Best Asset Protection Trust isnt an Asset Protection Trust

Could it be true that the best trust for asset protection isn’t even an asset protection trust? It may sound strange, but the legal precedent proves it to be true.

Whenever you hear the term “asset protection trust” it almost exclusively refers to a self-settled spendthrift trust. This where the settlor establishes and funds an irrevocable trust naming themself as a beneficiary. The trustee is an independent party who can make distributions from the trust to the settlor. So what does this mean? It means that the settlor can give money or assets to the independent trustee of an “asset protection trust” so future creditors can’t touch those assets. It also promises that the trustee can give the assets back to you at any time. This sounds pretty awesome right!

The problem is that self-settled trusts have historically provided zero asset protection in the United States. Generations of US laws have made it clear that your creditors can reach into a trust that you create if you are also the beneficiary.

This includes dozens of US court cases successfully attacking the assets of offshore asset protection trusts and none to the contrary.

Likewise, domestic self-settled asset protection trusts have failed in the only court cases to date.

So if quote Asset Protection Trusts have a dismal record in protecting assets, what is the solution?

The solution lies right in front of us. Generations of US legal precedent has made it perfectly clear that a non self-settled trust has ALWAYS worked. As opposed to creating a trust and naming yourself as the beneficiary, this trust names a third part as the beneficiary, such as the settlor’s spouse or children. Because the trust is not “self-settled” the creditors of the settlor cannot reach into the trust, so long as there are no fraudulent transfers into it.

We’ve also learned that a special power of appointment is a tool that provides infinite flexibility without subjecting a trust to creditors. Court cases and statutes going back over 200 years have consistently held that a special power of appointment is not subject to creditors, without exception.

We call this a 541 Trust because it is canonized in Section 541(b)(1) of the US Bankruptcy Code, as well as multiple other statutes and court cases nationwide dating back generations. The 541 Trust is superior to what are traditionally called Asset Protection Trusts because:

1. It works in all 50 states and in bankruptcy courts and has for over 200 years.
2. It works for any asset in any location.
3. It is proven by court cases for generations. We can actually show you court cases and other examples where our trusts were upheld.
4. It’s simple to understand, implement, and operate unlike the extremely complex structures associated with offshore trusts
5. It is infinitely flexible and can be modified at any time.
6. It is a fraction of the cost of an offshore trust structure and doesn’t have high annual maintenance charges or complex IRS reporting.

Nobody prepares this trust as well as we do. We pioneered it, we perfected it, and we have seen it succeed in every challenge. Some have criticized the 541 Trust but the legal precedent and the continued court support remains. It doesn’t matter what we say or what others say. The only thing that matters is what the courts say. The courts have spoken in favor of the 541 Trust over and over again.

So technically speaking, a 541 Trust isn’t an asset protection trust. It just happens to protect assets better than the types of trusts referred to as asset protection trusts.

CALL 801-765-0279 for more information

SEC v Greenberg – Offshore Trust Contempt

 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
v.
KEITH GREENBERG, Defendant.

(SEC v Greenberg)

Case No. 00-09109-CV-HURLEY/HOPKINS.
United States District Court, S.D. Florida.
May 21, 2015.

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE, AND HOLDING DEFENDANT KEITH GREENBERGIN CONTEMPT

DANIEL T.K. HURLEY, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 67] of Magistrate Judge James M. Hopkins on Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission’s Application for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendant KeithGreenberg Should Not Be Held In Contempt of Court [ECF No. 27].

BACKGROUND

A. FINAL JUDGMENT

In 2002, the Court entered Final Judgment of $5,915,346 against Defendant KeithGreenberg.[1] Through default, Greenberg admitted to violating the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder.[2]The Final Judgment is comprised of a civil penalty of $100,000, disgorgement of $3,828,000, and prejudgment interest of $1,987,346.[3]

By 2010, Greenberg had paid nothing.[4] In late 2010, the SEC learned thatGreenberg lived an “extravagant lifestyle.”[5] On August 11, 2011, Defendant paid $114,592.35 to the SEC,[6] following the sale of a condominium. The SEC applied the payment to Greenberg’s civil penalty.[7] Greenberg paid nothing further.

By September 13, 2013, Greenberg owed the SEC $6,883,580.48.[8] Interest accrued at $288 a day.[9] On November 26, 2013, the SEC moved the Court for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Keith Greenberg Not Be Held in Contempt of Court.[10] In March 2014, Greenberg began paying $2,500 to $3,750 a month.[11]

The Court granted the SEC’s Motion to Show Cause on November 26, 2013, and referred the Motion to Magistrate Judge James M. Hopkins for an evidentiary hearing.[12] The Magistrate held three such hearings on October 15, 2014, October 16, 2014, and November 3, 2014, at which he admitted into evidence both testimony and exhibits.[13] This is what he found:

B. FINDINGS OF FACT

Mrs. Elise Greenberg created the Elise Trust in 1996.[14] From 1996 to 2011, KeithGreenberg’s efforts grew the Elise Trust from $1 million to $6-7 million in assets.[15]

The Elise Trust owns a condominium in Miami, Florida.[16] The Greenbergs lease this condominium from the Elise Trust.[17]

The Raintree Development Irrevocable Trust owns a house in Goldens Bridge, New York.[18] The Greenbergs lease this house from the Raintree Trust.[19]

At both their condominium in Miami and their house in New York, the Greenbergs have access to two luxury vehicles and a golf membership, all paid for by the Trusts.[20]

Braintree Properties, LLC is a New York company.[21] Braintree makes money by investing in medical centers.[22] From June 2006 to September 2011, Braintree paid $2,151,753 of the Greenbergs’ personal expenses.[23]

Greenberg was a consultant for the consulting firm, J.D. Keith, LLC.[24] J.D. Keith had a contract with a medical firm paying $10,000 a month for 22 months.[25]Between 2004 and 2006, the medical firm also personally paid Greenberg $83,000.[26]

In 2006, Braintree sold some of its medical centers to the medical firm.[27] Because of accounting issues, a dispute arose, and Braintree and the medical firm entered into a settlement agreement.[28] Under the agreement, the medical firm agreed to payGreenberg $600,000 personally over five years, provide him a $38,400 automobile expense, and reimburse him for entertainment and travel expenses.[29] These payments were made payable to the firm J.D. Keith in the amount of $635,538.[30]Greenberg used this money from J.D. Keith to pay his personal expenses.[31]

Vantage Beach Holdings, LLC was formed in 2010.[32] The Elise Trust owns and funds Vantage Beach.[33] Vantage Beach has recently replaced Braintree in paying the Greenbergs’ personal expenses.[34]

Together, the Raintree Trust, Braintree, J.D. Keith, and Vantage Beach are known as “the Entities.”

Before the Court entered Final Judgment in 2002, the Greenbergs owed more than $2,000,000 to the IRS.[35] By 2005, that amount totaled $7,750,000.[36] From 2006 to 2008, the Greenbergs made partial payments to the IRS by withdrawing funds from the Entities.[37] The IRS has written off $5 million and as of October 2014, the Greenbergs owed the IRS $675,000.[38]

DISCUSSION

A. CONTEMPT STANDARD

A court may enforce a final judgment of disgorgement, including prejudgment interest and civil penalties, through its contempt power.[39] To hold a defendant in contempt, the plaintiff must prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that the defendant violated the final judgment.[40] This requires proving that “(1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the order.”[41]

If the plaintiff proves its prima facie case, the defendant may assert his “present inability to comply” as a defense.[42] To assert this defense, the defendant must prove “that he has made `in good faith all reasonable efforts'” to comply with the final judgment.[43] If he does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s “ability to comply.”[44]

B. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate concluded that Greenberg had the ability to comply with the Final Judgment, but that he did not. Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends thatGreenberg be held in contempt. He also recommends that:

Defendant shall be incarcerated until such time as he satisfies the Judgment to the greatest extent he is able, or provides evidence that he has taken all reasonable efforts to comply with the Judgment yet is unable to make any payment.[45]

The Court must review the Report and Recommendation’s legal conclusions, as well as those objected to portions, de novo.[46] It must be satisfied that there is “no clear error on the face of the record.”[47] Upon this review, the Court will overruleGreenberg’s objections, sustain the SEC’s, and adopt the Report and Recommendation.

OBJECTIONS

A. OBJECTION 1: “HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY”

Greenberg objects to the Report & Recommendation, arguing that the Magistrate considered Greenberg’s past, not present, ability to comply with the Final Judgment. According to Greenberg, the Court must look only to his present ability to comply. Defendant objects as follows:

The Magistrate Judge committed legal error by misapplying the legal standard for civil contempt holding: “In this case, the only issue in dispute is whether Defendant had, at some point since the Judgment was entered in 2002, the ability to pay some or all of that Judgment.” Having misstated the criteria, the Magistrate Judge erroneously concluded that the SEC had met its burden “. . . to show, clearly and convincingly, that Defendant had the ability to pay.”[48]

Greenberg is partly correct as what issues are in dispute, but the Magistrate Judge did not err. The SEC’s burden is to prove that Greenberg “had the ability to comply” with the Final Judgment. The burden then shifts to Greenberg to prove his “present inability to comply.” According to Greenberg, “the Magistrate Judge points to no proof, much less clear and convincing proof, of Mr. Greenberg’s present ability to comply.”[49] Such proof, however, is not the SEC’s burden. The burden is onGreenberg to prove his present inability to comply—only then does the burden shift to the SEC to prove a present ability. The Eleventh Circuit states the requirements follows:

A party seeking civil contempt bears the initial burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has violated an outstanding court order. Once a prima facie showing of a violation has been made, the burden of production shifts to the alleged contemnor, who may defend his failure on the grounds that he was unable to comply. The burden shifts back to the initiating party only upon a sufficient showing by the alleged contemnor. The party seeking to show contempt, then, has the burden of proving ability to comply.[50]

Because the SEC proved Defendant had the ability to comply, the SEC satisfied its burden. The Magistrate did not apply the wrong legal standard, and appropriately concluded that the SEC had proved its prima facie case for contempt. Greenberg’sfirst objection is overruled.

B. OBJECTION 2: “PRESENT ABILITY TO COMPLY”

Next, Greenberg objects to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that the recommended incarceration is unconstitutionally punitive. If Greenberg cannot comply with the Final Judgment, then incarceration would be criminal, not civil, contempt. Greenberg would have `no keys to his prison.’[51] The question, then, is whether Greenberg proved his “present inability to comply.” “Present” means from the time of the contempt hearing to the time of the contempt citation.[52] The Magistrate reviewed Greenberg’s arguments on this question, and, based on his findings, concluded each was wanting.

