FTC asserts that the rights delineated in this section render an absurd result when applied to single-member LLCs; however, the FTC ignores that the same rule applies even if only a part of a member‘s interest is needed to satisfy a debt amount. Further, an assignee is entitled solely to an economic interest and is not entitled to governance rights without the unanimous approval of the other members or as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or the operating agreement.

The plain reading of this provision does not establish the judgment creditor as an assignee of such interest, only that to the extent of the judgment amount charged to the economic interest, the judgment creditor has the same rights as an assignee. Though section 608.433(4) directs that the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of such interest, as provided in section 608.432, it is important to clarify that the judgment creditor does not become an assignee; the language merely indicates that the judgment creditor‘s rights do not exceed those of an assignee.

This clear distinction can be seen when considering the voluntary and involuntary nature of these different interests—an assignment is generally a voluntary action made by an assignor, whereas a charging order is clearly an involuntary assignment by a judgment debtor. For that reason, the majority formulates a false conclusion that section 404.433(1) provides a foundation for the bare assertion that a charging order is inapplicable in the context of a single- member LLC. Exploiting this false foundation, the majority asserts a result that is unsupportable when considered in pari materia with the entirety of the statutory scheme.

The question before this Court requires articulation of a general principle of law that applies to all types of judgments, whether less than, equal to, or greater than the value of a membership interest, and to all types of LLCs. Reading section 608.433(4) and 608.432 together, a judgment creditor may be assigned a portion of the economic interest, depending on the amount of the judgment. This provision contemplates that a charging order may not encompass a member‘s entire membership interest if the judgment is for less than the available economic distributions of an LLC. For instance, if the LLC membership interest here were worth more than the $10 million judgment, it would be unnecessary under this provision to transfer the full economic interest in the LLC to satisfy the judgment. Further, a member does not lose the economic interest and membership status unless all of the economic interest is charged to the judgment creditor. See § 608.432(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). Thus, if the judgment were for less than the value of either the membership interest or the assets in the LLC, the members could transfer a portion of their economic interest and still retain their membership interest, in that they would still hold an economic and governance interest in the LLC. The FTC would then only have the right to receive distributions or allocations of income in an amount corresponding to satisfaction of a partial economic interest. Regardless of the amount of the interest assigned, the judgment creditor does not immediately receive a governance interest. See § 608.432(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2008).

In such a circumstance, the result contemplated by the FTC does not come to pass—the single member maintains his, her, or its membership rights because a member only ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any governance rights upon assignment of all of the economic interest of such member. See id. The majority disregards this factual possibility and considers only the application of the statutory scheme in the context of a judgment that is equal to or greater than the value of the membership interest. Under the majority‘s interpretation of the statute, a judgment creditor could force a single-member LLC to surrender all of its interest and liquidate the assets specifically owned by the LLC, even if the judgment were for less than the assets‘ worth.

Alternative Remedies

Currently, the plain language of the statute provides additional remedies to the charging order provision for judgment creditors seeking satisfaction on a judgment that is equal to or greater than the economic distributions available under a charging order—(1) dissolution of the LLC, (2) an order of insolvency against the judgment debtor, or (3) an order conflating the LLC and the member to allow a court to reach the property assets of the LLC. First, upon the issuance of a charging order that exceeds a member‘s economic interest in an LLC for satisfaction of the judgment, dissolution may be achieved because the remaining member ceases to possess an economic interest and governance rights in the LLC following the assignment of all of its membership interest. See § 608.432(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“Assignment of member‘s interest”). The statutory provision with regard to the assignment of a member‘s interest provides, in relevant part:

(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement:
….

(c) A member ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member upon assignment of all of the membership interest of such member. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, the pledge of, or granting of a security interest, lien, or other encumbrance in or against, any or all of the membership interest of a member shall not cause the member to cease to be a member or to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member.

Id. (emphasis supplied). This demonstrates a clear and unambiguous distinction between a voluntary assignment of all the interest and the granting of an encumbrance against any or all of the membership interest. Because a “member” is defined as an actual or legal person admitted as such under chapter 608, who also has an economic interest in the LLC, it is the assignment of all of that economic interest that divests the member of his, her, or its status and power. Thus, if the charging order is only for a part of the economic interest held by the judgment debtor, the statute does not require that the member cease to be a member. See §§ 608.402(21), 608.432(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). If, on the other hand, the charging order is to the extent that it requires a surrender of all of the member‘s economic interest, in that circumstance, the member ceases to be a member under section 608.432(2)(c). In the case of a member-managed LLC, this would leave the LLC without anyone to govern its affairs. However, within the manager-managed LLC context, the manager would remain in a position to direct the LLC and distribute any profits according to any governing documents.

This provision need not be limited to single-member LLCs. For example, if the appellants had entered into a multimember LLC, that entity would be subject to the same statutory construction issues as a single-member LLC. Once the FTC obtained a judgment against a member of the multimember LLC, a charging order would be lodged against that member‘s interest. In that circumstance, though there may be charging orders against separate membership interests, in essence the same divestiture of the membership interest would occur if the judgment was for all of each member‘s economic interest.