First, the Magistrate found that Greenberg used the Entities to pay his personal expenses. Had he wished, the Magistrate concluded, Greenberg could also use the Entities to pay his Final Judgment.[53] Second, the Magistrate concluded thatGreenberg should have asked the Elise Trust whether it would sell one of its cars, or rent one of its homes, to allow Greenberg to pay his Final Judgment. The Magistrate found “it to be beyond belief” that the Elise Trust would not, if it were asked, “agree to a compromise” to avoid Greenberg’s contempt.[54] Third, the Magistrate found that Greenberg withdrew money from the Entities to pay the IRS. Defendant, the Magistrate concluded, could do same for the SEC.[55] Finally, the Magistrate concluded that Greenberg’s monthly payments, compared to the findings of his “lavish lifestyle,” were insufficient to show his good faith to comply with the Final Judgment.[56] Upon de novo review, the Court not only agrees with the Magistrate’s conclusions, but finds additional support for them in the record. The record shows that although Greenberg has no “assets,” not even a personal bank account,[57] the Entities have become his piggy bank.

For example, Braintree purchased a Miami condominium for Greenberg in his own name.[58] Braintree paid to renovate the condominium, Braintree made its mortgage payments, and Braintree paid the condominium fees.[59] Vantage Beach, the Entity which replaced Braintree in paying Greenberg’s personal expenses, listsGreenberg as the sole checking account signatory.[60] From 2011 to 2012, Vantage Beach paid to renovate the Greenbergs’ condominium.[61] Furthermore, the Raintree Trust, which owns the Greenbergs’ New York home, has no accounting records and has not filed any tax returns since 2010.[62] As Greenberg testifies: the Raintree Trust “is clearly a, you know, among other things an asset protection, you know, vehicle.”[63]

For these, and the reasons cited in the Report, the Magistrate correctly concluded that Greenberg could use some, or all, of the Entities to pay or make reasonable efforts to comply with his Final Judgment. Such efforts could include selling or renting the New York home, selling or renting the Miami condominium, terminating the lease on the luxury cars, terminating the golf memberships, and withdrawing funds from the Entities.

C. “100% OWNED BY THE ELISE TRUST”

The SEC makes one objection to the Report and Recommendation. It objects to the finding that Braintree is “100% owned by the Elise Trust.” Because ownership of Braintree is immaterial to the Court’s present order, it will sustain the SEC’s objection and leave this question unresolved.[64]

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge James M. Hopkins [ECF No. 67] is ADOPTED in its entirety and incorporated herein by reference.

2. Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 68] are SUSTAINED.

3. Defendant Keith Greenberg’s Objections to the Magistrate’s Report [ECF No. 69] are OVERRULED.

4. Defendant Keith Greenberg is in CONTEMPT OF THIS COURT. It is hereby further ORDERED that:

a. Keith Greenberg shall surrender to the custody of the U.S. Marshal’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, located at the Paul G. Rogers Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 701 Clematis St., West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401, by 12:00 p.m. on Monday, June 1, 2015.

b. The U.S. Marshals Service SHALL REQUEST designation from the Bureau of Prisons for the nearest appropriate federal facility to West Palm Beach, Florida, for Defendant Keith Greenberg’s further incarceration.

c. The U.S. Marshals Office for the Southern District of Florida SHALL NOTIFY the Court of the fact of Keith Greenberg’s appearance or non-appearance on June 1, 2015.

d. Defendant Keith Greenberg SHALL REMAIN incarcerated until such time that he has complied with the conditions set forth in the 2002 Final Judgment, or provides evidence that he has made in good faith all reasonable efforts to do so.

[1] Final J. on Disgorgement and Civil Penalties (Oct. 4, 2002) [ECF No. 26].

[2] Final J. of Permanent Inj. by Default Against Defs.’ Keith Greenberg and Coyote Consulting and Fin. Servs. (Apr. 4, 2002) [ECF No. 18].

[3] Final J. on Disgorgement and Civil Penalties [ECF No. 26].

[4] Mot. for Order to Show Cause at 2 [ECF No. 27].

[5] Id.

[6] Keith Greenberg Account, Motion for Order to Show Cause, Silberman Aff., Ex. D, [ECF No. 27-3].

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] [ECF No. 27].

[11] Id. at 2; see supra note 64

[12] [ECF No. 29].

[13] See [ECF Nos. 54, 57, 61].

[14] Report and Recommendation at 3 [ECF No. 67] [hereinafter R&R].

[15] R&R at 11; see note

[16] R&R at 5.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 4-5.

[21] Id. at 5.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at 6.

[25] Id. at 6-7.

[26] Id. at 6.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 7.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.; Nov. 3, 2014 Hr’g 40:1-4.

[34] R&R at 7.

[35] Id. at 2; Def.’s Pre-Hr’g Br. at 4.

[36] R&R at 2; Def.’s Pre-Hr’g Br. at 4.

[37] R&R at 2; Def.’s Pre-Hr’g Br. at 4.

[38] R&R at 2.

[39] S.E.C. v. Solow, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1329-30 (S.D. Fla.) (Middlebrooks, J.), aff’d, 396 Fed. App’x 635 (11th Cir. 2010).

[40] Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984).

[41] Georgia Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 484 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007)

[42] E.g., CFTC v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992).

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] R&R at 16.

[46] Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed. App’x 664 (11th Cir. 2010).

[47] Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s notes (1983); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006).

[48] Greenberg Objection at 8 (quoting R & R at 8-9).

[49] Id. at 10.

[50] CFTC v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

[51] There are two types of coercive contempt. With civil contempt, “the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 844, (1994) (internal quotation omitted). Civil contempt coerces compliance: the contemnor “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.” Id.(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). With criminal contempt, “the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate the confinement through later compliance.” Criminal contempt is punitive: “the defendant is furnished no key.” Id. at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

[52] The Eleventh Circuit’s “present” standard derives from the Second Circuit, which held that a defendant could not be held in contempt because “at the time of the contempt citations . . . he did not have the present ability to comply with the court’s order.” United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 1978), cited in United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986), cited inJordan v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290, 1292 n.2 (11th Cir. 1988), quoted in McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir. 2000), cited in Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002), quoted in F.T.C. v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1232 (11th Cir. 2010). And the Supreme Court, when reviewing a defendant’s “present inability to comply with the order in question,” looks to “the showing made by [the defendant] at the [contempt] hearing.” United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983).

[53] R&R at 11.

[54] R&R at 11.

[55] Id. at 12.

[56] Id. 13.

[57] Nov. 3, 2014 Hr’g 150:5-8 (“Q: Do you have any available assets to satisfy the existing judgment? A: No, only, only the income that I hope to continue to make to try to continue to satisfy the judgment.”); R&R at 3.

[58] Pl.’s Closing Ar., Exhs. 5, 6.

[59] Nov. 3, 2014 Hr’g 70:24-71:2; 72:2-24; Pl.’s Closing Ar., Ex. 56, at Bates No. FR 00001800.

[60] Pl.’s Closing Ar., Ex. 41.

[61] Nov. 3, 2014 Hr’g 40:5-14

[62] Id. 106:10-16.

[63] Id. 108:17-18.

[64] See infra note 11.

 

Who Needs Asset Protection?

asset-protection-page

We are often asked when asset protection is necessary or helpful. Some believe asset protection might only be helpful once you accumulate millions of dollars in assets–but this isn’t always true. We help many wealthy clients and we also assist clients with only a few hundred thousand dollars in assets who want to protect those assets against outside liabilities.

Liability can arise for anyone. The risk of liability might come from driving a car, operating a business, being sued for professional malpractice, suffering economic downturns, engaging in bad investment deals, being subject to lawsuits, entering bankruptcy, and other similar risks. The key is to assess your specific situation and determine how to protect against those risks.

Here is a quick list of individuals who might benefit from some type of asset protection:

  • Professions with high liability risk (i.e. physician, dentist, attorney, accountant, engineer, and other similar professions)
  • Business Owners
  • Property Owners
  • Individuals who are close to retirement and want to protect retirement savings while still engaging in business ventures and other activities that might put retirement savings at risk.
  • Individuals who have accumulated substantial equity in real property, savings, or investments which with individual needs or wants to protect.

There are many ways to protect your assets such as maintaining liability insurance, using business entities for your business (corporations, LLCs, etc.), creating irrevocable trusts, and various other strategies. No two situations are exactly alike and everyone has different goals and risk tolerance. Finding the right solution to reach your goal is important.

To begin protecting your assets, we generally recommend that clients obtain adequate insurance coverage that frequently exceeds the minimum requirements. We can then analyze your situation and the available options to determine a plan that is unique to your situation.

Timing is important. It is essential to consider asset protection before a claim or liability arises. You can greatly reduce your risk exposure by implementing a plan before you are facing a claim or liability.

Hopefully, you will never need to test your asset protection plan. In any case, you will want the peace of mind and comfort of knowing that your plan will work and your assets are protected and can withstand lawsuits and unforeseen circumstances. We provide a free consultation to help you determine the most effective and appropriate asset protection strategy for your situation.

Transferable Offshore Trust Fails

Some asset protection promoters tout a transferable offshore trust strategy which begins onshore in the U.S. and shifts offshore at the first sign of duress. Such strategies initially hold assets in a U.S. entity or domestic asset protection trust (DAPT) and then shift or transfer to an offshore jurisdiction when the client is under duress.

An Ohio judge recently froze the assets of a limited partnership that was owned by a Cook Islands Trust.  The asset protection promoter had told the client they could shift the partnership interests offshore at the first sign of duress.  This is the same asset protection strategy and the same failing result as in the Indiana Investors case.  (See Indiana Investors, LLC v. Hammon-Whiting Medical Center, LLC No. 45D02-0807-CT-201 (Lake Superior Court, Lake County, Indiana); Indiana Investors v. Victor Fink, No. 12-CH-02253 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division), Victor Fink transferred assets to a Cook Islands trust provided by one of the popular asset protection providers found on the internet who claimed that the control could be shifted offshore in the event of duress.  The plaintiffs were able to obtain temporary restraining orders which prevented the trustees and protectors from shifting the control to the offshore  trustee (South Pac Trust International, Inc.) and the bank accounts were all frozen.)

The weakness of this strategy is not only proven by court cases, but it is emphasized by experts in the field of asset protection.  In fact, some are calling the this strategy legal malpractice.

Jay Adkisson had this to say about the asset protection strategy of shifting assets from a domestic entity to an offshore trust (FAPT) when under duress: “It is, quite arguably, malpractice for a planner to leave unencumbered U.S. assets owned by [a] FAPT, directly or indirectly, in the U.S. and within reach of creditors.”

Gideon Rothschild said, ” This seems to be the typical structure employed by many lawyers. They tell the clients they can keep the assets in the US in an FLP that you control and then upon an event such as a lawsuit the trustee is informed that he should take necessary steps to cause the FLP to be liquidated. In fact many of these structures will also have a US co-trustee so they don’t even have to file Form 3520 until US trustee resigns. I’ve told such settlors that this is a recipe for disaster. Not only will it expose the assets to what is happening in this case – the US court’s jurisdiction and attachment orders – but could also put the settlor in jail for contempt since he, as the GP, will have to take the steps needed to move the account offshore at a time when the clouds have already formed. That is why I will only settle foreign trusts where the client has liquid assets that he is willing to place offshore from day one. Otherwise, one needs to use other (domestic) strategies.”

 

TrustCo case shows importance of timing in asset protection.

The most important factor in almost every asset protection case is the timing between the time the assets were transferred and the time of the creditor’s claim.  In TrustCo Bank v. Mathews, the court held that a plaintiff was barred from bringing a fraudulent transfer claim because the statute of limitations had run.  Susan Mathews signed a personal guaranty in 2006.  A few months later she transferred stock to a couple of Delaware asset protection trusts.   The plaintiffs brought a fraudulent transfer claim against the trusts on March 1, 2013 and the court ruled that the claim was barred because the statute of limitations on fraudulent transfers had run.  This case is interesting because the transfer actually occurred after Susan had incurred an obligation.  Because the transfer occurred after the obligation, the transfer probably would have been voidable as a fraudulent transfer if not for the statute of limitations.  In other words, the planning worked only because of the timing between the date of the transfer and the date of the fraudulent transfer action.

IRS Approved NING Trust provides Substantial Tax Savings

For many years, we have helped clients reduce income taxes by using a Nevada trust often referred to as a “NING Trust” (Nevada Incomplete Gift Non-Grantor Trust). In PLR 20131002, the IRS approved this concept by ruling that the trust qualified as a complex trust for income tax purposes and that gifts to the trust were incomplete for federal gift tax purposes. In other words, a person can transfer assets of unlimited value to a NING Trust without gift tax consequences. The income of the NING Trust is taxed at the trust level and does not flow through to the grantor. Because Nevada has no state income tax there is huge potential for income tax savings. Here are three examples of how a NING trust can save taxes:

A California resident can avoid the 13.3% California tax on investment assets or capital gains. For example, assume a California resident establishes a properly structured [NING] trust and contributes a $20 million stock portfolio that produces 8% taxable income per year. Over a period of 10 years, the California income tax saved could be $2,500,000. Over 20 years, the compounded savings from not paying California income tax could be $8,500,000. (See Gordon Schaller & The 13.3% Solution: of DINGs, NINGs, WINGs and Other ThINGs, LISI Estate Planning Newsletter #2191 (February 5, 2014)).

As another example, we have a client who placed his stock into a NING trust prior to a sale of his company. When the stock was sold by the NING trust, the client saved over $5,000,000 in state capital gains taxes. Later, when the trustee terminated the trust and distributed the assets back to the client, the client was not required to pay state capital gains tax on the distribution because the state does not tax capital gains distributed from a nonresident trust.

As a third example, a professional athlete transferred the majority of his investment portfolio to a NING trust. The athlete pays federal and state tax on his W-2 earnings and on the investments he holds outside of the NING trust. The athlete is not required to pay state tax on the investment income earned by the trust, and this allows the trust to grow free of state income tax.

Call 801-765-0279 for more information or click HERE to email us.

The information and examples above are provided as general information and may not be used as tax advice for any particular situation. Each person should seek individualized tax advice for their own situation.

Why Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts Don’t Protect Assets

Don’t Self-Settle for Inadequate Asset Protection

Why Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts Don’t Protect Assets

By: Randall Sparks, JD LL.M. and Lee S. McCullough, III, JD MAcc

Click HERE for pdf verison

Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts are all the rage. They come in two main flavors: (1) The Domestic Asset Protection Trust (“DAPT”) and (2) the Offshore Trust, aka Foreign Asset Protection Trust (“FAPT”). To boost in-state trust business, about a dozen states have passed or are actively improving their self-settled asset protection trust statutes … and that number is growing. Although self-settled trusts are heavily promoted by asset protection attorneys across the county, all of the relevant court cases indicate that if asset protection is your goal, you should find a more viable option.

If self-settled trusts are inadequate for asset protection, why do attorneys go to such lengths to sell them? The answer is simple: Money. Asset protection promoters market them heavily promising maximum protection and make big profits in the process. They do this despite zero court authority in existence that upholds self-settled asset protection trusts. Promoters also ignore the many court cases showing that self-settled trusts simply don’t afford the promised asset protection benefits.

What is a Self-Settled Asset Protection Trust?

There are three parties to any trust agreement: (1) a Settlor, who creates the trust and funds it with assets, (2) a Trustee, who holds legal title to the assets in trust for the beneficiaries, and (3) the Beneficiaries, who are eligible to receive benefits from the trust. In most trusts, the Settlor and Beneficiary are different people. In a self-settled trust, the Settlor is also a Beneficiary. In concept, the idea is incredible: contribute any amount of property to the trust and while creditors can’t touch it, you can enjoy it as much as you want. The reality is that these arrangements just don’t work as advertised.

Public policy has long been clear that you cannot settle a trust for your own benefit and at the same time shield the trust assets from your potential creditors. The Uniform Trust Code states that a creditor of a settlor may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor’s benefit.[1] In other words, if a Settlor/Beneficiary has access to trust cash, property, vehicles, etc., so does a creditor.

Offshore jurisdictions were the first to market self-settled trusts by promising protections in a foreign jurisdiction that is not bound by the laws of the United States. In 1997, Alaska was the first state to enact a DAPT statute. Since then, over a dozen United States jurisdictions have enacted DAPT statutes. However, creditor attorneys have developed successful techniques to pierce these trusts. By frequently siding with creditors in these cases, courts have rebuffed the zeal of offshore and domestic jurisdictions to establish and promote self-settled trusts as superior asset protection tools.

Court Cases Defeating Domestic Asset Protection Trusts (DAPTs)

When it comes to self-settled trusts, there is an elephant in the room and that elephant has a name: Bankruptcy. In states that don’t recognize self-settled trusts, a debtor’s interest in a self-settled trust is subject to bankruptcy.[2] The Mortensen case made clear that Federal Bankruptcy Law can even defeat a self-settled trust in states that recognize, protect, and advocate self-settled trusts.[3] In Mortensen, an Alaska resident created a self-settled trust under Alaska’s DAPT statute under ideal circumstances: he was solvent and there were no judgments against him. Several years later he ended up in a bankruptcy court sitting in Alaska. The court applied Federal Bankruptcy Law instead of Alaska law ruling that the trust assets were reachable by the creditors in the bankruptcy under Section 548(e) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.[4]

Another problem with a DAPT is a potential lawsuit arising in a state that does not recognize or protect self-settled trusts. In Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, the Seventh Circuit Court ruled that despite the debtor’s trust having been created in a DAPT state, Illinois law applied instead.[5] Another huge blow to DAPTs came on May 17, 2013 in Waldron v. Huber where, among other things, Washington State law applied rather than Alaska law where the DAPT was formed.[6] The result was that the trust assets were not protected. Based on the Dexia Credit and Huber cases, one shouldn’t expect that a self-settled trust will be upheld in a state that does not allow them. Numerous other cases indicate that a court can apply the law of the state where the court is located and not recognize the laws of the state where an entity was formed.[7]

If self-settled trusts don’t work in bankruptcy and don’t protect against laws of DAPT unfriendly states, then you can just avoid declaring bankruptcy and avoid contacts outside of your DAPT friendly state, right? Not so fast. Unfortunately, even if you are careful not to get sued in the wrong state and manage to avoid voluntary bankruptcy, your creditors could file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against you. The court cases and the bankruptcy code have shown that even though a self-settled trust is created pursuant to a DAPT statute, the trust is still vulnerable.

Court Cases Defeating Offshore Trusts, aka Foreign Asset Protection Trusts (FAPTs)

Many asset protection promoters claim that offshore trusts are impermeable, in contrast to the absence of a single court case to support their claims. Why do they sell a product that has such an abominable record? It’s a calculated risk that the resulting liability of a few failed trusts that are actually challenged will be vastly overshadowed by those that are never tested. In other words, they know that the majority of their clients will never get sued or go bankrupt. For those who are sued or face bankruptcy however, if the trust is self-settled, its assets are not protected.

Although promoters of FAPTs claim foreign laws protect you because the trust is not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts, there are many court cases showing how offshore trusts fail. For example, it is well established that an offshore trust cannot protect onshore assets.[8] Numerous other cases show that even though a court in the United States may not have jurisdiction over the FAPT, they have jurisdiction over the debtor and can order the debtor to repatriate the trust assets or face incarceration for contempt. In In re Lawrence the debtor was jailed for over six years for refusing to repatriate assets, in Bank of America v. Weese the debtors paid settlement of over $12,000,000 in order to avoid incarceration, and in U.S. v. Plath the debtor was held in contempt for refusing to obey the court order to disclose details about offshore accounts despite the fact that there was no fraudulent transfer.[9] These are just a few lowlights of the long list of failed FAPT strategies.

For a time, offshore trust peddlers used US v. Grant as the one court case that supported their strategy, because it was the single case where a court did not hold the debtor in contempt. The purported steel bulwark of the Grant opinion came crashing down when, in the Spring of 2013, a Florida court ruled against the very strategy FAPT promoters touted, dealing a huge blow to the offshore asset protection industry.[10] In Grant, Raymond Grant created two self-settled trusts offshore (FAPTs), one for his own benefit and one for the benefit of his wife. Raymond funded both FAPTs at a time when he was solvent and had no known claims against him, once again ideal circumstances. Years later, Raymond died and the IRS obtained a $36 million dollar judgment against Raymond’s wife Arline. The U.S. moved to hold Arline in contempt of court for failing to repatriate the assets in the offshore trusts to pay the tax liability. Initially, the court refused to do so because Arline had never exerted control or received benefits from these trusts. But later when it was proven that Arline had received funds from the trust through her children’s accounts, the court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Arline and her children from ever receiving any benefits from the trusts. Ultimately a very expensive “asset protection” strategy kept the assets protected from creditors, but also out of reach of those the trust was created to benefit. If your goal is to protect assets from both creditors and yourself, an offshore trust may be a great fit. If, however, you seek any self-settled benefits at all, look elsewhere.