It is important to note, however, if an LLC becomes a shell or legal fiction with no actual governing members, the LLC shall be dissolved under section 608.441. The dissolution statute provides:

(1) A limited liability company organized under this chapter shall be dissolved, and the limited liability company‘s affairs shall be concluded, upon the first to occur of any of the following events:

(d) At any time there are no members; however, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, the limited liability company is not dissolved and is not required to be wound up if, within 90 days, or such other period as provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, after the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member, the personal or other legal representative of the last remaining member agrees in writing to continue the limited liability company and agrees to the admission of the personal representative of such member or its nominee or designee to the limited liability company as a member, effective as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member; or

….
(4) Following the occurrence of any of the events specified in this section which cause the dissolution of the limited liability company, the limited liability company shall deliver articles of dissolution to the Department of State for filing.

§ 608.441(1)(d), (4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis supplied). A dissolved LLC continues its existence but does not carry on any business except that which is appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under section 608.4431. Once dissolved, the liquidated assets may then be distributed to a judgment creditor holding a charging order. See § 608.444(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).

The judgment creditor may also seek an order of insolvency against the individual member, in which instance that member ceases to be a member of the single-member LLC, and the member‘s interest becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. In Florida, the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding also terminates membership within an LLC. See §§ 608.402(4), 608.4237, Fla. Stat (2008). The decisions advanced by the FTC involved bankruptcies of the judgment debtor, and the rights of a judgment creditor in a bankruptcy are substantially different than the rights of a judgment creditor generally. See In re Modanlo, 412 B.R. 715 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006), aff‘d, No. 06-2213 (4th Cir. 2008); In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003). Upon commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy estate includes all legal or equitable property interests of the debtor.

An LLC membership interest is the personal property of the member. Therefore, when a judgment debtor files for bankruptcy, or is subject to an order of insolvency, the judgment debtor effectively transfers any membership interest in an LLC to the bankruptcy estate. In this context, it is reasonable for the bankruptcy courts to construe the LLC Act to no longer require a charging order because the judgment debtor has passed the entire membership interest to the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee stands in the shoes of the judgment debtor, who is now seeking reorganization of its assets. See, e.g., In re Albright, 291 B.R. at 541. The majority refuses to even acknowledge any of these approaches.

This bankruptcy context is distinguishable from the general case of a judgment creditor seeking to execute upon the assets of an LLC because the judgment may not meet or exceed the economic interest remaining in the LLC. Thus, the Albright bankruptcy situation should not alter our determination that the plain language of the statute applies the charging order provision to both single- and multimember LLCs. This may be a more complicated procedure than to allow a court to simply “shortcut” and rewrite the law and enter a surrender-and-transfer order of a member‘s entire right, title, and interest in an LLC as the majority accomplishes today. However, it is the method prescribed by the statute. Although the procedures created by the statute may involve multiple steps and legal proceedings, they are not absurd or irreconcilable with chapter 608 as a whole.

A Charging Order, in and of Itself, Does Not Entitle a Judgment Creditor to
Seize and Dissolve a Florida LLC

Based on the plain language of the statute and the construction of chapter 608 in pari materia, I would answer the certified question in the negative: A court may not order a judgment debtor to surrender and transfer outright all “right, title, and interest” in the debtor‘s single-member LLC to satisfy an outstanding judgment. If a judgment creditor wishes to proceed against a single-member LLC, it may first request a court of competent jurisdiction to impose a charging order on the member‘s interest. If the judgment creditor is concerned that the member is constraining distribution of assets and incomes, the creditor may seek judicial remedies to enforce proper distribution. In addition, if the economic interest so charged is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment creditor may move through additional proceedings: (1) seek to dissolve the LLC and to have its assets liquidated and subsequently distributed to the judgment creditor; (2) seek an order of insolvency against the judgment debtor, in which case the trustee of the bankruptcy estate will control the assets of the LLC, or (3) request a court to pierce the liability shield to make available the personal assets of the company to satisfy the personal debts of its member. This plain reading of chapter 608 may create additional steps for judgment creditors and judgment debtors to satisfy, as characterized by the federal district court in this case. However, only the Legislature, as the architects of this statutorily created entity, has the authority to provide a more streamlined surrender of these rights, not the judicial branch through selective reading and rewriting of the statute. As enacted, the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous and does not require “judicial invention” of exceptions that are clearly not provided in the LLC Act. If the Legislature wishes to make either an exception to the charging order provision for single-member LLCs or to provide additional remedies to judgment creditors, it may do so through an amendment of chapter 608.

Accordingly, I would answer the certified question in the negative. Under Florida law, a court does not have the authority to order an LLC member to surrender and transfer all right, title, and interest in an LLC and have LLC assets liquidated without first going through the statutory requirements created by the Legislature.

POLSTON, J., concurs.

Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit – Case Nos. 06-13254-DD and 03-02353-CV-T-17-TBM

Thomas C. Little, Clearwater, Florida,

for Appellant

William Blumenthal, General Counsel, John F. Daly, Deputy General Counsel and John Andrew Singer, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.,

for Appellee

Daniel S. Kleinberger, Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota,

As Amicus Curiae