Solution – Non-Self-Settled Trust

The alternative to the self-settled trust is simple, remove the one aspect of the trust that creates all of its vulnerability; make the trust non-self-settled. A non-self-settled trust, aka third party trust, has the support of state and federal statutes, the federal bankruptcy code, and an overwhelming number of court cases. Since the Settlor is not a beneficiary, the creditors of the Settlor cannot reach the trust assets, even in bankruptcy.[11] A properly drafted third party trust can still benefit the settlor without disrupting the asset protection. The settlor could potentially benefit from the trust through a spouse who is a beneficiary. For example, the settlor could live in a trust owned residence free from rent so long as the spouse is a beneficiary.[12] The settlor could be an income only beneficiary and still protect the trust principal.[13] The settlor could also maintain flexibility by appointing a trust protector or through the use of a special power of appointment.

If the trust has discretionary spendthrift language, the assets are also shielded from the creditors of the beneficiaries. If Raymond Grant had created a non-self-settled discretionary spendthrift trust for his wife Arline, instead of creating the two FAPTs that failed, the assets would have been protected from the IRS judgment and Arline and other trust beneficiaries could still have benefitted from the trusts. For example, the trust could have purchased a home for Arline to live in and paid Arline’s credit card bills.[14]

If true asset protection is the goal, consumers and especially promoters should remember the old adage that pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered. The court cases make it clear that a non-self-settled trust provides proven asset protection, whereas a self-settled trust lays out the welcome mat, flips on the light, and leaves the front door wide open to creditors. If you self-settle, you settle for an inferior trust.

[1] Uniform Trust Code Section 505, Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 156(2), and Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 58(2).

[2] Federal Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. 541. See also In re Simmonds, 240 B.R. 897 (8th Cir. BAP (Minn.) 1999).

[3] In re Mortensen, Battley v. Mortensen, (Adv. D.Alaska, No. A09-90036-DMD, May 26, 2011).

[4] 11 U.S.C. 548(e).

[5] Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan 624 F. Supp 2d 970 (N.D.Ill. 2009).

[6] Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 2013 WL 2154218 (Bk.W.D.Wa., Slip Copy, May 17, 2013).

[7] American Institutional Partners, LLC v. Fairstar Resources, Ltd. (where Utah law applied against a Delaware-formed LLC), 2011 WL 1230074 (D.Del., Mar. 31, 2011), Malone v. Corrections Corp. Of Am., 553 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 2009) (a district court in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits).

[8] In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (D. Conn. Bkrpt. 1998) (where the offshore trust was disregarded because it was self-settled and the onshore assets were seized).

[9] In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002), Bank of America v. Weese, 277 B.R. 241 (D.Md. 2002), and U.S. v. Plath, 2003-1 USTC 50,729 (U.S. District Court, So. Dist. Fla. 2003).

[10] US v. Grant, 2013 WL 1729380 (S.D.Fla., April 22, 2013).

[11] Uniform Trust Code Section 505, Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 156(2) and Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 58(2), In re Jane McLean Brown, D. C. Docket No. 01-14026-CV-DLG (11th Cir. 2002), Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997).

[12] Revenue Ruling 70-155, Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), PLR 9735035.

[13] In re Jane McLean Brown, D. C. Docket No. 01-14026-CV-DLG (11th Cir. 2002).

[14] United States v. Baldwin, 391 A.2d 844 (1978) or U.S. v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (1994) (where the trust assets were not subject to tax lien because the trust was not self-settled).

Bankruptcy Court – Our Trust Protects Client’s Home and Trust Assets

In 2009, our client, Todd H., transferred his home and some cash to one of our carefully drafted irrevocable trusts at a time when they were solvent and had no foreseeable liability problems.  Todd’s wife was the trustee, and his wife and children were the beneficiaries.  In 2010, Todd’s business went downhill along with the rest of the US economy.  In 2011, Todd’s small business went bankrupt and he was also forced into personal bankruptcy.  The transfer of the home to the trust was fully disclosed to the bankruptcy court, but the bankruptcy court excluded the trust and its assets pursuant to the federal bankruptcy code which provides that this type of trust is excluded from the bankruptcy estate.  After losing everything else they owned in the bankruptcy,  Todd’s family continues to live in the paid-off home that is owned by the trust.

Wilshire Credit v. Karlin – Irrevocable Trust Protects Home Despite Partial Rent Payments

988 F.Supp. 570 (1997)

WILSHIRE CREDIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
Stanley KARLIN, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. AW 96-943.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division.

December 8, 1997.

571*571 William A. Isaacson, Washington, DC, for Wilshire Credit Corp.

Yale L. Goldberg, Bethesda, MD, M. Michael Cramer, Benjamin A. Klopman, Rockville, MD, for Stanley Karlin, Robert Dawson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

I

Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. In ruling on the motions, the Court has considered the briefs of the parties, the arguments of counsel at a hearing in open court, and the entire record.

572*572 II

Allan and Mary Rozansky (hereinafter sometimes “the Rozanskys”, and “the settlors”) established a trust for the benefit of their two minor children on July 21, 1982. The children, and any other future lineal descendants of the Rozanskys, are the sole beneficiaries of the trust. The trustees are Stanley Karlin, a former neighbor of the Rozanskys, and Robert Dawson, Mary Rozansky’s brother. The trust vests the trustees with discretion to distribute funds for the benefit of the beneficiaries during the life-time of the settlors.[1] Upon the death of the settlors, the trust is to be distributed equally among the beneficiaries so long as they are at least 25 years old. Because the trustees hold legal title and the beneficiaries hold equitable title to the trust, the Rozanskys have no remaining legally recognizable property interest. The trust is irrevocable, and cannot be modified in any fashion by either settlor.

When the trust was created, its sole asset was the home of the Rozanskys. The Rozanskys retained a life estate, but transferred the remainder interest to the trust. In 1992, the trust purchased the Rozanskys life estate for $50,000. Thus, the trust owns a complete interest in the home (subject to its mortgage). The settlors are tenants of the trust, and pay “rent” which covers the cost of the monthly mortgage, insurance, and other related expenses. The trustee Karlin, who authorized the transaction, concedes that the decision to purchase the life estate was made at the direction of the Rozanskys. No alternative investments were considered and no one other than the Rozanskys was consulted respecting the prudence of the investment. In setting the rent to be paid by the settlors, Karlin never took into account any factor other than the fact that the payment would equal the monthly mortgage.

In 1994, the trust acquired a $695,000 beach home in Delaware which the Rozanskys used for vacations. Karlin, the trustee who authorized the purchase, again did so at the request of the settlors. Karlin had never seen the home before the transaction. The trust also purchased furniture for the beach home for $20,000. Because the trust did not have cash assets, the purchase was financed by refinancing the mortgage on the existing home. The Rozanskys’ rent payments were increased to match the increased mortgage payments. These actions were all taken at the direction of the settlors.

In 1995, the beach home was sold. This action was taken because Karlin was told by the Rozanskys that they could not afford to pay the rent on the two homes. The Rozanskys themselves found the realtor and handled the sale of the beach home; the trustees never spoke with the realtor. The beach house was finally sold for approximately the same price as its initial purchase, excluding realtor fees and other closing costs. After the sale, the trust held a cash balance of approximately $144,000.

Since the sale of the beach home, the Rozanskys have defaulted on rental payments owed to the trust. The Rozanskys have executed promissory notes to the trust. However, the notes provided no date of repayment, and thus far no repayment has been made. The trust has dissipated the $144,000 in cash making mortgage payments. Thus, the trust has accumulated no investment or cash assets for the benefit of the children. The only money the trust has ever paid for the support of the children was a summer camp bill of less than one thousand dollars. According to the trustees, at no time has any of the property belonging to the trust been disbursed to the Rozanskys. According to Trustee Karlin, major decisions regarding the management of the trust property were made with the benefit of independent professional advice. The trustees admit that certain of the acts taken on behalf of the trust were undertaken at the direction of the settlors. While the trustees appear to have acted at times at the direction of the Rozanskys, the Plaintiff makes no allegation that the Rozanskys’ conveyances of the property held by the trust were fraudulent.

Plaintiff, the successor in interest to a creditor of the Rozanskys, secured a stipulated 573*573 judgment against them on July 16, 1990, in the amount of approximately $1.7 million.

III

A.

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The evidence of the non movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor, but a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985))

B.

In this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover the assets of the trust as satisfaction of the debt of the Rozanskys. The defendant trust moves for summary judgment, arguing simply that a creditor of the settlors of the trust has no valid claim to the res of the trust. Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that the Rozanskys have so dominated the trust that it is effectively their “alter ego,” this Court should equitably disregard the trust and treat its assets as those of the Rozanskys.

The Plaintiff’s argument is as follows: “Under Maryland law, where an entity is a mere `creature’ of another party, the entity may be treated as the alter ego of the dominating party.” In support of this position, Plaintiff cites three cases that conclude, essentially, that courts will equitably disregard a corporate form where such disregard is necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a “paramount equity.” Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md.App. 421, 428, 401 A.2d 480 (1979) (tort claim for fraud may be had against sole shareholder of corporation); Bart Arconti & Sons v. Ames-Ennis, 275 Md. 295, 312, 340 A.2d 225 (1975) (corporate entity may be disregarded to prevent fraud).

Under Maryland law, the question of whether a party exerts sufficient “dominion” and “control” over a corporation to warrant the conclusion that the corporation is a “mere instrumentality” of another turns on the facts of the particular case. As one court explained, “(T)he corporate entity is disregarded … wherein it is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit, or adjunct of another corporation. The control necessary to invoke what is sometimes called the `instrumentality rule’ is not mere majority or complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its principal.” Dixon v. Process Corporation, 38 Md.App. 644, 653, 382 A.2d 893 (1978). The Plaintiff here argues that, because the trust operated exclusively at the command of the Rozanskys, it must be concluded that the trust was so dominated and controlled by the settlors that it was nothing more than the settlors’ instrumentality.

However, Plaintiff cites no Maryland case, and the Court’s research has revealed no Maryland authority, supporting the application of this corporate “alter ego” principle to a trust. The Plaintiff does point to several federal cases where courts have applied the corporate “alter ego” doctrine to trusts. In William L. Comer Family Equity Trust v. U.S., 732 F.Supp. 755 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff’d., 966 F.2d 1455 (6th Cir.1992), the court acknowledged that it had “uncovered no precedent analyzing the `alter ego’ theory of property ownership in the context of a trust,” but reasoned that “cases involving corporate entities provide appropriate guidance.” Id. at 759. The court went on to explain that “where a corporation is a mere agent or instrumentality of its shareholders or a device to avoid legal obligations, the corporate entity can be ignored.” Id. By parity of logic, where a trust “is a mere agent or 574*574 instrumentality” of another party, the trust may similarly be disregarded. Id. Other federal courts have accepted the view that the corporate “alter ego” doctrine may be applied to trusts. E.g., F.P.P. Enterprises v. U.S., 830 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir.1987); Loving Saviour Church v. U.S., 728 F.2d 1085, 1086 (8th Cir.1984); U.S. v. Boucher, 735 F.Supp. 987, 988 (D.Col.1990).

The cases make clear, however, that whether a court is to equitably exercise the “alter ego” doctrine as to a particular entity must be determined in accordance with the law of the forum state. See Loving Saviour Church, 728 F.2d at 1086 (applying South Dakota law); Comer Trust, 732 F.Supp. at 759 (applying Michigan law).

The scant authority pertinent to the inquiry appears to suggest that, under Maryland law, a settlor’s access to the trust res will not defeat an otherwise valid trust. In United States v. Baldwin, 283 Md. 586, 391 A.2d 844 (1978), the government sought to impose a tax lien on the assets of a trust established by the settlor before he incurred his tax liability. The trust was irrevocable, but the settlor maintained the right to receive the income from the investments and other personalty of the trust during his lifetime. While the trustee was a third party bank, the settlor maintained the right to name himself as trustee. The Court concluded that “the settlor of an irrevocable trust, reserving to himself only the right to receive, during his lifetime, the income from the investments and other personalty of the trust does not have such an estate in the corpus thereof as constitutes `property and rights to property’ under Maryland law,” and thus the lien could not be attached. Id. at 595-596, 391 A.2d 844.

This seems to be the consistent rule of Maryland law. In Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman, 167 Md. 158, 173 A. 31 (1934), the court explained that “[w]ith the ownership of the corpus in the [beneficiary] remaindermen, even though possession may be delayed or defeated by the will of the donor, there being no evidence of fraud in the inception of the trust, and none in the instrument creating it, the corpus cannot be attached to satisfy the creditors of the settlor.” Id. at 166, 173 A. 31. Similarly, after reviewing the relevant precedent, the U.S. Claims Court found “no assumption by the Maryland courts that the wife may be deemed merely the husband’s alter ego for purposes of insulating property from a settlor’s creditors in a non-fraudulent conveyance transaction.” Estate of German v. U.S., 7 Cl.Ct. 641, 645 (1985), citing Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md.App. 230, 388 A.2d 934 (1978). Likewise, in the present case the Rozanskys retain no ownership interest in the corpus of the trust benefitting their children and there is no allegation of fraud in the establishment of the trust;[2] accordingly, it is logical to conclude that, under Maryland law, the trust res is beyond the reach of the Rozanskys’ creditors.

Further, even assuming that the “alter ego” doctrine were applicable to properly established trusts in Maryland, the Plaintiff has not offered an adequate basis for invoking “alter ego” principles here. Again, there is no allegation of any fraud on the part of the Rozanskys in conveying the property to the trust; Plaintiff merely contends that the Rozanskys should not be able to evade their legal obligations through a trust device that they dominate and control. Concededly, this argument finds support in the out-of-state authority referred to by Plaintiff. “[W]here [a] corporation is a mere agent or instrumentality of its shareholders or a device to avoid legal obligations, the corporate entity may be ignored.” Comer Trust, 732 F.Supp. at 759. The Maryland courts, however, have adopted a somewhat different view of the “alter ego” doctrine.

In Arconti, the Maryland Court of Appeals acknowledged that “although the courts will, in a proper case, disregard the corporate entity,” it appears that such a “proper case” may only be found “where it is necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity.” Arconti, 275 Md. at 310, 340 A.2d 225. 575*575 Notably, the Arconti court specifically overruled a lower court’s determination that the “alter ego” doctrine may be applied “in order to prevent evasion of legal obligations.” Id. at 311-312, 340 A.2d 225. Thus, in Arconti, even though three corporations commingled equipment, operated from a single place of business, permitted one corporation to become dormant as the two other corporations improved, and made personal loans and transferred insurance policies to the principals, the “alter ego” doctrine could not be applied to hold the dominant corporations and principals liable for the obligations of the indebted corporation because there was no showing of fraud.

Similarly, even assuming the general applicability of the “alter ego” doctrine to trusts in Maryland, there can be no application of the doctrine in this case. There has been no showing of fraud here. While Plaintiff generally avers that the Rozanskys have “fraudulently shelter[ed] assets from their creditors,” there has been no contention that the property held by the trust was fraudulently conveyed. While it is true that a settlor cannot place assets in trust for the settlor’s own benefit in order to frustrate his or her own creditors, in absence of a fraudulent conveyance of the property, the property becomes an asset of the trust when conveyed; non-beneficiary settlors no longer have assets to shield. Inasmuch as the only “fraudulent” conduct of the Rozanskys is the domination of the trust while failing to honor legal obligations, this does not warrant the application of the “alter ego” doctrine under Maryland law. Arconti, 275 Md. at 311-312, 340 A.2d 225.[3] Indeed, even in the out-of-state cases relied upon by the Plaintiff, in every instance the “alter ego” doctrine was applied in concert with an allegation of a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., F.P.P. Enterprises, 830 F.2d at 118 (affirming conclusion that “the trusts were shams and fraudulent conveyances”); Loving Saviour Church, 728 F.2d at 1086 (applying “alter ego” as an alternative to conclusion that “the property transfers to the church were a sham”); Boucher, 735 F.Supp. at 988 (government argues alternatively that “the trusts are void as fraudulent conveyances, or that the trusts are the settlor’s alter egos”); Comer Family Trust, 732 F.Supp. at 760 (relying on “indicia of improper transfers” in applying “alter ego” doctrine).

It is apparently true that the trustees have at times acted at the behest of the Rozanskys, though they are under no legal obligation to do so.[4] Nonetheless, to the extent that the trust was properly created and the property properly transferred to it, the Court must conclude that the trust res is now beyond the reach of the Rozanskys’ creditors, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s prayer for equitable application of the “alter ego” doctrine. Further, even assuming “alter ego” principles apply to trusts in Maryland, Plaintiff here points to no fraudulent conduct other than the fact that the Rozanskys have “controlled” the trust while failing to pay their debts. It seems clear that under Maryland law, the evasion of legal obligations does not warrant the invocation the of “alter ego” doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no legal claim to the assets of the trust.

576*576 IV

For the reasons set forth, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be granted, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment must be denied.

[1] The trust document also vests the trustees with the power to “mortgage, lease, … [or] borrow on … any and all of the funds and properties of the Trust.”

[2] It is interesting to note that the conveyance into the trust of the Rozanskys’ life estate interest in the property occurred in 1992, two years after the judgment was entered. Nonetheless, Plaintiff makes no allegation that this subsequent conveyance was fraudulent.

[3] It is true that “alter ego” principles may be invoked to “enforce a paramount equity” as well as to prevent fraud. However, the enforcement of “a paramount equity” rationale appears to be of limited application in Maryland. See Travel Committee v. Pan Am., 91 Md.App. 123, 158, 603 A.2d 1301 (1992) (“Notwithstanding its hint that enforcing a paramount equity might suffice as a reason for piercing the corporate veil, the Court of Appeals to date has not elaborated upon the meaning of the phrase or applied it in any case of which we are aware”). In any event, the Court concludes that principles of fundamental equity and fairness do not compel the invalidation of a trust for the benefit of minor children, in favor of creditors of the settlor, simply because the trust’s third-party trustees may have been less than diligent in the discharge of their duties.

[4] Indeed, the trustees do so at their own peril. It is black letter law that the trustees of a trust owe a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust. “Even if a trustee has no personal stake in a transaction, the duty of loyalty bars him from acting in the interest of third parties at the expense of the beneficiaries.” Trustees of Employees Retirement System of Baltimore v. Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 109, 562 A.2d 720 (1989). It does not appear, however, that a creditor of the settlor has standing to bring a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the trustees. See Parish v. Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 261 Md. 618, 277 A.2d 19 (1971) (suggesting that a “fiduciary relationship” is necessary to give “former members the right to maintain this action”).

Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997)

Shurley Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank, 115 F. 3d 333 (5th Cir 1997) Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,423, 11 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 259 In The Matter of Billy R. SHURLEY and Jane Bryant Shurley, Debtors. Billy R. SHURLEY and Jane Bryant Shurley, Appellants, v. TEXAS COMMERCE BANK–AUSTIN, N.A. and Texas Commerce Bank–San Angelo, N.A., Appellees. In The Matter of Billy R. SHURLEY and Jane Bryant Shurley, Debtors. Billy R. SHURLEY and Jane Bryant Shurley, Appellants, v. TEXAS COMMERCE BANK–SAN ANGELO, N.A., Texas Commerce Bank–Austin, N.A. and Dennis Elam, Trustee, Appellees. In The Matter of Billy R. SHURLEY and Jane Bryant Shurley, Debtors. William H. ARMSTRONG, II, Appellant, v. TEXAS COMMERCE BANK–SAN ANGELO, N.A., Dennis Elam, Trustee, and Texas Commerce Bank–Austin, Appellees. Nos. 96-50137, 96-50138. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. June 20, 1997. John P. Higgins, Michael Lee Rush, Higgins & Rush, Dallas, TX, for Shurley Appellants. Eric Jay Taube, Hohmann, Werner & Taube, Austin, TX, Mitchell Dodd Savrick, Hohmann, Werner & Taube, Austin, TX, for Texas Commerce Bank–Austin. Stanley M. Johanson, University Of Texas Law, Austin, TX, Henry H. McCreight, Jr., Houston, TX, for Texas Commerce Bank–San Angelo in No. 96-50137. Michael A. Wren, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, TX, Shannon H. Ratliff, Austin, TX, Scott Davis Moore, Joseph & Moore, Austin, TX, for William H. Armstrong. John Lloyd Hopwood, Houston, TX, Stanley M. Johanson, Austin, TX, Henry H. McCreight, Jr., Houston, TX, for Texas Commerce Bank–San Angelo in No. 96-50138. Michael G. Kelly, The McMahon Law Firm, Odessa, TX, for Trustee. James Alfred Carter, W. Truett Smith, Smith, Carter, Rose, Finley & Griffis, San Angelo, TX, for amicus curiae. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. REAVLEY, Circuit Judge: 1 The question here is to what extent the assets of a spendthrift trust settled by a bankruptcy debtor and others are included in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy and district courts held that the entirety of the debtor’s interest in the trust is property of the bankruptcy estate. We limit the estate to the property contributed to the trust by the debtor. BACKGROUND 2 In 1965 M.D. Bryant, Ethel Bryant, Anne Bryant Ridge, and Jane Bryant Shurley created a trust under Texas law. M.D. and Ethel Bryant were husband and wife. Anne Bryant Ridge and Jane Bryant Shurley are their daughters. The trust is known as the “M.D. Bryant Family Trust” or the “Bryant Family Trust.” 3 The parents and daughters contributed real property to the trust. The property consisted of ranches owned by the family, including one owned by Shurley. Shurley contributed approximately 11,000 acres of raw land from the south of a west Texas ranch (her contribution herein the “Marfa ranch”).1 The trust agreement states that the property contributed by the parents “represents two-thirds (2/3) of the total value of all of said real property to be contributed and that the value of that portion of said real property to be contributed by [the two daughters] each represents (1/6) of the total value of all of said real property to be contributed.” 4 The trust agreement provided that additional property could be added to the trust at a later date. According to Shurley the vast bulk of the corpus of the trust came through pourover provisions in the parents’ wills, which were executed at the same time the trust agreement was executed. She claims that the Marfa ranch represents only two percent of the value of the total assets of the trust. The parents died in 1967 and 1971. 5 Under the trust agreement, while the parents were alive, two-thirds of the income generated by the trust was distributed to the parents and one-sixth of the income was distributed to each of the daughters. Upon the death of one parent, the income was distributed equally among the living parent and the daughters. Upon the death of the second parent, the two daughters each received half of the income if both were living at the time. The agreement has provisions for the children and other descendants of the daughters to receive income from the trust and distribution of its assets upon final termination of the trust. 6 In 1992, Shurley and her husband filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Since Shurley’s parents were deceased at the time, she and her sister each had a one-half interest in the income from the trust. The Marfa ranch was still held by the trust. Two bank creditors and the bankruptcy trustee brought an adversary action, seeking a declaratory judgment that Shurley’s interest in the trust was property of the bankruptcy estate. After a trial, the bankruptcy court entered a judgment declaring that Shurley’s “entire interest in the [trust], being an undivided 50 percent interest in the principal assets and income of the [trust], is property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.” In its memorandum opinion it enjoined the trustee of the trust “from disbursing any beneficial interest previously held by Mrs. Shurley to anyone other than” the bankruptcy trustee.2 Shurley and the trustee of the trust3 appealed to the district court, which affirmed. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION 7 We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review its legal conclusions de novo.4 8 Under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code5 a bankruptcy estate is created at the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Section 541(a)(1) states that “[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case” is included in the estate. Subsection (c)(2) states the exclusion relevant here: “A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.” 9 Section 541(c)(2) excludes “spendthrift trusts” from the bankruptcy estate if such a trust protects the beneficiary from creditors under applicable state law.6 “In general, a spendthrift trust is one in which the right of the beneficiary to future payments of income or capital cannot be voluntarily transferred by the beneficiary or reached by his or her creditors.”7 10 The Bryant Family Trust agreement vests in the trustee authority over the trust assets. Among other powers vested in the trustee, the agreement provides: 11 The trustee (and his successors) shall have full power and authority: to manage, handle, invest, reinvest, sell for cash or credit, or for part cash and part credit, convey, exchange, hold, dispose of, lease for any period of time, whether or not longer than the life of the trust, improve, repair, maintain, work, develop, operate, use, mortgage, or pledge all or any part of the funds…. The trustee shall have full power to determine the manner in which expenses are to be borne and in which receipts are to be credited as between principal and income, and also to determine what shall constitute income or net income and what shall constitute corpus and principal…. [B]eneficiaries shall have no right or power to transfer, assign, convey, sell or encumber said trust estate and interest therein, legal or equitable, during the existence of these trusts. 12 The agreement expressly provides that trust assets cannot be reached by creditors of the beneficiaries.8 13 By vesting control of the trust in the trustee, denying the beneficiaries control over the trust, and denying creditors of the beneficiaries access to trust assets, the trust agreement qualifies as a spendthrift trust under Texas law. For two reasons, however, the bankruptcy court concluded that the trust assets are not beyond the reach of creditors under state law. The first reason, which we reject in part, is that spendthrift trust protection under state law does not extend to a trust settled by the beneficiary herself. The second reason, which we reject, is that Shurley exercised sufficient control over the trust to make the assets subject to her creditors. 14 A. The Self-Settlor Rule and its Consequences 15 The bankruptcy court’s principal reason for holding that Shurley’s interest in the trust is property of the bankruptcy estate is that she was one of the original settlors of the trust. We have recognized that a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust is not subject to claims of creditors under Texas law “[u]nless the settlor creates the trust and makes himself beneficiary.”9 The rationale for this “self-settlor” rule is obvious enough: a debtor should not be able to escape claims of his creditors by himself setting up a spendthrift trust and naming himself as beneficiary. Such a maneuver allows the debtor, in the words of appellees, to “have his cake and eat it too.” As one Texas court has explained:Public policy does not countenance devices by which one frees his own property from liability for his debts or restricts his power of alienation of it; and it is accordingly universally recognized that one cannot settle upon himself a spendthrift or other protective trust, or purchase such a trust from another, which will be effective to protect either the income or the corpus against the claims of his creditors, or to free it from his own power of alienation. The rule applies in respect of both present and future creditors and irrespective of any fraudulent intent in the settlement or purchase of a trust.10 16 The novel issue presented here is whether the entirety of a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust is subject to creditors’ claims where the trust is only partially self-funded by the beneficiary. There is no compelling Texas authority on this issue, but we conclude that on these facts Texas courts would surely hold that the partially self-funded spendthrift trust is only partially subject to creditors’ claims. 17 Allowing creditors to reach only the self-settled portion of the trust is consistent with the other long-standing rule of Texas law that a settlor should be allowed to create a spendthrift trust that shields trust assets from the beneficiary’s creditors. “Spendthrift trusts have long been held valid by Texas courts.”11 The bankruptcy court’s ruling ignores the wishes of Shurley’s parents, the primary settlors of the trust, and the state’s policy of respecting their expectations. “Spendthrift trusts are not sustained out of consideration for the beneficiary. Their justification is found in the right of the donor to control his bounty and secure its application according to his pleasure.”12 Allowing creditors to reach only that portion of the trust contributed by Shurley would further the policy of allowing her parents to create a spendthrift trust for the benefit of Shurley that is protected from her creditors, while giving effect to the exception for self-settled trusts. At least one court from another jurisdiction agrees with this this approach,13 and we believe that Texas courts would do the same. Accordingly we hold that the property which Shurley herself contributed to the trust–the Marfa ranch–is not protected from creditors under state law and is therefore property of the bankruptcy estate, but that all other assets of the trust are not property of the estate.14 18 We so hold despite Shurley’s “power of appointment” granted by the trust agreement. Under the agreement each sister has a right to allocate assets of the trust to specified beneficiaries. The agreement states that the sisters “shall each have a special power of appointment over an adjusted one-half (1/2) of the trust assets, to appoint such adjusted one-half (1/2) of the assets of said trust to and among their children and lineal descendants…. Neither [daughter] can appoint assets to herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her estate.” If a daughter does not exercise her power of appointment, the trust agreement provides that her interest shall be distributed in equal shares “to her children and lineal descendants, and to the lineal descendants of a deceased child, per stirpes.” Shurley represents on appeal that she has not exercised her special power of appointment because she is content with the trust’s distribution provisions for her descendants. 19 This power of appointment does not alter our conclusion that the Marfa ranch is property of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code expressly excludes such a power of appointment from the bankruptcy estate, since section 541(b)(1) provides that property of the estate does not include “any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor.” However, while the power of appointment to others does not become property of the estate under § 541(b)(1), the property which became part of the bankruptcy estate under the Code upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case now belongs to that estate and is controlled by the bankruptcy trustee. Regardless of how Shurley might indicate that trust assets should be divided upon her death, the Marfa ranch now belongs to the bankruptcy estate, and her designation of beneficiaries is irrelevant. The bankruptcy estate will be divided among creditors according to the Code, regardless of Shirley’s appointment of assets under the trust agreement. 20 The exercise of the power of appointment under the trust agreement is analogous to a will, and has no more effect on the property of the bankruptcy estate and creditor priorities than a garden-variety will of the debtor. With an ordinary will, the heirs only receive the stipulated items of the property that were owned by the testator. Stated more simply, a testator can only give away that which was hers. Here, the Marfa ranch no longer belongs to Shurley; it is property of the bankruptcy estate. 21 Shurley argues that she only has a life estate in the Marfa ranch and other trust assets in the form of an equitable interest in the income from the trust assets during her life, and that creditors therefore cannot reach the corpus of the trust even if it is self-settled. She is correct that absent distributions of corpus at the discretion of the trustee or a premature termination of the trust (discussed below), the trust agreement only provides her with an income interest in the trust assets, with the remainder going to other beneficiaries. Shurley cites authority that even when a settlor creates a trust for herself, creditors can only reach trust assets to the extent of the settlor’s interest.15 22 The issue here–whether the creditors can reach only Shurley’s income from the Marfa ranch or the ranch itself–does not turn on whether the Shurley’s interest in the trust is “equitable,” since the Bankruptcy Code defines property of the bankruptcy estate to include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property.”16 Resolution of this question turns on whether creditors can reach the trust corpus under state law, regardless of how the interest is characterized. 23 We conclude that under Texas law creditors can reach not only Shurley’s income from the Marfa ranch but the ranch itself, in light of Bank of Dallas v. Republic National Bank of Dallas.17 In Bank of Dallas, the debtor settled a trust with spendthrift language for the benefit of herself and her children. The debtor was to receive the net income of the trust during her lifetime, with the remainder going to her children or other beneficiaries named in her will. The trust agreement further provided that “[w]henever the trustee determines that the income of the Settlor from all sources known to the trustee is not sufficient for her reasonable support, comfort, and health and for reasonable support and education of Settlor’s descendants, the trustee may in its discretion pay to, or use for the benefit of, Settlor or one or more of Settlor’s descendants so much of the principal as the trustee determined to be required for those purposes.” 24 The court held that “where a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit, and inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing or future creditors are concerned, and they can reach his interest under the trust by garnishment.”18 It further held that income from the trust was subject to creditor claims, and that “the interest of [the debtor] in the trust is such that the corpus may be reached by her creditors.”19 25 The court considered the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 156 (1959), which provides: 26 (1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest. 27 (2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit. 28 The court also looked to comment e of this section, which states that “[w]here by the terms of the trust a trustee is to pay the settlor or apply for his benefit as much of the income or principal as the trustee may in his discretion determine, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee could pay to him or apply for his benefit.” Applying these rules the court held that the creditor could reach the corpus of the trust, even though the debtor only had a life interest in the trust. 29 By this reasoning the creditors are able to reach the self-settled asset of the trust in our case, namely the Marfa ranch. The trust agreement states that “[i]f the trustee determines that the net income of said trust is insufficient to maintain and support any of the beneficiaries of said trust or their children and lineal descendants in their accustomed manner of living, taking into account, however, such beneficiary’s income from all other sources, the trustee may use so much of the corpus of said trust as the trustee sees fit to make up such deficiency.” This language is even broader than the language of the trust agreement in Bank of Dallas, since in our case the trustee can make grants of trust corpus to support the beneficiaries’ or their descendants’ “accustomed manner of living,” while in Bank of Dallas the trustee was limited to making such distributions to support the beneficiary’s “reasonable support, comfort, and health” and the reasonable support and education her descendants. If anything, the former term grants even more discretion to the trustee than the latter. Accordingly we conclude that the creditors in our case can reach the corpus of the trust under Texas law as to that property–the Marfa ranch–contributed by Shurley to the trust, and that the ranch is therefore property of the estate. 30 The court in Bank of Dallas also quoted comment c to § 156, which states that “[i]f the settlor reserves for his own benefit not only a life interest but also a general power to appoint the remainder by deed or will or by deed only or by will alone, the creditors can reach the principal of the trust as well as the income.” In Bank of Dallas the debtor apparently had a general power to appoint the remaining trust assets by will, while in our case Shurley and her sister have a special power of appointment, meaning that the trust document limits the choice of recipients of appointed assets to the sisters’ descendants. We do not see this factual distinction as significant. Comment c was only one of three comments to § 156 (comments c, d, and e) quoted by the court in Bank of Dallas, and § 156 itself, as we read it, states than any self-settled support or discretionary trust is subject to creditor claims up to “the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to” the beneficiary. We cannot fathom why the court would have reached a different result if the debtor had had a special rather than a general power of appointment. Before even mentioning the Restatement, the court stated without qualification that, under Texas law, “where a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit, and inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing or future creditors are concerned, and they can reach his interest under the trust by garnishment.”20 31 A similar result was reached in State v. Nashville Trust Co.21 The debtor was the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust holding real estate. The debtor built a mansion on the property. The court held that the debtor had self-settled the trust to the extent of the improvements he had made, and that the property was therefore subject to the creditor’s claim to the extent of the debtor’s improvements. The debtor argued that even if he “can be held to have contributed to the trust property, enhanced its value, and to that extent created a spendthrift trust for his own benefit, only his interest in such enhancement, i.e. his life estate in such enhancement, may be subjected and that the remainder interest of his children … may not be subjected for any debt of his.”22 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the debtor’s children “could only be donees or volunteers and could take no benefits under such transfer as against his creditors. So we think the chancellor did not err against defendants in decreeing that the [creditor] had a right to subject the land for the amount by which its value had been enhanced by reason of the improvements.”23 The court held that the creditor was entitled to a lien on the trust property for the value of the debtor’s improvements, and that the creditor was “entitled to a sale of the land, if necessary, to enforce the lien.”24 32 Shurley argues that creditors cannot reach the corpus of the trust because of our decisions in In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.1983) (Goff I), and In re Goff, 812 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.1987) (Goff II ). In Goff I we held that the debtor’s Keogh plan, a pension trust under the ERISA statute,25 was not a spendthrift trust excluded from the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) because it was self-funded. We stated that “[t]he general rule is well established that if a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and inserts a ‘spendthrift’ clause, restraining alienation or assignment, it is void as far as creditors are concerned and they can reach the settlor’s interest in the trust.”26 33 In Goff II, a creditor claimed that its recorded judgment against the debtor gave it a statutory lien against the property held in the pension trust, and that it therefore had a secured bankruptcy claim. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the claim was unsecured. We held that the claim was unsecured, because under Texas law a judgment lien only attaches to real property in which the debtor has legal title, and the debtor only had equitable title to the real property in the trust. We stated that “[t]he trust remains valid; only the spendthrift clause is void, allowing creditors to reach the property held in trust by garnishment.”27 Goff II did not, as appellants argue, hold that creditors cannot reach the corpus of a self-funded trust with an invalid spendthrift clause. It held only that a judgment lien against the debtor did not create a secured claim against the assets of the trust. We have cited Goff II for the proposition that “[a] creditor can reach the trust assets” of a trust funded by the debtor-beneficiary.28 As with the Bryant Family Trust, the trust in question (1) contained a spendthrift clause, (2) provided the debtor with a life interest in the income, with the remainder going to other beneficiaries, and (3) provided that the trustee could invade the corpus of the trust for the debtor’s support, maintenance and welfare. 34 Shurley points out that when she made the original contribution of the Marfa ranch to the trust, it was subject to a note and lien. She argues that this lien should affect our analysis, but we disagree. There is no dispute that Shurley was the owner of the ranch when she conveyed it to the trust, even if it was encumbered with a lien. The note and lien may have affected the value of the property at the time the trust was funded, but they did not affect ownership of the property. When determining the property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Code looks to the debtor’s property “as of the commencement of the case.”29 It makes no more sense to look to the value of the ranch at the time of the creation of the trust than in does to look to the value of any other property of the debtor on the date of acquisition. If the debtor owns stock, bonds, real estate or other property, the original value or cost basis of those assets is irrelevant to the bankruptcy matter of defining the estate. Accordingly a lien on the ranch at the time of the trust’s creation does not alter our conclusion that the ranch is property of the bankruptcy estate. The ranch might have appreciated or depreciated in value for any number of reasons since 1965, including the balance on the note, but it is still property of the bankruptcy estate. 35 Shurley argues that there was no proof by appellees that she had any equity in the ranch at the time of creation of the trust, reasoning that she could not be a self-settlor if the property she contributed was worthless. Assuming that Shurley is legally correct–that a settlor’s contribution to a trust of real property in which she had no equity at the time of the trust’s creation does not fall within the self-settlor rule–the bankruptcy court found that she had equity in the property at the time of the creation of the trust in 1965.30 This fact finding is not clearly erroneous. Shurley purchased the ranch from her parents in 1950 for $131,366.64 and assumed a $50,000 balance on the note.31 The balance on the note was only $23,000 when the property was conveyed to the trust.32 Moreover, in the trust agreement itself, Shurley as a signatory represented that “the value of that portion of said real property to be contributed by [Shurley and her sister] each represents (1/6) of the total value of all of said real property to be contributed.” This declaration is an admission by Shurley that the property she contributed had some value, exceeding the balance on the note, since the trust assumed the note. B. Beneficiary Control 36 The bankruptcy court concluded that “[e]ither substantial control or self-settlement may operate to invalidate protective trust provisions.”33 It found that Shurley exercised too much control over the trust to qualify as the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. We find none of the reasons given persuasive.34 37 First, the court found that “Mrs. Shurley, in conjunction with her father during his life, had the power to revoke, alter, or amend the Trust document, or distribute the Trust assets back to the settlors.”35 We disagree. The agreement provides that “M.D. Bryant (the father) with the concurrence of either Settlor Anne Bryant Ridge or Settlor Jane Bryant Shurley, shall have the right at any time during his lifetime to revoke, alter and amend said trust and distribute the assets of said trust to the Settlors in the same proportion as the original contributions by each of said Settlor, taking into account any adjustment under paragraph (b).” The power to revoke or amend the trust was vested in the father, not the daughters. Shurley had no authority to alter the trust. She only had the authority to prevent her father from doing so, and only if she and her sister vetoed the change. At most therefore she and her sister in combination had the power to ensure the perpetuation of the trust. Further, this power lapsed upon the death of the father in 1967. We find no authority that such a limited power rendered the trust subject of creditor claims against the beneficiaries. 38 Second, the bankruptcy court noted that the agreement provided that Shurley had the right to petition three “special trustees” for the partial or complete termination of the trust. The agreement provides for the appointment of certain named special trustees, including a state judge, after the death of the parents. It states that “[u]pon application made by either daughter … or both, showing that termination would best serve the intended purpose of the trust, such Special Trustees shall in their sole and absolute discretion have the power and authority by unanimous consent to terminate in whole or in part and from time to time the trust or trusts established hereunder.” Again, this provision does not vest in Shurley the power to terminate or alter the trust. It only authorizes her to request such a change from special trustees, who have “in their sole and absolute discretion” the authority to alter the trust. Even absent such a provision, Shurley, like all Texas trust beneficiaries, had a statutory right to seek judicial modification or termination of the trust if “compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.”36 No court has ever held that such a statutory right renders a spendthrift trust subject to creditor claims. 39 Third, the bankruptcy court noted Shurley’s special power of appointment. This provision merely gave the daughters the authority to allocate trust assets to their descendants. It grants no authority to the daughters to allocate assets to themselves. As explained above, the Bankruptcy Code expressly excludes such a power of appointment from the bankruptcy estate. Section 541(b)(1) of the Code provides that property of the estate does not include “any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor.” 40 Aside from the terms of the trust agreement, the bankruptcy court found that Shurley had exercised de facto control over the trust. The court found: 41 Outside the Trust document, the Shurleys also manipulated Trust assets and governed the initial Trustee, Bryant Williams. The Shurleys were regularly able to obtain unrestricted corpus distributions and loans. While the Trust provides for such distributions, the liberality and circumstances under which they were requested and granted suggested a domination by M.D. Bryant, Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins of Mr. Williams. Only recently had any corpus distribution request been denied, and only recently had the successor Trustee, Mr. Armstrong, started to make only “loans,” to the exclusion of corpus distributions. Indeed, in the early days of the Trust, the initial Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, executed promissory notes as a comaker for the Shurleys. Part of the malleability of Bryant Williams may have arisen either from his fear of being replaced for failing to abide by the wishes of Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins, or from his close relationship with the family. While M.D. Bryant, the Shurleys and the Watkines may not have held all of the puppet strings to Mr. Williams, they held enough of them to exert the control necessary to defeat the Trust’s protective attributes.37 42 Shurley strongly denies that the evidence at trial supported these findings, arguing for example that there is no evidence that the first trustee ever made a single distribution of trust corpus or a single loan to Shurley or any other beneficiary. Appellees argue that in addition to the above-quoted findings, Shurley, among other things, “used the Trust income to induce extensions of credit to herself and her husband,” and “engaged in ‘trustee shopping’ to help further her control of the trust assets.”Even if these findings are taken as undisputed, they do not establish control by the daughters over the trust assets sufficient to make the trust subject to their creditors. The fact that the trustees liberally bestowed trust assets on the daughters, by itself, does not establish de facto control by the daughters over the affairs of the estate. The daughters were after all two of the principal beneficiaries of the trust, and distributions of the wealth of the the trust to the daughters is entirely consistent with its apparent purpose. The agreement provides that the trustee was not limited to distributing income generated from the corpus of the trust. As discussed above, it expressly authorized the trustee to make distributions from the trust corpus “[i]f the trustee determines that the net income of said trust is insufficient to maintain and support any of the beneficiaries of said trust or their children and lineal descendants in their accustomed manner of living….” It also expressly authorized the trustee to “loan money to … and otherwise deal with any and all persons” including “the beneficiaries of this trust.” 43 As one Texas decision has explained in denying a creditor’s claim against assets held by a spendthrift trust: 44 the purpose of such a trust is not defeated by the fact that the trustee is authorized in his discretion to apply a part of the corpus of the fund to the use of the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the trust. Neither is the purpose of such trust defeated by the fact that the trustee is authorized or even required to turn the entire trust fund or property over to the beneficiary absolutely at some fixed time in the future.38 45 Appellees did not establish that loans or grants from the trust to the daughters, on their face consistent with the purpose and language of the trust, amounted to de facto control of the trust by the daughters. Further, the fact that the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may have behaved as a spendthrift only shows the prescience of the settlors, and should not defeat the protective features of the trust. Appellees’ focus on the behavior of Shurley as beneficiary is misplaced, since as explained above, spendthrift trusts are not shielded from creditors “out of consideration for the beneficiary. Their justification is found in the right of the donor to control his bounty and secure its application according to his pleasure.”39 C. Whether the Trust Is an Annuity 46 By separate appeal Shurley argues that the bankruptcy court erred in denying her summary judgment motion urging that her interest in the trust is an “annuity” exempt from creditors under Texas law. 47 Under Texas law and Bankruptcy Code § 522, Texas debtors may elect either state or federal exemptions from creditors.40 Shurley’s claims that her interest in the trust is an annuity exempt from creditors under Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp.1997), which provides an exemption for “all money or benefits of any kind, including policy proceeds and cash values, to be paid or rendered to the insured or any beneficiary under any policy of insurance or annuity contract issued by a life, health or accident insurance company, including mutual and fraternal insurance, or under any plan or program of annuities and benefits in use by an employer or individual.” The emphasized language was added by a 1993 amendment to the statute, after Shurley filed for bankruptcy. 48 This argument fails for two reasons. First, her interest in the trust was not issued by an insurance company or employer, so the only conceivable claim of exemption is that her interest is part of a “plan or program of annuities and benefits in use by an … individual.” The reference to an individual was added to the statute after the bankruptcy filing. In determining exemptions we must apply the law in effect at the time the debtor entered bankruptcy.41 Although Texas exemption laws are liberally construed,42 the exemption Shurley claims simply did not exist at the commencement of her bankruptcy case. We cannot agree with Shurley that the 1993 amendment merely “clarified” legislative intent insofar as it added a reference to non-employer annuities that are not issued by insurance companies.43 The statute plainly did not apply to such annuities prior to the amendment. 49 Second, we do not believe that Shurley’s trust interest can be characterized as an annuity in any event. One Texas court has described an annuity as a “a form of investment which pays periodically during the life of the annuitant or during a term fixed by contract rather than on the occurrence of a future contingency.”44 We have cited this same definition with approval.45 While all annuities do not make payments in fixed, predetermined amounts,46 we do not believe that the term extends to a trust where future payments are highly contingent on the future circumstances of the beneficiaries. The trust agreement provides that the trustee “may” make distributions of trust corpus if he determines that such distributions are needed to “maintain and support any of the beneficiaries or their children or lineal descendants in their accustomed manner of living.” Any such good faith determination by the trustee is “final and binding on all interested parties.” Such distributions were in fact made. By design, such distributions are tied to contingencies unknown at the time of the creation of the trust, and are not consistent with the concept that an annuity makes payments without regard to “the occurrence of a future contingency.”47 In addition, under terms of the trust agreement discussed above, payments to Shurley were contingent on (1) the death of her parents, since her interest increased on the death of one parent and increased again on the death of the second parent, (2) whether the father, with the consent of either sister, chose to terminate the trust, and (3) whether the special trustees terminated the trust. 50 Further, Shurley’s argument simply proves too much, since if her interest in the trust is an annuity, then all beneficiaries of self-settled trusts could make the same argument, as long as the trust agreement called for periodic payments to the settlor for life or a fixed term. We cannot accept that the Texas legislature intended this result, which would reject the universally recognized rule, and one codified by Texas statute, that a settlor cannot create his own spendthrift trust and shield its assets from creditors. If the legislature had intended this result, it would have repealed Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 112.035(d), which provides that “[i]f the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest does not prevent his creditors from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust estate.” CONCLUSION 51 In summary, we conclude that the Marfa ranch and income generated therefrom is property of the estate.48 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 52 REVERSED and REMANDED. 1 The briefs indicate that the “Marfa Ranch” also refers to a larger tract of land out of which came the acreage Shurley contributed to the trust. In this opinion the “Marfa ranch” means only that acreage owned by Shurley and conveyed to the trust in 1965, together with any mineral interests she may have owned and conveyed to the trust 2 In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 789 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1994) 3 For convenience, appellants Shurley and the trustee of the trust are sometimes collectively referred to as Shurley 4 In re Herby’s Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 130-31 (5th Cir.1993) 5 11 U.S.C. § 541 6 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762, 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2248, 119 L.Ed.2d 519 (1992) (noting legislative history that § 541(c)(2) “continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor’s interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable State law.”); In re Moody, 837 F.2d 719, 722-23 (5th Cir.1988) (“A beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust is excluded from his bankruptcy estate by 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), if state law and the trust so provide.”) 7 Id. at 723 8 The agreement states: “The interest of the beneficiaries in the trust estate and the increase and proceeds thereof, both legal and equitable, so long as the same are held in trust, shall not be subject in any manner to any indebtedness, judgment, judicial process, creditors’ bills, attachment, garnishment, execution, receivership, charge, levy, seizure or encumbrance, of or against said beneficiaries; nor shall the interest of the beneficiaries in said trust be in any manner reduced or affected by any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale, encumbrance, act, omission or mishap, voluntary or involuntary, anticipatory or otherwise of said beneficiaries….” 9 Id. at 723. See also Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (“In Texas, a settlor cannot create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit and have the trust insulated from the rights of creditors.”); Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 112.035(d) (“If the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest does not prevent his creditors from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust estate.”) 10 Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 11 Moody, 837 F.2d at 723 12 Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1958, no writ) 13 In re Johannes Trust, 191 Mich.App. 514, 479 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1991) (“[The self-settlor’s] creditors can reach the assets of the trust and compel payment in the maximum amount that would be in the trustee’s discretion with respect to that portion of the assets that came from [the self-settlor], but not with respect to any portion of the trust that came from other individuals, particularly petitioner.”) 14 We note that the Marfa ranch was still held by the trust when Shurley commenced her bankruptcy case. If the ranch had been sold, prior to the bankruptcy filing, this case would be more complicated. We would still hold that some portion of Shurley’s interest in the trust was self-settled and therefore property of the estate, but would have to engage in a further analysis of (1) how to value the self-settled portion of the trust, through tracing of assets or some other method of calculating Shurley’s proportionate contribution to the trust relative to the other settlors’ contributions, and (2) who should have the burden of proof on this issue 15 E.g., Fordyce v. Fordyce, 80 Misc.2d 909, 365 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1974) (“Even in the case of a self-settled trust, creditors can only reach the interest the settlor retained for himself.”) 16 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 17 540 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 18 Id. at 501 19 Id. at 501-02 20 Bank of Dallas, 540 S.W.2d at 501 21 28 Tenn.App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944) 22 Id. 190 S.W.2d at 791 23 Id. at 792 24 Id. at 799 25 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq 26 Goff I, 706 F.2d at 587. The principal holding of the case–that a qualified ERISA pension plan is not excluded from the bankruptcy estate because the federal ERISA statute is not “applicable nonbankruptcy law” under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)–was expressly overruled in Patterson, 504 U.S. at 757 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2246 n. 1 (citing Goff I ) 27 Goff II, 812 F.2d at 933 28 In re Latham, 823 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir.1987) 29 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 30 Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-79 n. 5 31 Shurley paid only $200 down for the ranch, and executed 25 separate promissory notes to her parents, which were annually forgiven by the parents 32 The note was subsequently paid off by the trust 33 Shurley, 171 B.R. at 782 34 We assume without deciding that the court was legally correct in concluding that “substantial control” can render a spendthrift or other protective trust subject to creditor claims. We note however that we do not believe that appellees have cited any Texas authority for this proposition 35 Id. at 783 36 Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 112.054 (Vernon 1995) 37 Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783 38 Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673, 679 (1923) 39 Hines v. Sands 312 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1958, no writ) 40 In re Walden, 12 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir.1994) 41 Walden, 12 F.3d at 449 n. 7. In so holding, Walden was interpreting the same state statute at issue here, Insurance Code art. 21.22 42 Id. at 448 43 We assume without deciding that Shurley is correct that an annuity under the current statute can be issued by an entity other than an insurance company. But see art. 21.22(6) (“For purposes of regulation under this code, an annuity contract issued by a life, health, or accident insurance company, including a mutual company or fraternal company, or under any plan or program of annuities or benefits in use by an employer or individual, shall be considered a policy or contract on insurance.”). Texas, like all states, comprehensively regulates insurers and insurance policies 44 Steves & Sons, Inc. v. House of Doors, Inc., 749 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (quoting In re Howerton, 21 B.R. 621 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1982)) 45 In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting Howerton ) 46 With a variable annuity, “payments to the purchaser vary with investment performance.” NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254, 115 S.Ct. 810, 812, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995) 47 Steves & Sons, 749 S.W.2d at 175 48 Income from the ranch belongs to the estate because the Bankruptcy Code defines property of the estate to include “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)